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The Circumstances of the Offence:
The Post-Ipeelee Sentencing of Indigenous Offenders for Manslaughter
in the Superior Courts

Abstract
Precisely how section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code – the so-called Gladue provisions – is meant
to apply to the sentencing of serious and violent crimes has remained an open question for two
decades. This paper utilizes a comparative analysis of the sentencing of Indigenous and nonIndigenous offenders for manslaughter in the superior courts of Ontario, western Canada and the
territories in an attempt to answer that question. It compares the outcomes for Indigenous and nonIndigenous offenders sentenced for manslaughter in the six years following the Supreme Court of
Canada’s decision in Ipeelee to determine whether there is a different sentencing regime in
operation for Indigenous offenders with respect to this offence and, if so, what outcomes that
regime produced. The central conclusion of this paper is that a beneficial outcome attributable to
the operation of the Gladue provisions occurred primarily in manslaughter offences where the
intoxication of the offender played a central role. This suggests that sentencing judges found their
way to applying the Gladue provisions most frequently where the offences themselves fit a pattern
aligning with prevailing views around Indigenous offending and the consumption of alcohol or
other intoxicants.
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Lay Summary
There is perceived to be a crisis of over-representation among Indigenous people in Canada’s
prison population. In the mid-1990s, Parliament added section 718.2(e) to the Criminal Code in
an attempt to address this by encouraging alternatives to incarceration for Indigenous offenders.
This section of the Criminal Code is commonly referred to as the Gladue provisions, after the
Supreme Court of Canada decision that first interpreted its application. How the provisions are
meant to apply to offenders sentenced for serious and violent offences has remained an open
question for sentencing judges. This paper attempts to answer that question by comparing
sentencing decisions for manslaughter between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders over a
six-year period following the Supreme Court of Canada’s most recent decision related to the
provisions in R v Ipeelee. This research examined superior court decisions to determine if
Indigenous offenders were treated differently at sentencing and, if so, what differences in sentence
outcome arose as a result. The central conclusion of this paper is that Indigenous offenders are
most likely to see a beneficial outcome result from the application of the provisions where
intoxication played a central role in the commission of the offence. This suggests that sentencing
judges applied the provisions most frequently where the offences themselves aligned with
prevailing views around Indigenous offending and the consumption of alcohol or other intoxicants.
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Chapter One: Introduction
1. Introduction
Jamie Tannis Gladue, James Wells and Manasie Ipeelee were all intoxicated when they
committed the crimes that eventually brought them to the Supreme Court of Canada. Alcohol was
a factor each time the Supreme Court has entertained the application of s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal
Code to sentencing. Alcoholism among Canada’s Indigenous peoples has destroyed communities
and countless individual lives. There is nothing fresh in that observation and this research
contributes nothing to addressing that problem. What it does suggest is that where an offender has
consumed large amounts of alcohol or other intoxicants, sentencing judges will be more apt to see
a path to allowing the Gladue provisions to impact upon sentence.
In brief, the research conducted for this paper suggests that incidents of manslaughter that
are defined to a substantial degree by an offender’s state of intoxication will tend to receive more
favourable treatment at sentencing. Through an analysis of nearly two hundred sentencing
decisions in Canada’s superior courts over the preceding six years, this research indicates that
those manslaughters committed by an offender in a state of serious intoxication are both more
likely to produce sentencing decisions that are conducted in such a way that they address an
Indigenous offender’s heritage and more likely to produce lower sentences than comparably
situated non-Indigenous offenders. This diverges from manslaughter sentencing where the
presence of intoxication is not seen to be a major factor in commission of the offence. In those
cases, Indigenous offenders not only see a reduced likelihood of an Indigenous-focused sentencing
methodology, they are also more likely to attract longer sentences than similarly-situated nonIndigenous offenders.
While this is certainly a benefit to those Indigenous people who were intoxicated while
they committed an act of manslaughter, it does not serve to further the remedial aim of reducing
the overrepresentation of Indigenous peoples in prisons more broadly which was the goal of the
Gladue provisions in the first instance. Thirty years ago, a report prepared originally for the
Canadian Bar Association summed up the proposition that arguably still informs the sentencing of
Indigenous people today:
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Put at its baldest, there is an equation of being drunk, Indian and in prison. Like
many stereotypes, this one has a dark underside. It reflects the view of native people
as uncivilized and without coherent social or moral order. The stereotype prevents
us from seeing native people as equals. The fact that the stereotypical view of native
people is no longer reflected in official government policy does not negate its power
in the popular imagination and its influence in shaping the decisions of the police,
prosecutors, judges and prison officials.1
This is a stark assessment of the criminal justice system’s view of Indigenous people in Canada.
The truth can be ugly, particularly in a country that prides itself on being enlightened. Thirty years
later attitudes towards Indigenous peoples have improved, but stereotypes remain durable. In the
sentencing courts today, it may not be assumed that all First Nations, Inuit and Métis offenders are
amoral and driven by substance abuse. However, this research suggests that the stereotype persists.
The figure of the ‘drunk Indian’ who was once condemned for his inability to control his actions
while intoxicated is now more likely to see a benefit, at least in sentencing for manslaughter. The
sober Indigenous offender by contrast loses that benefit. It appears that the path to the application
of the Gladue provisions to the sentencing of offenders for serious and violent crime continues to
run through old stereotypes.

2. Central Question
The central question this paper addresses is how the courts are treating Gladue when they
are sentencing offenders for serious and violent crimes. How the Gladue provisions should
manifest themselves in the sentencing of offenders for serious and violent crime has long been an
open question. Since the Parliamentary debates on Bill C-41, the provisions have been viewed by
some critics as little more than an attempt to “sneak through the back door a parallel system of
justice for Aboriginals.”2 This paper seeks to answer the related questions of what methods the
courts use to address Indigenous offending in serious and violent crime and how precisely these
methods manifest themselves in sentence outcomes. In order to address these questions, this paper
employs a comparative analysis of manslaughter sentencing decisions between Indigenous and
non-Indigenous offenders as well as different categories of manslaughter. The aim was to assess

1

Michael Jackson, “Locking Up Natives in Canada,” (1989) 23:2 UBC L Rev 215, at 218.
Carmela Murdocca, To Right Historical Wrongs: Race, Gender, and Sentencing in Canada (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2013) at 60-61.
2
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whether there was an identifiable difference in sentence outcomes for Indigenous offenders
compared to non-Indigenous offenders sentenced for the same offence. If such a difference was
evident, the project sought to resolve the questions of whether that difference was attributable to
the operation of the Gladue provisions and how precisely such operations manifested themselves.
As noted above, the evidence analyzed here suggests that across the different categories of
manslaughters identified there is some difference in sentence outcomes for Indigenous and nonIndigenous offenders and that a beneficial operation of the provisions is more likely to be found
where an Indigenous offender was intoxicated while committing the offence.
At the outset of this research it was assumed that in cases of serious and violent crime,
where the Gladue provisions were found to impact sentence, this would be in the form of a
reduction in sentence. The research has borne this out to an extent. The most frequent manifestation
of sentence impact attributable to the operation of the Gladue provisions did come in the form of
a reduction in sentence when compared with non-Indigenous offenders and with Indigenous
offenders who appeared not to have benefitted from an impact of the provisions. This was not the
only manner in which the provisions were found to impact upon sentence outcome. There were
also decisions in which the judge determined that in order for the provisions to have their intended
remedial effect, the offender would be required to spend time in a penitentiary so they could benefit
from the programming in the federal system geared towards Indigenous offenders. In the course
of writing this paper, the definition of what constitutes an impact upon sentence expanded to
address the evidence derived from the decisions themselves.

3. Methodology
This paper approaches its subject matter from the doctrinal school of legal research.3 The
purpose is first to analyze how the Gladue provisions are designed to function by the legislation
that created them and the Supreme Court jurisprudence that interpreted them and second to
determine how the provisions were being applied in practice to sentencing offenders for serious
and violent crime. Indigenous peoples and their interactions with the criminal justice system in
Canada is an expansive topic. Even the question of sentencing Indigenous persons potentially
invites inquiry into a wide variety of historical and sociological phenomena such as settler
3

Terry Hutchinson, “The Doctrinal Method: Incorporating Interdisciplinary Methods in Reforming the Law,” 83
Erasmus L Rev 130 (2015) at 131.
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colonialism and institutional and systemic racism. The potential exists to bring in interdisciplinary
approaches from varied fields of academic inquiry ranging from feminism and criminology to
history and critical race theory. This paper is not concerned with those broader questions, as
interesting and important as those areas of inquiry are. It opts instead for a narrow focus on how a
particular provision of the Criminal Code aimed at ameliorating the levels of Indigenous
overrepresentation in Canada’s prisons has functioned in practice for those offenders who have
been convicted of serious and violent crimes.
The first part of this paper deals with the jurisprudence and scholarship around Gladue and
its application in theory. The core of this paper is a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the
effects of the Gladue provisions on sentencing manslaughter in the trial courts. There is value in
quantitative assessments of sentencing decisions. The Supreme Court in Wells cautioned that
“[t]here is no sense comparing the sentence that a particular Aboriginal offender would receive to
the sentence that some hypothetical non-Aboriginal offender would receive.”4 While this may be
true in terms of determining a given sentence, in analyzing the practice of sentencing such a
comparison does have a merit. Clayton Ruby has written that “few crimes are truly original” and
“their characteristic features repeat themselves with appalling regularity.”5 That idea underlies the
research conducted for this paper. The Indigenous offenders in this study are being compared to
actual rather than hypothetical non-Indigenous offenders to determine whether there are
differences in sentence outcome that can be attributed to the Gladue provisions.
It is trite law that sentencing is an individualized process and that the determination of a fit
sentence is to be made with reference to the circumstances of the particular offender and the
particular offence. With that in mind, there are only so many ways in which any crime can
manifest. Despite the fact that each offender has walked a distinct path to arrive where they find
themselves at sentencing, the similarities between offenders and offences are frequently striking.
This analysis is premised on the idea that given sufficient numbers of offenders - both Indigenous
and non-Indigenous - sentencing decisions can be examined comparatively and generalizations
can be made about sentencing outcomes. The information derived from a large scale comparative
sentencing analysis can be used to answer the broad question of what outcomes are being produced

4
5

R v Wells, 2000 SCC 10 at para 86.
Clayton Ruby, Sentencing, Ninth Edition. (Toronto: Lexis Nexis, 2017) at 239.
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from the application of this particular Criminal Code provision to a single offence at one level of
court across Canada.

3. Organization
This paper is divided into six chapters including this one. Chapter two deals with the
legislative and jurisprudential framework that gives the Gladue provisions their form. It then
examines the scholarship and earlier empirical assessments of the operation of the provisions. This
chapter concludes with a survey of the operation of the provisions in practice across Canada
examining Gladue Reports, the application of the provisions in the courts, community alternatives
for Indigenous offenders, the correctional system, and provincial and federal prosecutorial
policies. Chapter three deals with sentencing in general and manslaughter sentencing in particular.
It begins with an outline of the structure of the sentencing regime in Canada. The balance of the
chapter deals with the sentencing of manslaughter in Canada with a particular focus on the different
regimes operating in the provinces and territories under discussion.
Chapter four outlines the plan of the case study in detail and provides a general overview
of the information drawn from the manslaughter decisions. It then breaks down this information
by analyzing the different categories of manslaughter and the different jurisdictions, it concludes
with a comparison between the sentencing of the two largest categories of manslaughter and the
treatment of Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders in those categories. Chapter five deals first
with answering the question of how different methodologies manifest in the sentencing of
Indigenous offenders and their rates of occurrence. It then considers how the Gladue provisions
impact upon sentence outcomes before concluding with an assessment of why different
methodologies are employed and different rates of sentence impact are found among different
categories of manslaughter. This paper concludes in chapter six with a brief assessment of how
different actors in the criminal justice system might ensure that the remedial aspects of the
provisions have a greater impact on sentence outcomes for Indigenous offenders.
The central conclusion of this paper is that where an Indigenous offender is sentenced for
a manslaughter involving serious intoxication, they are both more likely to be sentenced according
to a different methodology than non-Indigenous offenders in that category and they are more likely
to see the Gladue provisions impact upon sentence outcome than those Indigenous offenders
whose crimes were not defined by intoxication.
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Chapter Two: The Landscape of Gladue
1. Legislation and Jurisprudence
The Gladue principles have their origins in Bill C-41 introduced in 1995 with the aim of
codifying sentencing practices in Canada. Part of this legislation was section 718.2(e) of the
Criminal Code – the Gladue provisions.1 The provisions require:
718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the
following principles:
(e) all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the
circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community
should be considered for all offenders, with particular reference to the
circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.2
Since its passage this provision has expanded into many different areas of criminal law such as
bail,3 parole,4 extradition5 and review board hearings6 but its initial interpretation extended only to
sentencing.7
The Supreme Court of Canada first interpreted the provision in the course of a sentence
appeal from Jamie Tannis Gladue for the manslaughter of her common-law spouse in 1999. In R
v Gladue,8 the Court determined that Indigenous people face distinct circumstances compared with
non-Indigenous people and Parliament had determined that they should be subject to a different
method of determining sentence. The Court took Parliament’s intention to be a remedial one and
understood the provisions as meant expressly to reduce the over-incarceration of Indigenous
offenders.9 Writing for a unanimous court, Cory and Iacobucci JJ determined that there were two
considerations peculiar to sentencing Indigenous offenders:

1

Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46.
Ibid s. 718.2(e).
3
R v Robinson, 2009 ONCA 205.
4
Twins v Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FC 537.
5
United States v Leonard, 2012 ONCA 622, leave to appeal to SCC refused.
6
R v Sim, [2005] OJ No 4432.
7
Jonathan Rudin, Indigenous People and the Criminal Justice System: A Practitioner’s Handbook. (Toronto:
Emond Montgomery, 2019) at 146-194.
8
[1999] 1 SCR 688 [Gladue].
9
Ibid at para 33.
2
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(A) The unique systemic or background factors which may have played a role in
bringing the particular aboriginal offender before the court; and
(B) The types of sentencing procedures which may be appropriate in the
circumstances for the offender because of his or her particular aboriginal
heritage or connection.10
Section 718.2(e) would be applied in light of these considerations: systemic and background
factors and appropriate types of sentencing procedures and sanctions.
The Supreme Court held that sentencing judges had no discretion as to whether or not the
provisions would apply. Instead their sole discretion lay with the determination of a fit sentence
for the individual before the court.11 As a corollary to this limitation on discretion, the degree to
which an individual was connected to any particular Indigenous community would not be a bar to
the application of the provisions as Indigenous people living off-reserve continue to be closely
connected to their culture.12 At sentencing, the duty to adduce evidence of the relevant factors for
the consideration of the sentencing judge lay with counsel and should counsel fail in their duties,
it would fall to judges themselves to ensure that the information was brought before the courts.13
Though the decision did not contain specific procedures for determining sentence or
suggestions for alternative sanctions, it was straightforward: the determination of a fit sentence for
Indigenous offenders was a bifurcated process and was universal in its application. However, there
was one paragraph in the decision that would be used frequently by sentencing judges and cited
disproportionately by appellate courts in applying the provisions.14 The Court added:
Yet, even where an offence is considered serious, the length of the term of
imprisonment must be considered. In some circumstances the length of the sentence
of an aboriginal offender may be less and in others the same as that of any other
offender. Generally, the more violent and serious the offence the more likely it is
as a practical reality that the terms of imprisonment will be closer to each other or
the same, even taking into account their different concepts of sentencing.15

10

Ibid at para 66.
Ibid at para 82.
12
Ibid at para 91.
13
Ibid at paras 83-4.
14
Kent Roach, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: Gladue at Ten and in the Courts of Appeal,” 54 Crim LQ 470
(2008-2009) at 472.
15
Gladue, supra note 8 at para 79.
11
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The Supreme Court would later clarify that this “was not meant to be a principal of universal
application.”16 Regardless, until 2012 when the Court in R v Ipeelee17 dispensed with the notion
that the provisions would not apply to sentencing offenders for serious and violent crime,
sentencing and appeal courts would continue to cite that passage for the proposition that
Indigenous status did not need to be considered for such cases. As detailed below, after the
Supreme Court held that Gladue considerations must be analyzed in every case, there remains
uncertainty among sentencing judges and appeal courts as to which alternative sanctions might be
applied to sentencing of offenders for serious and violent crimes. This remains one of the primary
conceptual hurdles in the exercise of the provisions and no convincing answers have so far been
supplied by the courts.
In summarizing its conclusions in Gladue, the Court made several other points that
continue to inform the interpretation of the provisions, in particular their direction that where
“there is no alternative to incarceration the length of the term must be carefully considered” while
cautioning that “it not to be taken as a means of automatically reducing the prison sentence of
aboriginal offenders.”18 With respect to the Indigenous worldview of crime and punishment, the
Court ended its judgement by suggesting it was “unreasonable to assume that aboriginal peoples
do not believe in the importance of traditional sentencing goals such as deterrence, denunciation,
and separation, where warranted.”19
The year after the Gladue decision, the Supreme Court returned to the question of how s.
718.2(e) was meant to apply in Wells. The Court stated that “the guidelines set out in Gladue…
are not intended to provide a single test for a sentencing judge to apply in determining a reasonable
sentence in the circumstances. Section 718.2(e) imposes an affirmative duty on the sentencing
judge to take into account the surrounding circumstances of the offender, including the nature of
the offence, the victim and the community.”20 Of key importance in Wells, were the effects that s.
718.2(e) was meant to have on the outcome of sentence. Justice Iacobucci, writing for the Court,
emphasized in his reasons “that s. 718.2(e) requires a different methodology for assessing a fit
sentence for an aboriginal offender; it does not mandate a different result.”21 This meant that trial
16

R v Wells, 2000 SCC 10 [Wells].
2012 SCC 13 [Ipeelee].
18
Gladue, supra note 8 at para 93.
19
Ibid at para 93.
20
Wells, supra note 16 at para 41.
21
Ibid at para 44.
17
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courts were obliged to sentence Indigenous offenders differently not necessarily to arrive at a
different sentence. As established in Gladue, in order to engage in this process judges would
require information about the offender and their background. Here, the Court determined that there
was an affirmative obligation on the part of the trial judge to inquire into the relevant circumstances
of an Indigenous offender in the event that counsel fails to do so.22
In response to the apparent reluctance of the judiciary to apply the considerations to the
sentencing of offenders for serious and violent offences, the Supreme Court addressed these issues
once more in Ipeelee. This decision has been seen as a repudiation of judges who had restrained
the application of Gladue and limited its application to non-serious criminal matters.23 The
Supreme Court admonished sentencing judges that they “have a duty to apply s. 718.2(e).”24 The
application of the provisions was a statutory duty and declining to consider them:
would also result in a sentence that was not fit and was not consistent with the
fundamental principle of proportionality. Therefore application of the Gladue
principles is required in every case involving an Aboriginal offender… and a failure
to do so constitutes an error justifying appellate intervention.25
The Court justified this by saying that the consideration of background and systemic factors in the
first plank of Gladue dealt with the moral blameworthiness of the offender. The effects of
colonialism wrought on Indigenous communities would inform this consideration. The Court
explained held that:
Canadian criminal law is based on the premise that criminal liability only follows
from voluntary conduct. Many Aboriginal offenders find themselves in situations
of social and economic deprivation with a lack of opportunities and limited options
for positive development. While this rarely – if ever – attains a level where one
could properly say that their actions were not voluntary and therefore not deserving
of criminal sanction, the reality is that their constrained circumstances may
diminish their moral culpability.26

22

Ibid at para 54.
Jonathan Rudin, “Looking Backward, Looking Forward: The Supreme Court of Canada’s Decision in R. v.
Ipeelee,” 57 SCLR 375 (2012) at 381.
24
Ipeelee, supra note 17 at para 85 [Emphasis in original].
25
Ibid at para 87.
26
Ibid at para 73 [Emphasis in original].
23
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The Court, in their restatement of Gladue, held that the provisions must be considered for all
Indigenous offenders and the background and systemic factors speak directly to the moral
blameworthiness of the offender.
The Supreme Court emphasized that s. 718.2(e) was aimed at the over-incarceration of
Indigenous persons. As a consequence, the framework from Gladue required that alternatives to
incarceration be employed wherever possible. Sentencing judges, the Court wrote:
can endeavour to reduce crime rates in Aboriginal communities by imposing
sentences that effectively deter criminality and rehabilitate offenders. These are
codified objectives of sentencing. To the extent that current practices do not further
these objectives, those practices must change so as to meet the needs of Aboriginal
offenders and their communities.27
This indicated to judges that to comply with the second stage of the Gladue framework, they should
look to develop alternative sentencing procedures for Indigenous offenders in order to give form
to the provisions.
While establishing the principles from Gladue with greater clarity, Ipeelee failed to provide
guidance for its application at sentencing in respect of either serious or non-serious crimes. The
Court declared that section 718.2 (e) did not “create a race-based discount on sentencing.”28
Neither did it provide further guidance for its application or suggest what form appropriate
alternatives might take. It is evident from the decisions that the Court did not want to create an
Indigenous sentencing framework. Absent action from Parliament on this issue, the justices
seemed content to return the issue to sentencing judges and appellate courts to work out the details.

2. Scholarship
This is a narrow area of study and one dominated by a handful of law and criminology
professors. There is scant scholarly opposition to the provisions as most writers favour them,
however many question the manner in which they have manifested in practice. Most prominent
among these scholars are Jonathan Rudin29 and Kent Roach.30 Between them they have authored

27

Ibid at para 66.
Ibid at para 75.
29
Program Director at Aboriginal Legal Services Toronto and law professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, York
University.
30
Law professor at the University of Toronto.
28
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a third of the articles discussed here. If there is an opposing school of thought, it is the sentencing
judges who cannot see how to apply the provisions to the sentencing of offenders for serious and
violent crime in practice. Scholarship is largely concerned with this failure and how it can be
improved upon. This is supplemented by limited empirical research conducted to determine the
function of the provisions in practice. Early scholarly reactions to Gladue discuss many issues that
continue to trouble their application to serious crime. Some considerations in these early works
are moot, as there are now more limited options since conditional sentences were made unavailable
for serious bodily harm offences.31
Roach and Rudin offered their first assessment of the Gladue decision in 2000 where they
identified most points of contention going forward.32 They argue that the decision holds promise
for remedying the over-representation of Indigenous persons in the prison system but see barriers
to its implementation. First, there are a lack of community resources available to aid in the
rehabilitation of Indigenous offenders and a similar lack of culturally-relevant correctional
resources; second, there is lingering uncertainty about its application to the sentencing of offenders
for serious and violent crimes.
Rudin and Roach suggested that the limited nature of Indigenous-specific programming
available, particularly within Indigenous communities themselves would restrain the ability of
judges to offer innovation and result in a continued reliance on custodial sentences.33 For a
specialized regime of Indigenous sentencing to function properly, they argue, resources will have
to be increased at the front end to allow counsel and court workers to handle the new regime.34
Finally, Rudin and Roach were troubled by Gladue’s implication that the provisions were not
intended to apply to the sentencing of offenders for serious and violent crimes, arguing this violated
proportionality which the Criminal Code identifies as the fundamental principle of sentencing.35
This paper was remarkably insightful, correctly identifying most of the pitfalls subsequently
encountered by the criminal justice system in practice.
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In a similar vein, Renée Pelletier36 argued that the legal analysis provided by the Supreme
Court failed to recognize the provisions’ distinct purpose of furnishing alternatives to incarceration
and would therefore limit its effective application.37 Pelletier contends that the distinction between
serious and non-serious crimes is inappropriate and does not exist in law.38 She argues the Court
is wrong in suggesting that denunciation and deterrence are aligned with Indigenous concepts of
justice or that Indigenous people agree with many of the purposes of sentencing outlined in the
Criminal Code.39 Pelletier criticized the Supreme Court for its failure to appreciate the impacts of
colonialism and argued that the situation would worsen by relying on traditional aggravating and
mitigating factors at sentencing.40 In her view, counsel are inadequately trained to deal with these
issues and will receive no help from a system where Indigenous-specific pre-sentence reports are
not available and where funding for them is unlikely to be forthcoming.41
These criticisms, like those of Rudin and Roach, proved prescient. Pelletier’s analysis of
the failure to focus on colonialism is apt and remains a substantial issue even post-Ipeelee, however
her insistence that no classification of crime as serious can exist without Parliamentary approval
is specious. Given the broad discretion provided to sentencing judges and the wide range of
activities covered by individual Criminal Code offences, seriousness is clearly a consideration in
virtually any sentencing, notwithstanding the absence of a formal legislative classification. In fact,
Justice Iacobucci noted in Wells that “whether a crime is serious in the given circumstances is, in
my opinion, a factual matter that can only be determined on a case-by-case basis.”42
One of few critiques of the provisions themselves came from Phillip Stenning43 and Julian
V. Roberts44 in 2001. In a controversial article they suggested the crisis of Indigenous
overrepresentation was a fiction and that the Supreme Court had failed to offer evidence of a causal
relationship between sentencing and overrepresentation.45 Interpreting various studies, Stenning
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and Roberts argued there was no evidence that Indigenous people received more or longer
sentences, suggesting instead that they received shorter sentences in spite of longer criminal
records.46 They contend that the social conditions outlined by the Court in Gladue affect other
groups equally and should be ordinary considerations in the sentencing of any offender.47 In their
view, this attempt to redress historical injustice “amounts to hijacking the sentencing process.”48
While they argue that the provisions were meant to have no effect on serious crimes, in their view
the only way for them to manifest is as a sentencing discount, particularly since the Court has
provided judges with no guidance to steer their implementation.49
Stenning and Roberts’ final assessment of the provisions and the decision is bleak, arguing
it offers “little more than an empty promise to Aboriginal people and a bitter pill for sentencing
judges who struggle to do the right thing, but become daily more aware of their powerlessness in
the face of a situation far beyond their control.”50 This blunt assessment is the harshest offered by
any scholar but elements of it remain apparent in the frustrations of many academics. Despite their
dismissal of the scope of the crisis, Stenning and Roberts properly diagnosed the practical issues
with the decision and its application.
In reaction to Stenning and Roberts, there was a special issue of the Saskatchewan Law
Review in which other scholars responded to their views. Jean-Paul Brodeur51 took issue with their
statistics but reserved his harshest criticisms for their refusal to acknowledge the unique nature of
Indigenous social issues. Taken in their proper context, he argued, it is clear that Indigenous people
are the most adversely affected by these issues, their communities are the most forlorn and
devastated and they have suffered from the longest history of discrimination of any marginalized
group in Canada.52
In the same issue, Rudin and Roach also rejected Stenning and Roberts’ claims. They
argue that limitations in their data rendered meaningful conclusions impossible.53 That sentencing
is not the cause of overrepresentation is irrelevant to Rudin and Roach, who point out that
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sentencing is traditionally used to resolve issues not themselves caused by sentencing.54 For them,
colonialism should be central to any consideration of the rationale behind section 718.2(e), since
its purpose is to reduce overrepresentation in the prison system.55 Finally, they argue that if the
desire is to reduce incarceration of Indigenous people, the focus should be on restraint in
sentencing.56
Another avenue of criticism of the Gladue factors relates to their philosophical
underpinnings. Following Ipeelee, Jeanette Govikoglu57 criticized the Gladue framework arguing
that the emphasis on sentencing ignored the wider societal problems bringing Indigenous people
before the courts.58 She claims the Supreme Court denies power and autonomy to Indigenous
peoples by constructing them as victims and reducing the voluntary nature of their conduct.59 By
concentrating on an Indigenous offender’s reduced moral blameworthiness, she contends the
Supreme Court is suggesting that voluntariness is reduced by trauma and so frames Indigenous
peoples in the same manner as youthful offenders and the mentally ill.60 In what she calls a “new
essentialism,” Gevikoglu argues that these ideas serve only to reinforce historical stereotypes.61
By conflating Indigenous concepts of “healing” with restorative justice, she maintains that the
Court is making Western concepts part of the Indigenous worldview. She suggests that real
solutions to the issue are properly located in addressing claims to self-government and Indigenous
approaches to criminal justice.62 In her view, these concerns are rarely remarked upon by scholars
and judges.
Ten years after Gladue, Kent Roach analyzed its interpretation in the courts of appeal.63
With the initial controversy over, the provinces and territories were in the process of erecting the
infrastructure to implement the decision.64 Roach noted substantial regional variation but identified
some commonalities. In his view, the courts of appeal were unwilling to extend the application to
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the sentencing of offenders for serious and violent crimes. He credited this phenomenon in part to
successful Crown appeals restraining innovation by trial judges.65 Roach identified a nearuniversal unwillingness by appeal courts to extend alternatives to imprisonment to serious
offences.66 While this analysis was conducted pre-Ipeelee, his subsequent research indicates that
there has been little innovation related to the sentencing of offenders for serious and violent
offences in the intervening decade.67 It may be unfair to place too much criticism at the feet of
appeal courts. After all, they are tasked with applying the law as it exists and if trial courts are
unable to produce decisions that satisfy the relevant aspects of the law, appeal courts will not
endorse them.
In his own assessment after a decade before the courts, Jonathan Rudin suggested there
was reason for optimism, though reliance on incarceration continued to treat symptoms rather than
underlying conditions.68 While acknowledging that Gladue was not useful in crafting a different
sentencing methodology, Rudin argues that this ignores how law reform is done.69 He suggests
that legislatures have abdicated their responsibilities to the courts and this, combined with public
indifference, limits the potential for change.70 Judicial creativity will not be possible without
increased resources and for sentencing methodologies and procedures to change, governments will
have to allocate resources to alternatives and the courts will have to modify procedures to
recognize a different reality. This paper addresses the core issue in respect of the sentencing of
offenders for serious and violent crimes. Courts are extremely limited in their capacity to create
sanctions not outlined explicitly by law and absent actions by government, there can be no
meaningful law reform based solely on a suggestion to reduce over-incarceration in one section of
the Criminal Code.
In 2019, Kent Roach again examined the impact of Ipeelee in the courts of appeal.71 He
argues that one “of the purposes of Ipeelee was to bring greater national uniformity to sentencing
practices,” but that the independence granted to appeal courts “combined with the deference given
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to trial judges allow considerable divergence in sentencing practices.”72 Professor Roach found
that outcomes were “mixed but run to negative,” explaining that:
On the one hand, the increasing willingness among some Courts of Appeal to relate
Gladue background factors to an offender’s moral blameworthiness follows from
the Court’s clear signal in Ipeelee and is in my view a positive development. At the
same time, however, the appellate engagement with moral blameworthiness
analysis has generally been superficial in the sense of failing to explain exactly how
Gladue factors can reduce moral blameworthiness and not explaining how they
affect the sentencing purposes of deterrence, denunciation and incapacitation that
judges generally stress in serious cases. In addition, much of the application of
Ipeelee at the appellate level still relates to rehabilitation which will often receive
less weight in serious cases. Finally appellate courts have not approved (or
disapproved) of alternatives to imprisonment informed either by Indigenous law or
by restorative justice. All of these findings are consistent with overall conclusions
that Gladue is applied differently in different parts of Canada and that it continues
to fail to reduce growing Indigenous overrepresentation in prison.73
Roach analyzed the application of Ipeelee in each of the provincial courts of appeal and offered
his assessment of how the principles from the case were being applied.
Professor Roach found that the British Columbia Court of Appeal related background
factors to moral blameworthiness “though often not without fully explaining how factors relate to
each of these purposes.74 He suggests that the Alberta Court of Appeal jurisprudence demonstrated
“some recognition of the relevance of Gladue factors to moral blameworthiness, but a reluctance
to relate them to the punitive purposes of deterrence and denunciation and corresponding modest
reductions in sentences on the basis of decreased moral blameworthiness.”75 With respect to
Saskatchewan, Roach found that the court of appeal recognized and elaborated “on the relationship
between Ipeelee and moral blameworthiness,” however, “in most of its cases the Court of Appeal
has not found reduced moral blameworthiness” and when it has “the reductions in sentence have
been modest.”76
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Professor Roach argues that the Manitoba Court of Appeal is reluctant to make findings of
reduced moral blameworthiness and “may with the exception of cases where Gladue factors relate
to rehabilitation be the most resistant to following Ipeelee and in appropriate cases relating these
factors to moral blameworthiness.”77 He credits the Ontario Court of Appeal with leading the way
in the expansion of Gladue beyond the realm of sentencing78 but suggests that while there were
indications in Kreko79 that the court recognized the connection between background factors and
moral blameworthiness, “it did not fully explain how this would be achieved and this may help to
explain a series of subsequent cases where the Court of Appeal seemed to assume that Gladue
factors will not be relevant to the objectives of deterrence, denunciation, and incapacitation.”80
Professor Roach summarizes his findings of the impact of Ipeelee in provincial appellate
courts by arguing that:
This concern about the generally under-developed and under-theorized relation of
background factors to punitive sentencing purposes is re-enforced by the frequent
reference in Court of Appeal decisions about background factors not being an
“excuse” or providing a “discount” for a sentence. This implicit but often
unexamined assumption in such conclusions is that length of imprisonment must
increase with the need to punish, deter or denounce serious crimes and to
incapacitate offenders. Indeed, the failure to relate background factors to punitive
purposes of sentencing and the new slogans of no “excuse” or “discount” have
produced new shortcuts that have replaced the old shortcuts for not applying
Gladue in serious cases that the Supreme Court attempted to correct in Ipeelee.81
Roach concludes by suggesting that half of the provincial courts of appeal have related background
factors to more blameworthiness in their analysis but even those courts require further elaboration
on the subject if they are to inform the actions of trial courts.82
David Milward and Debra Parkes83 argued in 2011 that the successful implementation of
the Gladue provisions in Manitoba are hampered by three myths: that they were not to be
considered for serious crimes; that prison works for Indigenous people; and that Indigenous
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overrepresentation was an intractable problem.84 They argue that continued emphasis on
denunciation and deterrence in violent crime has limited the effect of the provisions and runs
counter to Gladue.85 As a result, the reliance of the courts on incarceration has compounded the
situation as prison is ineffective in rehabilitating Indigenous people. They suggest that the lack of
culturally-relevant programs in communities and the correctional system means that recourse to
incarceration only aggravates what it is meant to alleviate.86 Milward and Parkes argue that the
problem is intractable when seen through the lens of sentencing alone. Increased funding for the
criminal justice system will not address the problem unless it is supplemented by resources for
addressing social problems.87 The authors are correct that continued emphasis on denunciatory and
punitive aspects of sentencing law are substantial barriers to the aims of the provisions. Unless
judges can reorient their thinking toward a different methodology, innovation in sentencing for
serious crimes will founder on the traditional common law and statutory principles of sentencing.
Julian V. Roberts and Andrew Reid88 studied admissions to custody since 1978 to ascertain
changes in the rates of Indigenous incarceration. They determined that remedial reforms had been
ineffective and the problem has become more serious.89 Roberts and Reid argue that there will be
no progress in arresting the crisis unless federal and provincial governments make greater efforts
to ensure their application, create a more ambitious sentencing methodology and recognize that
neither of these will address the underlying social conditions.90 They argue that section 718.2(e)
and Gladue are insufficient and it is beyond the power of courts to address the crisis. They
recommend five possible approaches: (1) a separate sentencing code for Indigenous people; (2) a
strengthening of the provision itself – possibly with a rebuttable presumption against
imprisonment; (3) requiring that certain criteria be met before imprisonment is imposed - similar
to youth criminal justice reforms; (4) adoption of an Indigenous sentencing guideline; or, (5)
adoption by Parliament of reforms that are general in nature but would benefit Indigenous
peoples.91 It seems unlikely that Parliament is interested in creating potentially unpopular revisions
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to the Criminal Code; instead it appears that this issue will remain the purview of the courts.
Nonetheless, they are correct that if the Supreme Court continues to be unwilling to step in and
outline the parameters of a different methodology, Parliament may feel compelled to provide that
guidance.
Brent Knazan92 offered a view from the bench on how the provisions should function. In
his view, Gladue was a departure from the orthodoxy that everyone is treated equally and without
bias by the courts and this requires a changed legal environment for sentencing Indigenous
offenders.93 Knazan does not specify the contours of such a changed environment, but this
presumably refers to the idea of a different methodology for sentencing Indigenous offenders
discussed in Wells. This different method of analysis to determine a fit sentence is particularly
relevant to traditional aggravating factors. For example, where a prior criminal record is a
statutorily-recognized aggravating factor, Knazan believes it should qualify as mitigating for
Indigenous people.94
Knazan is concerned with crafting alternative sanctions while recognizing that they can
still include a punitive element. He believes that alternatives to imprisonment do not mean that an
offender effectively escapes punishment but rather that some alternatives could be provided that
both punish the offender and aid in their rehabilitation. Knazan bemoans the lack of resources and
argues that until they are in place, community sanctions and alternative sentences will not be
possible.95 Without alternative sanctions, he concludes that the project of sentencing Indigenous
people differently is an unrealistic one.

3. Empirical Studies
There have been four empirical studies conducted to ascertain the effects of the provisions
to date. The first was undertaken in 2008 by Andrew Welsh96 and James Ogloff.97 They analyzed
691 randomly selected cases pre- and post-Bill C-41 to determine the weight given to different
aggravating and mitigating factors and their relationship to an offender’s Indigenous status. They
concluded that seriousness of offence and length of criminal record were the factors most closely
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linked to longer sentences, while plea agreements and pre-trial detention were the mitigating
factors most closely linked with shorter sentences.98 While Indigenous offenders are more likely
to have a criminal record and to be charged with a violent offence, this study suggests there is
otherwise no difference in the probability of receiving a sentence of incarceration between
Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders.99
Their sample set was randomly selected from Quicklaw and compared cases before and
after the passage of the reforms in 1996. They excluded cases involving minimum sentences,
dangerous offender applications, and Gladue Reports100 since their purpose “was to evaluate the
section 718.2(e) provision and not, specifically, the impact of the R v Gladue decision.”101 After
controlling for other variables, they determined that “Aboriginal offenders were neither more or
less likely to receive a custodial disposition by virtue of their Aboriginal status.”102 Welsh and
Ogloff conclude that a balance between considerations of Indigenous status in combination with
the presence of aggravating factors may account for the absence of an effect on sentencing
outcomes.103 This study is useful in its methodology but its focus on the effects of the Criminal
Code provisions to the exclusion of the decision in Gladue is too narrow and the comparisons
between pre- and post-reform sentencing does not account for the wider overhaul of practices
undertaken at the time. By sampling without regard to offence, it is difficult to appreciate the utility
of the custodial/non-custodial sentencing divide in their study.
A second empirical study of the impacts of section 718.2(e) was conducted by Gillian
Balfour in 2012.104 This study analyzed 168 decisions dealing with serious personal injury offences
(61 of them appeals) between 1996 and 2004.105 She acknowledges that the data set is limited to
decisions made by reporting services and that the absence of sentences reached through plea
bargaining is also an issue for her analysis. However, she argues that since reported decisions are
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those considered by judges, these cases form the “dominant sentencing discourses.”106 The data
suggests that there is variance between provinces, with those jurisdictions with large Indigenous
populations seeing an increased likelihood of custodial sentences for Indigenous offenders,
particularly in the territories.107
Balfour notes that no aggravating or mitigating factors were mentioned in 70% of cases
and that a defendant’s Indigenous background was only mentioned in 19% of cases, most often in
sexual assault cases where the offender was male.108 The aggravating and mitigating factors most
commonly cited by judges for Indigenous people were those most frequently cited for all offenders.
Those mitigating factors identified as applying to Indigenous people in particular, such as
economic deprivation, cultural dislocation, family breakdown and systemic racism, were not
subject to judicial notice in the decisions she examined.109 The most common aggravating factor
cited in relation to Indigenous offenders was the risk of re-offending, which she found in 30% of
all cases. Denunciation and deterrence dominated considerations and restorative justice goals were
least likely to be cited.110 Balfour believes this is evidence of an inability on the part of sentencing
judges to move beyond the accepted common law principles of sentencing when dealing with
Indigenous offenders convicted of serious and violent crime.111 The study provides a useful
framework for assessing the operation of mitigating and aggravating factors in decisions.
However, it suffers from the same flaw as Welsh and Ogloff in that the data set is drawn from both
pre- and post-Gladue decisions. This creates an additional variable complicating the comparison
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders. Her concentration on serious crimes is useful
because it allows a closer examination of the thorniest practical aspect of the application of the
provisions which this study also looks to examine.
The most relevant of the empirical studies to this project, as it deals with analyzing
Gladue’s application to manslaughter sentencing, was conducted by Anna Johnson112 and Paul
Millar113 in 2016. They studied all reported manslaughter sentencing decisions from Manitoba and
Saskatchewan for two periods, the first between 1989-1997 and the second between 1998-2012.
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The cases were drawn only from QuickLaw and produced 105 results. After removing those with
life sentences, 95 cases remained.114 The cases were analyzed to determine sentence length,
imposition of a conditional sentence, Aboriginal status, gender, prior history of violence, and trial
type.115 This was done to determine the effect of these variables on sentence.
While they found that sentences were longer for Indigenous offenders, the difference was
not statistically significant. They concluded that efforts at reducing the rates of incarceration for
Indigenous persons have not succeeded.116 However, the authors admit that in light of the small
and incomplete sample size combined with a lack of Indigenous identification in earlier cases, they
were unable to determine whether an offender’s Indigenous status played a role in determining
sentence.117 While this study is interesting and closely in line with the one conducted here, its
limitations are evident. A purely empirical analysis of sentence length only serves to illustrate one
aspect of how the provisions and case law are implemented. While numbers on their own are useful
in determining outcomes, they should be contextualized through a critical reading of the decisions
to ascertain how the provisions are being understood and applied by judges.
The most recent study was conducted by Marie-Andrée Denis-Boileau118 and Marie-Ève
Sylvestre119 and examined the application of the Gladue provisions in a selection of decisions from
trial and appeal courts. They argue that innovative sentencing practices for Indigenous offenders
are discounted by judges leading to what they term a “judicial resistance” to the Supreme Court
meant to protect the state’s monopoly on punishment.120 This paper randomly sampled 635
decisions released between 2012-2015 from three databases,121 dealing with the sentencing of
Indigenous offenders post-Ipeelee. The decisions were analyzed with respect to the sentencing
court’s adherence to the two steps in Gladue: the unique background and systemic factors and the

114

Anna Johnson; Paul Millar, “Invisible No More: Sentencing Post-Gladue in Manitoba and Saskatchewan
Manslaughter Cases,” 37 Windsor Rev Legal & Soc Issues 26 (2016) at 36-37.
115
Ibid at 38.
116
Ibid at 41.
117
Ibid at 43.
118
Law professor at the University of Ottawa.
119
Counsel for the Quebec Commission of Inquiry into the Relationships between Indigenous People and Certain
Public Services.
120
Marie-Andrée Denis-Boileau; Marie-Ève Sylvestre, “Ipeelee and the Duty to Resist,” 51 UBC L Rev 2, 548
(2018) at 553-5.
121
They do not specify but presumably they are CanLII, Quicklaw and Westlaw.

23
types of sentencing procedures appropriate in the circumstances.122 The research found sixty-one
decisions deeming the provisions inapplicable altogether because the offence was serious.123
With respect to the systemic and background factors, this paper distinguished between
cases where they were applied satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily. Unsatisfactory decisions were
those where the logic of the considerations could not be understood. Satisfactory cases were those
where a minimal recognition of the factors could be discerned. This was determined to be the case
in only 20% of decisions.124 The authors believe that one major difficulty limiting the application
of the provisions was the inability of judges to conceive of how moral culpability could be limited
by the systemic and background factors.125
This study determined that sentencing judges barely attended to the second stage of Gladue
at all. Denis-Boileau and Sylvestre argue that the types of penalties employed have not changed
since Ipeelee and that trial judges continue to prefer incarceration for Indigenous offenders in 87%
of decisions.126 Moderation as a principle was applied satisfactorily in one case in five, seven of
those were cases in which “the judge attempted to adapt the type of sanction and the procedure to
the Indigenous heritage of the accused,” and only three of those resulted in sentencing circles.127
The authors credit these limitations to many of the same sources as earlier studies, such as a lack
of community resources, a lack of judicial resources, a dearth of Gladue Reports, and the volume
of files.128 However, they go further in their criticism, suggesting that despite these limitations, it
is the inability of judges to move outside punitive sanctions or consider legal pluralism with respect
to Indigenous legal traditions that causes the analysis to be set aside in serious cases.129
Marie-Andrée Denis-Boileau and Marie-Ève Sylvestre suggest these failures are partially
a result of the Supreme Court declining to provide guidance for crafting such sentences. In practice,
they suggest that many judges cannot see how to apply the provisions and “some judges simply
include the expression ‘Gladue factors’ among the mitigating circumstances in their judgments,
or, failing anything better, lean towards a reduction of the sentence handed down.”130 In their view,
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the second stage of Gladue is an invitation to rethink punishment and the process of sentencing
altogether. They argue this creates a contact zone for legal pluralism where judges can engage with
alternatives and acknowledge Indigenous legal orders.131 The paper concludes that judges should
look to Indigenous legal orders and Indigenous communities in developing innovative sentencing
practices.132 This study’s narrow temporal focus is useful and it has produced an admirably indepth analysis of the considerations at play in these cases. However, their examination of whether
decisions produced custodial sentences or not is complicated by the variety of offences covered by
the 635 decisions studied, many of which would not necessarily have carried a presumption of a
custodial sentence.

4. Gladue Reports
The difficulties encountered by the courts in applying Gladue lies partially with a failure
to provide courts and justice system actors with the information required to craft appropriate
sentences. In the immediate aftermath of the Gladue decision, critics pointed out that in order for
this new regime to function further resources be made available to the courts. This was particularly
true with respect to Indigenous-specific pre-sentence reports, the preparation of which would
require paying someone.133 These criticisms were prescient, both for recognizing that Gladue
Reports would materialize but also for anticipating that funding for them would not and any
funding that did would be piecemeal.
There are no formal processes for the production of Gladue Reports in Newfoundland and
Labrador, New Brunswick, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut.134
Alberta is the only jurisdiction that directly assumes responsibility for these reports by funding
and assigning them.135 In other jurisdictions where they are available, Gladue Reports are produced
by a network of independent contractors or local organizations with funding and therefore supply
limited. The province of Ontario has twenty-five full-time Gladue writers producing some 750
reports annually. These are funded in part by the Ministry of the Attorney General, Legal Aid
Ontario and the federal government but the workers themselves are drawn from a collection of
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non-profits, First Nations, and Indigenous organizations.136 The small numbers of reports produced
annually in Ontario means that they are not widely available, with one study finding that Gladue
Reports were only mentioned explicitly in one third of sentencing decisions involving Indigenous
offenders.137
As a consequence of this scattered and under-resourced approach to furnishing judges with
information, the necessary preconditions of crafting individualized sentences taking into account
the Gladue factors are not consistently available. This is in spite of the requirement that the
Supreme Court placed upon counsel and judges to procure this information.138 This problem is
exacerbated by the fact that, unlike pre-sentence reports, there is no Criminal Code section
providing for Gladue Reports. Consequently, some judges do not feel able to order their
production.139 Courts are forced to rely on the limited capacity of non-governmental entities to
produce reports in those jurisdictions where they are available at all. This state of affairs, while
not fatal to the functioning of the provisions, represents a serious impediment to their effectiveness
as, across the justice system, a lack of money is causing serious problems.

5. Application of Gladue in the Courts
The application of the Gladue provisions in practice demonstrates the difficulties for the
courts in considering background and systemic factors and crafting sentences incorporating them.
The Gladue provisions were adopted with the intention of reducing the overrepresentation of
Indigenous people in prison and so far they have not achieved this aim. Indigenous people
accounted for 30% of all admissions to sentenced custody in 2014-5 while accounting for only 4%
of the population.140 This figure is interesting when compared with earlier ones. Following the
Gladue decision in 2000-1, Indigenous people accounted for only 15% of admissions to sentenced
custody,141 at a time when they represented 3.3% of Canada’s population.142 The continuing
overincarceration of Indigenous people may be partially explained by demographic factors, in that
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the Indigenous population is generally younger than the population overall,143 although this is not
sufficient to explain the general failure of the provisions to reduce over-incarceration.
Despite the passages dealing with the need to consider background and systemic factors in
Gladue and Ipeelee, the Supreme Court provided scant guidance for crafting appropriate sentences
to accommodate them. The Supreme Court is ultimately limited in its capacity to offer in-depth
guidance to sentencing judges without real alternative sanctions to which sentencing judges can
refer. Parliament, as the author of the country’s criminal law and the provinces and territories as
its administrators, have largely failed to build and fund widespread alternatives to which trial
judges can direct offenders.
The provisions have been applied differently by courts in different provinces. It is accepted
practice in Canada that different jurisdictions will have different approaches to sentencing.144 Kent
Roach views the issue of regional variation in the application of Gladue as troubling given that
section 718.2(e) was designed to remedy overrepresentation of Indigenous peoples across
Canada.145 In his most recent study of the impact of the provisions in the courts of appeal, Professor
Roach found that different jurisdictions tended to concentrate on different aspects of the
provisions. Professor Roach found that:
The Alberta and Saskatchewan Courts of Appeal have provided the most sustained
analysis of how background circumstances can reduce moral blameworthiness
while making only modest reductions in sentences on such basis. More recently,
the BC, PEI and the Quebec Courts of Appeal appear more willing to make
significant reductions of the type seen in Ipeelee on the basis that Gladue factors
have reduced moral blameworthiness. The Manitoba and New Brunswick Courts
of Appeal emerge as those that have been the most resistant to applying Gladue in
serious cases. None of the Courts of Appeal have systematically related background
factors to the effectiveness of deterrence, denunciation or incapacitation in
responding to offending. This suggests that judicial engagement with how Gladue
factors can affect moral blameworthiness has been generally superficial.
Many Courts of Appeal including the Ontario and Newfoundland and Labrador
Courts of Appeal continue to stress the rehabilitative purposes of sentencing in their
considerations of Gladue. Although consistent with the Supreme Court’s original
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message in Gladue, this discounts the Court’s recognition in Ipeelee that
background factors can reduce moral blameworthiness and may lessen the use of
Gladue in more serious cases where courts will stress the punitive purposes of
sentencing.
Finally, almost none of the Court of Appeal decisions applying Ipeelee dealt with
creative alternatives to imprisonment involving victims and communities. This
does not mean that such sentences are never used especially in cases where the
Crown supports alternatives to imprisonment, but it does mean that Crowns and
trial judges have not received positive signals from their Courts of Appeal to
encourage such experimentation.146
Sentencing decisions are based in the jurisprudence of the relevant court of appeal and a lack of
direction in sentencing will determine the range of sentences that trial judges view as acceptable
for similar crimes and similarly situated offenders.147 The Supreme Court in Ipeelee stated that
sentencing is a highly individualized process in which the sentencing judge is given a high degree
of deference.148 This is true in respect of all offenders who are sentenced, Indigenous and nonIndigenous alike. However, judicial sentencing determinations are based on submissions from
counsel and are drawn from similar cases considered by the court of appeal.
The reluctance of appeal courts to stray from conventional sentencing has likely caused
trial judges to limit the originality of their decisions. This problem extends beyond concerns with
appellate intervention. Despite Ipeelee, research indicates that the types of penalties imposed by
judges have not changed and incarceration continues to be the preferred response to crimes
committed by Indigenous offenders.149 These offenders may be less likely to be understood by the
courts as subjects for rehabilitation and retributive factors prevail in sentencing.150
An inability to understand and apply the provisions continues to be a particular problem
with the sentencing of offenders for serious and violent crimes. It has been argued that traditional
sentencing considerations override Gladue considerations in such cases and limit their impact.151
Many judges appear unable to conceive of how an offender’s moral blameworthiness can be
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reduced with reference to the systemic and background factors.152 In one study, denunciation and
deterrence were most frequently mentioned in respect of serious crimes and restorative goals least
frequently, leading the author to conclude that sentencing judges were incapable of moving beyond
common law principles in determining sentence.153 It has been suggested that this is the result of
an outsized emphasis on individual responsibility and a refusal of judges to consider the context
of the individual in their decisions.154 It has also been suggested that attempts at alternative
approaches to sentencing are “confounded by staggering rates of interpersonal violence and the
lack of community capacity” within Indigenous communities to deal with these issues reveals the
“limits of law reforms… in the space of profound deprivation.”155
Whatever the judicial reasoning, it appears that judges are reticent to set aside traditional
considerations in sentencing serious crime and fall back on the established methods employed for
non-Indigenous offenders. Marie-Andrée Denis-Boileau and Marie-Ève Sylvestre have suggested
that this is evidence of a judicial resistance against the Supreme Court’s decisions in Ipeelee and
Gladue conducted in defence of the state’s monopoly on punishment.156 This is only true in the
sense that judges have frequently abided by traditional considerations in crafting sentences but it
points to a combination of genuine confusion and a dearth of resources rather than to active
resistance. If there were more resources available to the judiciary, there could be more judicial
creativity.157 Sentencing decisions suggest that judges would like to utilize more creative options
and would like the Supreme Court of Canada to provide additional guidance as to what forms they
might take but believe they have failed twice to do so.158
The Supreme Court’s lack of guidance is itself a reflection of the limited resources existing
for non-custodial sanctions for Indigenous people. In the immediate aftermath of Gladue, this
weakness was identified as one of the main impediments to the successful application of the
provisions, particularly within Indigenous communities themselves.159 In reflecting on the practice
in his own court, Justice Knazan also argued that greater community resources would substantially
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increase the options available for crafting meaningful sentences.160 Those programs that do exist
are few, underfunded and resourced, and vary greatly by region.

6. Community Alternatives
Placing blame at the feet of the Supreme Court for failing to outline appropriate responses,
in Jonathan Rudin’s view, ignores how law reform works in Canada.161 It should be remembered
that Parliament and the legislatures have not responded to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of
section 718.2(e). Having passed the provisions into law, Parliament was largely satisfied to have
the provisions themselves do the work of reducing overrepresentation. Parliament has made no
further innovations with respect to the Criminal Code’s sentencing provisions dealing with
Indigenous offenders and the legislatures of the provinces and territories have not built a
sophisticated infrastructure to provide culturally-appropriate alternatives to their jails.162
Scholars have recognized that there is a deficiency in culturally-appropriate resources
available in communities.163 A lack of options for sentencing offenders outside the correctional
system constrains judges and increases the likelihood that they will rely on imprisonment to
achieve the goals of sentencing. It is hardly ground breaking to suggest that the criminal justice
system lacks resources, its attempts to respond to the ruling on delay in Jordan stands witness to
this but resource limitations nonetheless plague the system at every stage.164 We have already seen
the piecemeal availability of Gladue Reports at sentencing, where most justice system participants
report that culturally-relevant information is still brought forward mostly through pre-sentence
reports.165
The problems in crafting culturally-appropriate sentences result from of a lack of resources
in the community. The Department of Justice Aboriginal Justice Strategy (“AJS”) is a cost-sharing
program directed by the federal government which provides financial support for Indigenous
community justice programs “grounded in principles of restorative justice and Indigenous Legal
Traditions… designed to reflect the culture and values of the community in which they are
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situated.”166 In 2015-16, this program provided $15 million in funding for roughly 200 communitybased justice programs serving 750 rural and urban Indigenous communities.167 These programs,
while they vary in size and scope, are designed to provide pre-trial diversion programming as well
as culturally-appropriate sanctions and are accessed by way of police and Crown referral.
A Department of Justice survey of the program found that half of Crown attorneys said
they were “a little,” “to a small extent,” or “somewhat” aware of the programs in their region. This
lack of awareness of programs is a significant impediment to accessing them. However, even
among Crown attorneys familiar with the programs, there was reluctance to recommend their use.
Crowns were split evenly between those who viewed the sanctions as culturally appropriate and
recommended their use and those who did not and refused to recommend them.168
The Department of Justice assessment also found that the programs were troubled by a lack
of quality and consistency, insufficient and unstable funding, and high staff turnover. Communities
were often unable to supplement federal grants with additional funds, the level of training for staff
and volunteers was inconsistent due to a lack of stable funding and resources which in turn led to
high turnover, and there was a “lack of recognized core competencies for various types of programs
and services.”169 While programs are available across the country, their application and quality is
inconsistent. Funding is so limited that the Department of Justice found it allowed “communities
to hire minimal staff (in some cases, only a single part-time person) to operate programs along
with volunteers or other staff paid through other sources.”170
A lack of funding is a barrier to the availability of alternative and culturally-appropriate
sanctions and this is due in part to a lack of political will. A $15 million annual expenditure by the
Government of Canada is insignificant in budgetary terms. The unevenness in program quality and
issues with staff training alone demonstrate that current levels of funding are insufficient. Given
that these programs are community based and intended to provide culturally-relevant programming
for Indigenous peoples, there may be reticence on the part of governments to attach too many
specific requirements to funding. Notwithstanding a desire to adopt a hands-off approach to the
management of Indigenous community justice programs, if government wants them to function
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efficiently and to see more frequent prosecutorial referrals, there will need to be increased funding
accompanied by some directives regarding the kinds of programs that they will need to provide.
It is important to note that these organizations do not simply provide alternative sanctions
for offenders, they also respond to the needs of victims and other members of the community.171
The impact of this expanded mandate on these organization is further exacerbated by the limited
nature of funding arrangements which often last only for a prescribed period of time, impacting
the capacity of organizations to plan effectively.172 Arguably, until these programs benefit from
stable funding and political support, their potential to impact the crisis facing Indigenous peoples
in the criminal justice system will remain an open question. Given their limited nature and spotty
financing, it is impossible to tell if they have or could have a real impact in addressing the intended
purpose of the Gladue provisions.173

7. Corrections
Like the community justice programs that are designed to provide community-based
services to offenders, a lack of programs and services also plagues the correctional system. In one
study of sentencing decisions, a considerable number of judges spoke of their hope that the
offender would be able to avail themselves of Indigenous-specific programming during their
imprisonment.174 This is a refrain heard frequently among sentencing judges who determine that
there is no recourse except imprisonment. Justice Knazan argued that the availability of such
programs is a consideration in crafting an appropriate sentence for Indigenous offenders.175
Despite the need for culturally-relevant correctional programming, they do not tend to be available
in provincial prisons due to the limitation on programs and resources in these institutions and the
short length of sentences.176
The short length of terms notwithstanding, 96% of all custodial sentences are served in
provincial and territorial institutions.177 This suggests that there should be an increased focus on
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the provision of Indigenous-specific services by the provinces and territories. Some jurisdictions,
such as the Northwest Territories, have dealt with this issue by entering into exchange of service
agreements with the Correctional Service of Canada (“CSC”) that allow offenders sentenced to a
term greater than two years to serve their time in a territorial institution at the recommendation of
the sentencing court.178 Though federal penitentiaries are better equipped to provide programs for
inmates than territorial institutions, some judges believe that allowing an Indigenous offender to
serve their time in a culturally relevant and familiar environment in their own region will do more
to aid their rehabilitation than CSC programming.179
Federal penitentiaries tend to provide more involved rehabilitative programs for offenders
than their provincial counterparts and the same is true of culturally-specific programs for
Indigenous people. The CSC has suggested that “[s]ome institutions in the Prairies Provinces can
be considered ‘Indigenous Prisons’,” such as the Stony Mountain Institution and the Saskatchewan
Penitentiary, where 58% and 59% of inmates are Indigenous.180 In recognition of the particular
issues facing Indigenous people in federal custody, the CSC operates the Elder Service Program
which “supports the delivery of ceremonial services, participation in the delivery of Aboriginal
correctional programs and establishing and maintaining partnerships to help offenders reintegrate
into the community.”181 However, the CSC admits that these programs are under-staffed and
under-resourced and that this has taken a toll on the provision of services within the system.182
Alongside its attempts to provide services within federal institutions, the CSC has also
established healing lodges, either on their own or operated by Indigenous communities pursuant
to an agreement with the CSC under section 81 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.183
Healing lodges exist to “assist the successful reintegration of Indigenous offenders by using
traditional healing approaches and holistic and culturally appropriate programming.”184 At present,
the CSC operates four lodges with a total of 60 beds for women and 210 for men while Indigenous
communities operate a further five lodges under the auspices of section 81 of the CCRA with 16
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beds for women and 131 for men.185 These healing lodges are located only in Quebec and western
Canada, leaving large portions of the country to do without. This is particularly troublesome given
that no lodges exist in any of the three territories, where the Indigenous proportion of the
population is highest.
The CSC has found a number of significant shortcomings in its analysis of the program.
Availability across the country was not the only geographic issue, the CSC conceded that most
Indigenous offenders will eventually be released into urban centres rather than Indigenous
communities where most of these facilities are located. They determined that to increase their
effectiveness and relevance, the CSC would need to concentrate on developing ties to urban
Indigenous organizations for offenders on conditional release.186 Because 70% of Indigenous
inmates will be released to urban communities, the CSC hopes to expand the operation of healing
lodges from First Nations’ territory to lodges organized by urban Indigenous organizations.187
Besides the limitations of geography, the capacity of these facilities is also a concern. In 2012,
healing lodges could accommodate no more than 2% of Indigenous inmates in the federal
penitentiary system and less than 20% of those held in minimum-security facilities.188
There are also issues with community-run lodges operated in partnership with the CSC.
The Office of the Correctional Investigator noted that many Indigenous communities, like nonIndigenous communities, had no desire to play host to offenders.189 As with much of the system
erected to support the implementation of the Gladue provisions, Indigenous communities and
Indigenous-run justice organizations are frequently not compensated for their services but asked
to volunteer their time and resources. In the context of healing lodges in particular, members of
the communities in which they are located were being asked to monitor the compliance of
offenders without compensation.190 Like those organizations funded by the AJS, section 81 healing
lodges were found to be under-resourced and their staff underpaid.191 These programs are not
without value but they are small in scale and, as can be seen with many community justice
programs in Canada, under resourced and dependant on voluntary contributions of community
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labour and effort. As with other aspects of the support structure for the Gladue provisions,
governments are attempting to achieve these goals with a minimum of expense.

8. Prosecutorial Discretion and Diversion
All actors in the criminal justice system play critical roles in ensuring that the Gladue
provisions are implemented successfully. The Supreme Court has called directly upon counsel and
judges to inform themselves of an offender’s Indigenous status and to take steps to acquire the
relevant information. The exercise of prosecutorial discretion is a key aspect of the system and it
is at this stage that decisions are made that will substantially impact what follows. Depending on
the circumstances of the case, prosecutors can divert matters, lay charges carrying mandatory
minimums, choose to proceed by indictment or summary conviction, or temper their sentencing
submissions. Prosecutorial decisions and directives represent an important facet of the application
of the Gladue factors in practice. In order for courts to craft sentences that see an impact by the
Gladue provisions, Crown counsel will have to take the Gladue considerations into effect when
they make submissions before the court.
Given that the Gladue principles are remedial in nature, Marie Manikis192 has argued that
to achieve this end, they should be “recognized as a stand-alone principle that also applies to all
decision-making processes by criminal justice agencies that have the power to restrict an
Aboriginal person’s liberty.”193 The decision to prosecute at all or how to proceed has outsized
effects going forward. Consequently, Manikis argues, the background and systemic factors and
their relationship to the offender should be considered by prosecutors before charges are laid
against Indigenous accused.194
In the context of deportation proceedings undertaken against an Indigenous respondent,
the Ontario Court of Appeal in United States v Leonard offered the proposition that the Gladue
factors should be considered by “all decision-makers who have the power to influence the
treatment of aboriginal offenders in the justice system… whenever an Aboriginal person’s liberty
is at stake in criminal and related proceedings.”195 The court determined that “[t]he sound exercise
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of prosecutorial discretion is fundamental to the fair administration of criminal justice. The
decisions of prosecutors have enormous implications for accused persons and for the justice
system” and “[g]iven the importance of prosecutorial discretion to the administration of Canadian
justice and to the extradition process, I cannot accept the proposition that Gladue principles have
no bearing on their exercise.”196
The Supreme Court declined to hear the appeal in Leonard but rendered a judgment on the
issue in 2014. In Anderson, the Court narrowly applied the judgment from the Ontario Court of
Appeal, noting that it was only meant to apply in respect of deportation proceedings.197 Justice
Moldaver wrote for a unanimous Court that:
both Gladue and Ipeelee speak to the sentencing obligations of judges to craft a
proportionate sentence for Aboriginal offenders. They make no mention of
prosecutorial discretion and do not support Mr. Anderson’s argument that
prosecutors must consider Aboriginal status when making a decision that limits the
sentencing options available to a judge. Mr. Anderson’s argument in effect equates
the duty of the judge and the prosecutor, but there is no basis in law to support
equating their distinct roles in the sentencing process.198
The Court held that prosecutorial discretion is immune to review on the basis of an accused’s
Indigenous status. However, given the interest of all levels of government in pursuing a reduction
in the over-incarceration of Indigenous people this does not preclude voluntary policies on the part
of attorneys general and directors of public prosecutions.
The Department of Justice’s assessment of Gladue practices nationwide found that only
two of eleven districts had formal prosecutorial directives concerning Indigenous accused.199
Neither the Public Prosecution Service of Canada nor any of the four western provinces have
specific Indigenous charging policies in their Crown prosecution manuals and each make only
passing mention of Indigenous persons in practice directives concerning alternatives measures and
diversion.200 The most comprehensive policy comes from the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney
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General. Ontario’s practice directive on Indigenous people speaks to the importance of
relationships between the Crown and Indigenous peoples, diversion, bail, sentencing, Gladue
Reports, and Indigenous communities with particular reference to supports available to the
offender and to victims.201 While this practice directive is comprehensive, the policy makes no
particular reference to the exercise of restraint in prosecution but rather urges knowledge of and
sensitivity to Indigenous considerations. As will be addressed in chapter 3, this research suggests
that Crown attorneys in some jurisdictions have a tendency to make submissions for longer
sentences in certain sub-types of manslaughter than others and this can affect the length of sentence
for Indigenous offenders.

9. Conclusion
The academic analysis of the Gladue provisions suggests that practical guidelines for their
application to sentencing offenders for serious and violent crime have not crystalized in the trial
courts. This state of affairs is partially explained by a lack of guidance provided by the Supreme
Court and the courts of appeal. However, it is equally apparent that both levels of government have
failed to raise an infrastructure that would provide support for Indigenous offenders both within
and outside the correctional system. As with most areas of government, a lack of funding has
prevented the effective creation of programs to support Indigenous offenders and provide judges
with Gladue Reports in the majority of cases. The following chapter addresses the manner in which
sentencing is conducted in Canada and the approaches that the courts of appeal have taken to
sentencing manslaughter in the jurisdictions being examined in this study.
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Chapter Three: Manslaughter Sentencing in Canada
1. Introduction
This chapter begins by outlining the general purposes and principles used in sentencing in
Canada with an emphasis on those principles that are addressed most frequently in the sentencing
of manslaughter. It then proceeds to examine the general regime for manslaughter sentencing that
operates in Canada, with an emphasis on the role played by sentencing ranges in the practice. It
then addresses the different subcategories of manslaughter identified in the body of cases used in
this study and their general distribution in the data set. Finally, this chapter concludes by analyzing
divergent manslaughter sentencing regimes established by courts of appeal in the different
provinces and territories and how they treat these subcategories of manslaughter.

2. The Structure of Sentencing
A. Section 718 – Fundamental Purpose of Sentencing
Sentencing in Canada is governed primarily by the fundamental purpose of sentencing in
section 718 of the Criminal Code, the fundamental principle of sentencing in section 718.1, and
the other sentencing principles contained in section 718.2. The first stage is determining the
objectives of sentencing in the case. Here, section 718 explains:
718. The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and contribute,
along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance
of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more
of the following objectives:
(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community
that is cause by unlawful conduct;
(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;
(c) to separate the offender from society, where necessary;
(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and
(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders and an acknowledgement of
the harm done to victims or to the community.
One or more of these considerations must inform a judge’s reasoning in fixing a just sanction for
an offence. In sentencing manslaughter, denunciation and deterrence were the objectives most
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frequently cited as being the paramount considerations. After that, rehabilitation was mentioned
most often but judges frequently specified that it was a subordinate or secondary objective.
Separation, reparation and promotion of a sense of responsibility were offered as justifications far
less frequently and most often in cases involving individuals with substantial criminal records or
those offenders with a demonstrated history of being unresponsive to rehabilitative efforts.
Denunciation
Denunciation is not directed to the personal characteristics of the offender but instead to
society’s condemnation of the act itself.1 The Supreme Court has explained that denunciation
serves as a societal condemnation of the actions of a perpetrator who has contravened its code of
values. Denunciation, they suggest:
mandates that a sentence should also communicate society’s condemnation of that
particular offender’s conduct. In short, a sentence with a denunciatory element
represents a symbolic, collective statement that the offender’s conduct should be
punished for encroaching on our society’s basic code of values as enshrined within
our substantive criminal law… The relevance of both retribution and denunciation
as goals of sentencing underscores that our criminal justice system is not simply a
vast system of negative penalties designed to prevent objectively harmful conduct
by increasing the cost the offender must bear in committing an enumerated offence.
Our criminal law is also a system of values. A sentence which expresses
denunciation is simply the means by which these values are communicated. In
short, in addition to attaching negative consequences to undesirable behaviour,
judicial sentences should also be imposed in a manner which positively instills the
basic set of communal values shared by all Canadians as expressed by the Criminal
Code.2
While denunciation is also a crucial part of the sentencing process, it takes on a particular
importance when sentencing people who lead otherwise law-abiding lives.3 Societal
condemnation, it is believed, has little impact on people who regularly engage in criminal
behaviour but will have a substantial impact on ordinary citizens who do not. This is relevant for
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manslaughter sentencing since many people who commit the offence have not previously been
convicted of a crime.
Deterrence
At its core, deterrence as a sentencing principle is premised on the idea that the example of
punishment is itself sufficient to discourage crime.4 There are two distinct forms of deterrence:
general deterrence, directed toward society at large and to others who may be inclined to commit
a similar offence; and individual or specific deterrence, directed at the offender who is being
sentenced.5 While the Supreme Court of Canada has cautioned sentencing judges against relying
too much on the largely unproven efficacy of deterrence they nonetheless agree that there remain
times when it is necessary.6 Whatever its efficacy in practice, general deterrence continues to be
a mainstay of sentencing for manslaughter and was cited in virtually every decision in this study.
Specific deterrence on the other hand is meant to deal with the particular offender before the court.
The idea is not to discourage the offender from committing all crimes in future but this particular
crime based on the severity of the consequences.7 Like general deterrence, specific deterrence was
frequently noted as one of the paramount sentencing objectives in the manslaughter decisions
examined here.
Rehabilitation
Canadian sentencing law places a substantial emphasis on rehabilitation even in serious
cases of violent crime. In common with the criticisms of deterrence, there is little evidence to
suggest that rehabilitation comes about as a result of imprisonment.8 The tenor of many sentencing
decisions suggests that the need for rehabilitation, far from being focused on giving the offender
access to programs while imprisoned, implies that the sentence should not be one that is so onerous
that it forecloses any future for the prisoner when released. In this respect, rehabilitation as it is
sometimes used suggests an element of restraint, however, the Supreme Court has cautioned that
where denunciation and deterrence predominate “there may be few options other than

4

Ruby, Sentencing, supra note1 at 7.
Ibid at 8-9.
6
R v Proulx, [2000] 1 SCR 61 at para 107.
7
Ruby, Sentencing, supra note1 at 14.
8
Ibid at 19.
5

40
imprisonment for meeting those objectives.”9 This provides a partial explanation for why
rehabilitation was frequently cited in the manslaughter decisions considered here as a secondary
or subordinate consideration. The decisions strongly suggest a presumption of prison time resulting
from a manslaughter conviction.
B. Section 718.1 - Fundamental Principle of Sentencing
The fundamental principle of sentencing in Canada is proportionality, and it is here that
the “objectives of sentencing are given sharper focus.”10 Section 718.1 of the Criminal Code states
that “[a] sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the moral
blameworthiness of the offender.” This consideration is crucial to the determination of a fit
sentence. At its simplest:
The more serious the crime and its consequences, or the greater the offender’s
degree of responsibility, the heavier the sentence will be. In other words, the
severity of the sentence depends not only on the seriousness of the crime’s
consequences, but also on the moral blameworthiness of the offender.11
The Ontario Court of Appeal expanded on the elements of proportionality in Hamilton, explaining
that:
The “gravity of the offence” refers to the seriousness of the offence in a generic
sense as reflected by the potential penalty imposed by Parliament and any specific
features of the commission of the crime which may tend to increase or decrease the
harm or risk of harm to the community occasioned by the offence…
The “degree of responsibility of the offender” refers to the offender’s culpability as
reflected in the essential elements of the offence – especially the fault component
– and any specific aspects of the offender’s conduct or background that tend to
increase or decrease the offender’s personal responsibility for the crime.12
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This question lies at the core of determining a just and appropriate sanction for a crime and will
be defined primarily with reference to the gravity of the offence.13 In manslaughter, the gravity
involves the death of human being. While an arson directed at a residential area may occasion a
greater risk of harm to the community than the stabbing of an acquaintance in a drunken
altercation, the core of the gravity consideration for manslaughter remains a person’s death.
With the centrality of proportionality to the sentencing process, parity becomes a secondary
consideration and the operation of proportionality may result in disparate sentences.14 However,
highly similar cases involving highly similar offenders should still see sentencing outcomes that
are roughly similar. The importance of proportionality to the sentencing process is such that the
Alberta Court of Appeal has called it “the only governing sentencing principle under the Code,”15
and that “no matter what objective or combination of objectives a sanction is intended to achieve,
to be a just sanction, the sentence imposed must comply with the proportionality principle.”16
C. Section 718.2 – Other Sentencing Principles
The determination of sentence is rounded out by considering the secondary principles of
sentencing outlined in section 718.2, comprising aggravating and mitigating factors, parity,
totality, restraint, and restorative justice. These considerations, which the sentencing judge must
take into account, are all “either components of the proportionality principle or properly influence
its interpretation and application.”17
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
As noted, Clayton Ruby has written that, “few crimes are truly original, their characteristic
features repeat themselves with appalling regularity” and these features will consequently serve to
either increase or decrease the sentence.18 The Criminal Code lists a number of statutory
aggravating factors such as hate crimes, breach of trust, domestic relationship, criminal
organizations and terrorism but the list of potential aggravating factors is considerably wider.
Many of the more common aggravating factors are not statutory but judicially recognized. Among
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the most common of these are prior convictions, the use of a weapon, cruelty or brutality, offences
committed while subject to conditions, multiple victims or incidents, group or gang activity,
planning and organization, and the vulnerability of the victim.19 All of these were found in the
cases examined for this study and many appeared frequently.
Given the multiplicity of scenarios in which a manslaughter can unfold, the sentencing
decisions under consideration in this study offered a variety of offence-specific aggravating factors
that were frequently cited. Some of these were variations on those listed above but others were
peculiar to manslaughters and other acts of serious violence such as failing to render aid to the
victim, fleeing the scene, and taking steps to cover up involvement in the crime. It should be noted
that there were factors that, while they may appear aggravating, cannot be employed as such at
sentencing for example a failure to plead guilty, a lack of remorse, or a failure to cooperate with
authorities.20
The Criminal Code does not outline any specific mitigating factors but many have been
judicially recognized. The most frequently cited mitigating factors include the offender’s status as
a first offender, the lack of a criminal record, prior good character, guilty plea, remorse, evidence
of impairment – either mental impairment or occasionally and inconsistently intoxication,
employment record, collateral consequences such as immigration considerations or family
situation, rehabilitative efforts, and an offender’s disadvantaged background.21 In the cases
examined for this study, some other frequently cited mitigating factors were provocation,
deficiencies in the Crown’s case (where there was a guilty plea), family support, and youth. It
should be noted that Gladue factors are not considered true mitigating factors like those outlined
above. Rather, they are “mitigating in nature” and require the sentencing judge to look to the
collective experiences of Indigenous peoples rather than merely to the individual and they do not
require a causal link with the commission of the offence.22 Frequently, and particularly with coaccused, aggravating and mitigating factors will be the most apparent cause for the disparity
between sentences for otherwise similar offences.
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3. Courts of Appeal
A. Starting Points and Ranges
Categorization, ranges and starting points have developed in an attempt to rationalize
sentencing and achieve some degree of uniformity.23 Given the wide discretion conferred upon
trial courts, the potential variations in sentences, and the widespread absence of minimum
punishments for most crimes in Canada, these mechanisms are meant to ensure some measure of
parity. The Supreme Court views these tools as useful in meeting the requirements of sentencing
set out in sections 718-718.2 of the Code, noting that they have developed:
To ensure that similar sentences are imposed on similar offenders for similar
offences committed in similar circumstances – the principle of parity of sentences
– and that sentences are proportionate by guiding the exercise of… discretion, and
to prevent any substantial and marked disparities in sentences imposed on offenders
for similar crimes committed in similar circumstances.24
Despite the attempts to rationalize the sentencing process undertaken by the courts of appeal, these
mechanisms are meant to effect a uniformity in approach, rather than result.25
These tools exist to ensure “a uniform application of sentencing principles” while avoiding
the kind of rigidity that would make individualized justice impossible.26 Placing an excessive
emphasis on uniformity and parity risks creating a system in which the individual characteristics
of the offender are ignored and those of the offence hold sway. Such a system would risk
eliminating the discretionary role of sentencing judges. Criminal sentencing in United States
Federal Courts has been criticized on the grounds that the sentencing guidelines in that system are
so rigid that they ignore both the individual characteristics of the offender and the underlying
principles of sentencing.27 Parliament and the courts in Canada have rejected such an approach in
favour of one focused on the individualized nature of sentencing that continues to vest discretion
in the trial judge.
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Categorization
Given sufficient time, a “systematic assimilation of appellate decisions will provide
guidance for the exercise of sentencing discretion.”28 This assimilation will provide the body of
case law that Gillian Balfour has referred to as the “dominant sentencing discourses” which will
be drawn on by sentencing judges in crafting their decisions.29 Among these forms of appellate
guidance is categorization, defined by the Alberta Court of Appeal as “identifying a category or
categories within an offence based on varying degrees of seriousness.”30 Categorization serves as
an integral component of both starting point sentencing and ranges by narrowing the otherwise
broad categories of offences in the Criminal Code.31 Categories may serve as a first step in
establishing which starting point or range is appropriate or they may exist in isolation where neither
of those things have been established with respect to the offence.32 While categorization may not
necessarily contain set ranges or starting points, it will almost certainly form a first step in
determining the final sentence.33 Categorization of manslaughters is nearly inseparable from
ranges in the sentencing context.
Starting Points
Starting point sentencing is a practice that has been adopted sparingly in Canada. Alberta
is alone among the jurisdictions in this study to have explicitly adopted a starting approach to
sentencing although they have not done so for manslaughter. Only one of the decisions studied for
this paper mentions a starting point for manslaughter, which it identifies as one of seven years in
Saskatchewan.34 The Alberta Court of Appeal suggests that starting points represent “a logical step
in the judiciary’s efforts to reduce idiosyncratic decision-making” and play an important role in
reducing drastic divergences in sentence for serious crimes.35 They also suggest that starting points
“constitute an integral component of the proportionality principle” embodied in the 1996
sentencing reforms.36
28

Manson, Law of Sentencing, supra note 19 at 65.
Gillian Balfour, “Do Law Reforms Matter? Exploring the victimization-criminalization continuum in the
sentencing of Aboriginal women in Canada,” 19 International Review of Victimology 1, 85 (2012) at 88.
30
Arcand, supra note 15 at para 92.
31
Ibid at para 93.
32
Ibid at para 98.
33
R v Holloway, 2014 ABCA 87 at para 109.
34
R v RRF, 2008 SKCA 52 at para 9.
35
Arcand, supra note 15 at para 102.
36
Ibid at para 103.
29

45
Starting points operate within a three-step framework. The court begins by clearly defining
the category into which the particulars of the offence fall. The court will then determine the
appropriate starting point by comparing past cases and weighing policy considerations. Finally,
the court must consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that apply to the offender as
articulated in section 718.2(a) in order to determine a just and appropriate sentence.37 The Supreme
Court has recognized starting points as a legitimate tool in reducing disparity in sentencing,
particularly where the potential sentences available for the offence are sufficiently broad.38
However, the Court cautions that the process runs the risk of creating de facto minimum sentences
for certain categories of offences where Parliament has not expressly chosen to do so.39
The primary concern with all mechanisms aimed at reducing disparity is that they will act
to restrain the discretion of trial judges and by extension Parliament’s prerogative in bestowing
it.40 With this in mind, the Supreme Court was cautious in authorizing starting points. While it
permitted the practice and agreed that the departure from an appropriate starting point may be
suggestive of unfitness, such a departure alone would not be sufficient for a court of appeal to
overturn a sentence.41 Despite its fondness for starting points, the Alberta Court of Appeal in
Tallman determined that, given the vast potential difference in culpability with respect to
manslaughter, the offence did not seem to be an appropriate one for the use of a starting point
regime.42
Ranges
The most frequent mechanism for addressing disparity in sentence comes in the form of
ranges. The sentencing range has “gained wide acceptance because it is clearly a discernible
reflection on the methods of the common law applied to sentencing decisions.”43 As applied at
sentencing, a range will usually address itself to the seriousness of the offence and to the moral
blameworthiness of the offender without considering the aggravating and mitigating factors that
can serve to increase or decrease the sentence for the particular offender.44 Ranges are ordinarily
37

Ibid at paras 104-105.
Proulx, supra note 6 at paras 86-87.
39
Ibid at para 88.
40
Manson, Law of Sentencing, supra note 19 at 71.
41
R v McDonnell, [1997] 1 SCR 948 at para 43.
42
R v Tallman, 1989 ABCA 47 at para 14.
43
Ruby, Sentencing, supra note1 at 866.
44
Ibid at 866.
38

46
used in two distinct senses, either to mean one established by an appellate court to provide
guidance for future decisions or by a trial court after surveying the landscape of similar decisions.45
Though it does not change the role of the trial judge, where a court of appeal establishes a
range for a particular offence, it provides a tool to guide the trial courts in measuring the fitness of
sentence under s. 687(1) of the Criminal Code.46 While they serve to provide guidance to the trial
courts in their attempts to ensure parity, ranges do not relieve the sentencing judge of their
obligation to proceed on a case-by-case basis.47 Rather, where a case arises with a fact pattern that
is sufficiently dissimilar from others in the generally accepted range, this will serve to expand the
range of available sentences rather than create a “straightjacket to the exercise of discretion.”48
Ranges are largely a reflection of the “objective seriousness” of the offence being
sentenced.49 Endorsing the decision in Keepness, the Supreme Court explained that:
although they are used mainly to ensure the parity of sentences, they [ranges] reflect
all the principles and objectives of sentencing… [and]… are nothing more than
summaries of minimum and maximum sentences imposed in the past, which serve
in any given case as guides for the application of all the relevant principles and
objectives.50
Whatever else they may do, ranges cannot take precedence over the principle of deference. In fact,
disparity may arise “where warranted by the circumstances” in order to serve the principle of
proportionality.51
In McDonnell, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the “judicial creation of a category of
offence within a statutory offence for the purpose of sentencing” to which starting points or ranges
could attach, arguing that there was no legal basis for doing so and that it was a violation of the
principle against judicially-created offences in Frey v Fedoruk.52 However, the Court subsequently
endorsed the dissent in McDonnell and “resurrected” the idea of appending starting points and
ranges to subcategories of offences.53 The Supreme Court included the caveat that “appellate
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courts must clearly specify what category of offences are meant to be covered,” so it will not be
sufficient for the court to refer to “this kind” of a given offence.54 The Alberta Court of Appeal
has argued that the “value of a range is directly linked to the degree to which the required
sentencing rigour has been applied to defining the range and to the reasoning in the cases making
up the range” and therefore “where unifying principles might be discerned from what otherwise
appear to be a number of disparate results.”55 Ranges are designed to provide some basic scope to
the wide variety of potential sentences available for most offences in Canada which can
theoretically be extremely broad and the “margin for unwarranted disparity… great.”56
The Supreme Court endorsed the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal’s position in Muise,57
finding that the “the most that can be expected of a sentencing judge is to arrive at a sentence that
is within an acceptable range” given the variety of possible sentencing outcomes.58 In determining
the range, the trial judge does not need to engage in an exhaustive analysis of all the principles and
purposes of sentencing. They are only required to analyze the principles in sections 718-718.2 of
the Criminal Code “to the extent necessary to narrow the range of sentence for the offender.”59 In
this respect, establishing an appropriate range of sentence is only the first step in determining a
just and appropriate sanction for a given offender and a given offence. The choice of range is left
to the trial judge and subject to the same discretion before the court of appeal as other aspects of
the sentencing process.60 Should a case depart from the facts of those generally established by
other cases that have informed the range, the trial judge is entitled to depart from that range as long
as the sentence is one that accords with the principles and objectives of sentencing.61
Critically, ranges are guidelines and not rules, and “deviation from a sentencing range is
not synonymous with an error of law or an error in principle.”62 In a similar vein, it can never be
an error for a trial judge to fail to place a particular case into a particular category.63 The existence
of sentencing ranges reflect the individual cases that have preceded them, but will not govern the

54

R v Stone, [1999] 2 SCR 290 at para 245.
Arcand, supra note 15 at para 121.
56
Ibid at para 68.
57
[1994] NSJ No 487 (CA).
58
R v Shropshire, [1995] 4 SCR 227 at para 48.
59
Proulx, supra note 6 at para 59.
60
Lacasse, supra note 3 at para 51.
61
Nasogaluak, supra note 10 at para 44.
62
Lacasse, supra note 3 at para 60.
63
McDonnell, supra note 41 at para 32.
55

48
cases that follow and may be altered intentionally given an appropriate degree of consideration.64
Even where most cases will fall within the generally accepted range for an offence, cases falling
outside that range will not be treated as acceptable only in “exceptional circumstances” provided
that there has been found to be a correct application of principles.65
B. Regional Differences
Canadian sentencing law recognizes that regional differences and local conditions will
produce disparate sentences for similar offenders and similar offences. There are a number of
possible sources for such a disparity. Given the inherently individualized process of sentencing,
the Supreme Court has recognized that sentences, “should be expected to vary to some degree
across various communities and regions in this country, as the ‘just and appropriate’ mix of
acceptable sentencing goals will depend on the need and current conditions of and in the
particularly community where the crime occurred.”66
The principal justification for such disparate sentences is the prevalence of crime in a given
area. The sentencing judge should take “into account the needs and current conditions of and in
the community.”67 This state of affairs has been commented on frequently by the courts of appeal
and endorsed regularly by the Supreme Court.68 Local frequency itself is not an aggravating factor
but there may be circumstances in which it may be included in the consideration of denunciation
but it cannot be allowed to contribute to a sentence that is demonstrably unfit.69
Given the emphasis on individualization in sentencing, the trial judge is considered to be
best positioned to reach a conclusion as to the appropriate sentence. Trial judges know the local
conditions and the frequency with which particular crimes come before their courts and are
qualified to take judicial notice of such frequency.70 The trial judge is not obliged to inquire into
the conditions in other jurisdictions, their knowledge of local conditions is sufficient to justify
disparity in sentence and the courts of appeal should defer to their expertise.71
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C. Manslaughter Sentencing
Manslaughter carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment under the Criminal Code
and, except where a firearm is used, there is no minimum punishment prescribed.72 As a
consequence, the potential sentence available on a conviction for manslaughter is among the
widest for any crime. Courts of appeal have remarked that the proper range for sentencing
manslaughter runs from a suspended sentence to life imprisonment.73 Given the vast difference in
possible sentences, any manslaughter sentencing must be a fact-specific inquiry and establishing
any kind of precise range for sentencing is difficult.74 Ultimately, “[a]ny clear and definitive
principles governing the sentencing of an accused on a manslaughter conviction… have not been
realized.”75
The offence itself is infinitely mutable. Manslaughters may result from criminal
negligence, from an unintentional death resulting from another offence, or an intentional killing
mitigated by provocation or violence.76 Generally, the “well-established spectrum of culpability”
ranges between that of “near-accident” and “near murder.”77 Most sentences for manslaughter will
ordinarily be in the penitentiary range,78 and these lengthy sentences will be born of the need to
address the gravity of the offence.79 In all manslaughter cases the fact remains that the offender
has caused the death of another person. While there may be some variation in the gravity of the
offence, the result remains the same and so the gravity will always be substantial and denunciation
and general deterrence will usually predominate in the sentencing of manslaughter.80
Despite the prevalence of denunciation and deterrence in sentencing manslaughter, the
highly flexible framework for sentencing the offence is meant to account for the variability of
moral blameworthiness.81 Given the variety of circumstances that define different acts of
manslaughter running from accidental deaths to acts of violence falling short of the intent required
for murder, the scheme works to permit a sentence “tailored to suit the degree of moral fault of the
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offender.”82 This variety of moral culpability is not limited to the distinction between the “near
accident” and “near murder” divide but exists equally among a variety of impulsive killings.83 As
a consequence of the variance in moral culpability, there are a variety of categories into which
manslaughter may be placed.

4. Types of Manslaughter
Allan Manson identifies four basic categories of manslaughter: murder reduced by
provocation, manslaughter by reason of intoxication or mental disorder, unlawful act
manslaughter, and manslaughter by criminal negligence.84 This study is not concerned with
criminal negligence but concentrates instead on the other three categories. While these are useful
categories, they do not neatly correspond to the landscape of sentencing observed in the cases
surveyed here. Many of the cases informing this paper were the result of jury convictions and, as
a result, the precise basis for the conviction for manslaughter is not always evident. For the
purposes of this study, manslaughters are divided into five categories defined by the circumstances
of the offence.
The first category are those cases where intoxication by drugs or alcohol are the defining
characteristic of the offence. These sentencing decisions do not always suggest that intoxication
was sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter but they all share the common thread that the
offender was in a state of self-induced intoxication which largely precipitated the acts of violence.
The second and related category are those cases classified here as “near murder.” These cases are
not, following Manson’s definition, always defined by provocation, though that may have played
a role. They are crimes which are very similar to the drug and alcohol cases with respect to the
types of violence involved but lack the element of intoxication that defines the former.
The third category is similar to Manson’s unlawful act category. This paper deals with
cases where the manslaughter occurred as part of a home invasion or robbery. These are separated
from the fourth category of deaths by arson. This distinction is made because arson cases, like the
home invasion and robbery category, have a distinctive sentencing regime and applicable cases as
well as a tendency to draw lengthier sentences. The final category used for this paper may be
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classified as “one-punch” cases and those involving unusual circumstances. These are cases in
which violence was employed by the offender but death resulted from a fluke occurrence. They
most commonly involved the offender striking the victim once, causing them to lose consciousness
and hit their head on the ground, dying as a result. These were treated by sentencing judges as
distinct from the near murder and drug and alcohol cases given the high degree of chance involved
in the resulting death.

A. Near Murder
The Manitoba Court of Appeal has commented that many of the cases that eventually result
in manslaughter sentences are such that they would, had the required intent been present, have
resulted in a conviction for murder.85 While some of these cases fall into the drugs and alcohol
category, the majority fall into the category defined here as “near murder” killings. Many of these
cases are defined by brutality or prolonged application of violence and the resulting sentences are
ordinarily in the range of 4-12 years.86 Clayton Ruby suggests that like most categories of
manslaughter, these cases often feature heavy drinking.87 Despite the presence of intoxication in
many of these cases, this paper distinguishes between these cases and those where the sentencing
judge places a special emphasis on the role of drugs and alcohol in the commission of the offence.
This category represented 99 offenders in total, of whom 27 were Indigenous.

B. Drugs and Alcohol
Notwithstanding their similarities, cases where drugs and alcohol predominate will
generally be sentenced in a fashion similar to the near murder cases but evidence suggests that
these cases will ordinarily find themselves at the lower end of the general 4-12 year range that
defines both categories.88 Notwithstanding the extreme levels of intoxication involved in these
offences, the accused will not be permitted to benefit from this at sentencing since they have
already benefitted by having the charge of murder reduced to manslaughter.89 This is distinct from
the issue of provocation, where the Supreme Court has ruled that it is a legitimate consideration
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both in reducing murder to manslaughter and in determining the offender’s moral culpability at
sentencing.90 Cases of this kind represent the second-largest category after near murder and they
comprise the majority of cases involving Indigenous offenders, accounting for 52 offenders in
total, of whom 43 were Indigenous.
C. Home Invasion/Robbery
Manslaughters occurring during an indictable offence are sentenced more severely than the
more spontaneous variety.91 Besides those involving arson, the only other cases defined by
indictable offences here involved manslaughters committed in the course of robberies and home
invasions. The element of premeditation present in these cases, along with the greater tendency of
offenders to have prior records for similar offences tend to result in higher sentences for offenders.
In addition, the courts will often seek to deter acts committed for financial gain with stiffer
punishments. This category accounted for 14 offenders in total of whom three were Indigenous.

D. Arson
The second category of indictable offence manslaughters arising in these cases involved
arsons. In many cases it is unclear whether the fire was set with the intention of killing or doing
bodily harm to the victim or if that was merely its result. Notwithstanding the intent of the offender,
these cases are ordinarily sentenced more severely than other types of manslaughter. In some of
these cases this will be the result of multiple victims being killed in the resulting fire, but even
where there is only one victim the potential for public endangerment will result in higher sentences
on average. In all there were six offenders convicted for arson-related manslaughters, of whom
half were Indigenous.
E. Unusual Circumstances and One Punch Cases
The final distinct category of manslaughters sentenced in this material are the so-called
“one-punch” cases and those involving unusual circumstances. These are cases that are primarily
defined by brief episodes of violence and will tend to attract sentences in the range of one to four
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years.92 Judges often remark that these cases are particularly hard to sentence given the substantial
gravity of the offence and the outsized role played by chance in the resulting death. Decisions
falling into this category represented a very small proportion of cases overall but they were almost
all among those with the shortest sentences. There were a total of four one-punch offenders, half
of whom were Indigenous and three unusual circumstances cases, one of which involved an
Indigenous offender.

F. Domestic Manslaughter
A substantial proportion of these cases, whatever category they fell into, involved the
killing of a spouse or other intimate partner. While the killing of an intimate partner is a statutorilymandated aggravating factor under the Criminal Code, these cases do not appear to be substantially
different from many other cases of manslaughter and will attract a wide range of sentences.93
Notwithstanding the potential range of sentences, in the cases under examination domestic
manslaughters appeared to be sentenced more harshly than non-domestic ones.

G. Mental Illness
Another common feature of manslaughter cases are offenders who are suffering from
varying degrees of mental illness that fall short of a finding of not criminally responsible on
account of mental disorder. Nonetheless, the offender’s mental illness will affect their moral
blameworthiness and by consequence the sentence, but it will not be sufficient to negative criminal
liability altogether.94 In these cases, the sentence may also be strongly affected by the potential
treatment options made available or restricted by the choice of a federal or provincial institution.

5. Manslaughter and Sentencing Ranges
The Supreme Court has not endorsed any range of sentence with respect to manslaughter,
they have only said that the possible range of sentences lies between one day and life
imprisonment.95 The British Columbia Court of Appeal have repeatedly endorsed a similar line of
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thinking, defining the only legally binding range for the offence as being one between a suspended
sentence and life imprisonment as outlined in the Criminal Code.96 As noted, courts of appeal can
establish ranges for particular types of offences to serve as guidelines to the trial courts but these
cannot be binding.
Given the wide scope of circumstances and offenders that can come under the umbrella of
manslaughter, it was considered particularly ill-suited to the use of a starting point regime by the
Alberta Court of Appeal.97 While the Supreme Court did not decide that ranges were inappropriate
for the sentencing of manslaughter, they cautioned that the type of manslaughter to which a range
was applied would need to be defined with some precision to be of use to sentencing judges and
therefore permissible. In Stone, the Court noted that a “need for clear direction applies to ranges
set by appellate courts” and that a court of appeal’s reference simply to “this kind of manslaughter”
provided no useful clarity.98
The dubious utility of ranges for the exercise of manslaughter sentencing has not prevented
their proliferation in the courts of appeal, particularly among the most common forms of
manslaughter such as the near murder and drug and alcohol cases. Despite the individualized
nature of sentencing and the wide range of sentences available for manslaughter, patterns
nonetheless repeat and many cases emerge that bear striking similarities to those that have come
before. Most courts of appeal in the jurisdictions under consideration here have some form of
established range for at least some forms of manslaughter. Among the different types of
manslaughter categories defined above, there are distinct bodies of cases that tend to regularly
guide the sentencing practice of courts.

6. Provinces and Territories
A. Ontario
The Ontario Court of Appeal has gone back and forth on the issue of the appropriate range
for manslaughter sentencing and whether it is worthwhile to affix labels to subcategories. In 2003,
the court in Clarke found that a range of 8-12 years was appropriate for what they identified as a
case of “aggravated manslaughter.” In that decision, a highly intoxicated rooming house resident
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brutally attacked another elderly resident with a knife, attempting to divert suspicion before
ultimately confessing.99
Three years later in Devaney, the Ontario Court of Appeal rejected the idea of “aggravated
manslaughter” as a useful definition. A panel composed of Rosenberg, Goudge, and Feldman JJA
wrote:
it is not useful to attach a label to a subcategory of the offence, then try to
pigeonhole the facts of any case into the label. Adding a descriptive label to a set
of facts within the defined offence adds a level of complexity to the sentencing
exercise that is both unnecessary and potentially diverting for the court and could
lead to errors. Nor do I read this court’s decision in Clarke as adopting that
approach.100
The court rejected the naming of subcategories of manslaughter and insisted that each offender
must be subject to a case-by-case analysis.101 Four days later, another panel of the Ontario Court
of Appeal composed of Cronk, Lang and MacFarland JJA ruled in Cleyndert that the sentence
handed down by the trial judge was not outside the appropriate range for an “aggravated
manslaughter” in Ontario.102
Despite the obvious clarity of the panel in Devaney, the trial courts in Ontario continued
either to adopt103 or dismiss as inappropriate104 the designation of “aggravated manslaughter.”
Whatever the prevailing appellate perspective is on the propriety of defining subcategories of
manslaughter, the concept of an aggravated manslaughter accompanied by an appropriate range of
8-12 years continues to predominate in sentencing in Ontario. Manslaughter sentences fitting the
near murder and drug and alcohol categories are overwhelmingly understood as having a range
somewhere around 8-12 years. This range is also evident in the sentencing submissions of Crown
and defence counsel. In reference to this range for aggravated manslaughter the Ontario Court of
Appeal held that, where appropriate, it is always within the power of the sentencing judge to depart
from a range of sentence where circumstances exist that “distinguish the situation significantly
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from other cases where sentences were imposed in the range”.105 Whether or not the categorization
of aggravated manslaughter exists in Ontario as a legal concept at the Court of Appeal, it exists in
practice in the trial courts.

B. British Columbia
The British Columbia Court of Appeal continues to emphasize that manslaughter cases
exist on a spectrum of near accident to near murder and that this is a factual determination for the
sentencing judge.106 For many years, British Columbia has relied on the decision in Gillies in
discussions of the potential range for manslaughter.107 Here, the court of appeal outlined their basic
understanding of sentencing manslaughter by noting that:
While the Criminal Code prescribes a range of from suspended sentence to life,
four to six years has been the usual range for most manslaughter cases for as long
as I can remember.
There are, of course, other cases where sentences of eight to ten years or more have
been given. In most of these cases, however, there were other factors that made the
offence much more serious. Cases were cited where there was torture, long records
of violence offences, violence against a spouse, woman or child, and killing in the
course of a robbery.108
This structure bears a striking similarity to that which has been in operation in Ontario with respect
to “aggravated manslaughter,” where cases resembling those outlined by the court in Gillies are
sentenced in excess of ten years.
The Gillies ranges were later expanded by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Green,
and both cases were cited with roughly the same frequency. There, the Court of Appeal stated its
view that “most cases fall within the period of four to 15 years. A sentence below or above that
range is imposed only in a case involving special circumstances.”109 While these two cases were
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the most frequently cited, in Andrew110 in 2008, the Court of Appeal revived the pre-Gillies
standard from Mintert.111 Here, the Court of Appeal endorsed the trial judge’s view that:
A review of the British Columbia Court of Appeal cases since 1990 dealing with
the sentencing in manslaughter cases provides sentences from a suspended sentence
to life imprisonment. The lower range involves a near accidental death and very
special circumstances where the moral culpability of the offender is at the lowest.
In my opinion the next range involves sentences where the culpability of the
offender is such that the principle of general deterrence warrants a sentence of one
to seven years.
The next range involves sentences resulting in incarceration for six to twelve years
where the need is to remove the offender from the community to meet [sic] risk that
the offender presents after careful consideration of all the circumstances and the
need for general deterrence; and the maximum sentence I’ve already discussed.112
To this, the court in Andrew added only that in their view the bottom end of the range, absent
unusual circumstances was four years’ imprisonment.
The consensus in British Columbia is that the appropriate range for a manslaughter
sentence is between 4-15 years with sentences above or below for cases involving special or
unusual circumstances.113 Circumstances justifying non-custodial sentences are most likely to
appear in cases “marked by carelessness or near accident as opposed to violence.”114 However,
absent such exceptional, special or unusual circumstances, general deterrence and denunciation in
the sentencing of manslaughter will require a custodial sentence.115 In keeping with the Supreme
Court’s guidance on the question of sentencing ranges, the British Columbia Court of Appeal
recognizes that a departure from the recognized range does not constitute an error.116
British Columbia is alone is establishing a range of sentence for manslaughter that
specifically addresses cases involving Indigenous offenders. Citing the need for sentencing
Indigenous offenders to focus primarily on rehabilitation rather than denunciation and deterrence,
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the British Columbia Court of Appeal suggested that “a range of sentence for a young Aboriginal
offender with no prior record who committed manslaughter… appears to be generally between
three and eight years imprisonment with sentences of one and ten years at the outer ends.”117 Other
jurisdictions discuss the particular circumstances of Indigenous offenders and the need to address
rehabilitation, but British Columbia is alone in suggesting a potential range of sentence that is
unique to this group.

C. Alberta
Since 1995 manslaughter sentencing in Alberta has been governed by Laberge.118 This case
breaks down manslaughters into three categories based on moral culpability. The court states that:
Unlawful acts may be divided into three broad groups: those which are likely to put
the victim at risk of, or cause bodily injury; those which are likely to put the victim
at risk of, or cause, serious bodily injury and those that are likely to put the victim
at risk of, or cause, life-threatening injury. Only when the offender’s proven
mental state at the time of the commission of the offence is evaluated in the context
of the crime itself, in other words in terms of its relative degree of seriousness, is it
possible to classify for sentencing purposes the degree of fault inherent in the crime
committed.119
In order to complete the picture with respect to the culpability of the individual, the sentencing
judge must then consider “those personal characteristics of the offender which would mitigate or
aggravate culpability.”120
The Alberta Court of Appeal suggests that this sort of categorization is critical in
articulating intelligible principles for sentencing manslaughter and without engaging in such an
exercise, the public would not be able to discern any logic in determining sentence.121 They also
maintain that the Laberge categories are designed to satisfy the requirements of parity and
proportionality and so allow a predictable pattern of sentencing.122 However, the court insists that:
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The approach in Laberge does not fix any numbers for any of the categories. Nor,
for that matter does it insist that a case in a particular category will necessarily be
responded to by a sentence which might not also fit a different category. There are,
after all, other factors to consider. Laberge proposes a careful consistency in
approach, not arithmetic.123
This is in keeping with the court’s directive in Laberge that the categories did not represent
“gradually escalating degrees of moral culpability as one moves from one to the other.”124
Despite the Court of Appeal’s position to the contrary, dissenting justices have pointed out
that the claims of Laberge to a disinterested and rational categorization of manslaughter does not
reflect the practical reality. Berger JA offered a pointed criticism of the Alberta Court of Appeal’s
protestations in his dissent in Holloway.125 Justice Berger argued that whatever the Court of Appeal
may believe, trial courts will view the Laberge categories as consisting of an escalating scale and
will sentence accordingly and without regard to the individual characteristics of the offender.126
He suggests the Laberge categorization has the effect of creating three categories of manslaughter
and offers the view that the trial courts have already taken up the process of populating those
ranges with numbers and creating de facto subcategories of judicially-created manslaughter.127
In doing so, Berger JA argues that the Laberge scheme relegates the personal
characteristics of the offender to merely another category of aggravating or mitigating factors and
in doing so usurps Parliament’s prerogative by unduly constraining discretion.128 He argues this
has led to a situation where:
Notwithstanding the vehement protests of appellate decisions in this jurisdiction…
that Laberge does not establish a grid, it does just that when, with the enthusiastic
approval of this Court, the categories are populated with numbers. The practical
effect is to constrain the exercise of discretion of sentencing judges in the trial
courts and to facilitate appellate intervention on the basis that ‘in fixing the
category, the judge got it wrong’. Laberge quacks and walks like a grid.129
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Justice Berger is passionate in his criticism but he is correct in his view that the trial courts are
busy populating the Laberge categories with sentence ranges. The majority in Holloway itself
noted that the case at bar, which fit the third Laberge category of culpability, was similar to other
cases involving factors such as protracted brutality, weapons and vulnerable victims and that the
Alberta Court of Appeal had generally found that such cases warranted sentences greater than ten
years or alternatively in the range of eight to twelve years. They insisted they were not
“recognizing or adjudicating a starting point for such situations” but merely noting “that in a de
facto way something of a range of that sort appears to be reflected in the present selection of
decisions of this Court and some from other jurisdictions.”130
The population of categories with ranges can be seen in Valente, an Alberta Court of
Queen’s Bench case cited by half the Alberta cases examined for this study. Here, the sentencing
judge determined that the offender’s actions fit the middle Laberge category involving the risk of
serious bodily injury. For this category, the court found that it:
covers a broad range of circumstances and therefore a wide variety of sentences.
The low end of the range is generally about 3.5 or 4 years’ imprisonment, although
there are cases… where sentences of 2 or 3 years were imposed. The higher end of
the range is generally about 6 or 7 years, although again there are unusual cases
where higher sentence have been imposed. The higher end of the range has mostly
been applied where there were weapons involved or prolonged and extreme
violence.131
Here there is evidence that the second Laberge category, involving sentences of approximately
3.5-7 years, appears to fill a similar role to cases just below Ontario’s “aggravated manslaughter”
categorization or the lower half of the standard British Columbia range of 4-15 years’
imprisonment. As noted, Holloway, which was cited in approximately half of Alberta cases under
consideration, suggests a potential range for the third Laberge category of ten or more years, or
eight to twelve years. This is roughly in line with the “aggravated manslaughter” designation in
Ontario and the upper half of the British Columbia range. Notwithstanding the objections of the
majority in Holloway, the concerns of the dissent seem to have been borne out in the application
of the Laberge scheme at the trial level.
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D. Saskatchewan
In 1990 the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal surveyed the historical landscape for
manslaughter sentencing in the province over the previous quarter century. They found that
between 1965 and 1980, sentences in the three to five year range were common for manslaughters,
and sentences in the seven to eight year range increasingly common throughout the 1980s.132 The
court credited these increases in sentence with a response to the mounting prevalence of the crime
in the jurisdiction and the need to emphasize general deterrence in an effort to protect the public.133
The increase in sentence range has continued in Saskatchewan in the three decades since Zimmer
and, like Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta, Saskatchewan assigns ranges to types of
manslaughter.
Interestingly, Saskatchewan has also adopted a starting point with respect to manslaughter.
In RRF, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, stressing the need for deterrence in sentencing the
crime, found that seven years’ imprisonment was an appropriate starting point.134 This seven-year
starting point for manslaughter is determined generally and without reference to the specifics of
either the offender of the offence. It is only subsequently that the circumstances of the offender
and aggravating and mitigating circumstances are examined.135
Following an analysis of case law in the province in 2010, the Saskatchewan Court of
Appeal adopted a specific range of four to twelve years for “manslaughter involving brutality and
alcohol or drugs.”136 This range had been adopted earlier by the Court of Queen’s Bench for
Saskatchewan with the caveat that sentences falling outside the four to twelve year range “ought
to occur only in the most unusual, exceptional or extenuating circumstances.”137 The court in
Keepness, endorsed the Hathway model but cautioned that:
This language may lead a judge to conclude incorrectly that the lower and upper
limits of the range are more fixed than they are, or that they are to be departed from
in only the rarest of cases. No matter how one tries to delimit the type of case for
which the range for manslaughter is being set, the description will remain nebulous
132
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and the circumstances variable. Correct application of the principles of sentencing
should mean there are fewer sentences falling outside the range for manslaughter
than within in, but in the exercise of their discretion, judges may depart, without
introducing disparity, where the circumstances of the case are beyond those
customarily found at the lower or upper end of the range.138
The category of manslaughter defined by the court of appeal in Keepness – those involving
brutality and alcohol or drugs – accounted for the overwhelming majority of cases of manslaughter
that came before the courts in this study. Given the application of the decision at the trial level,
Keepness appears to address itself to cases involving drugs and alcohol as well as cases where
brutality is present but intoxication is not. In Saskatchewan, therefore, cases falling under the near
murder and drugs and alcohol categories are generally subject to sentences between four and
twelve years under the Keepness regime.

E. Manitoba
Unlike the other provinces examined, the Court of Appeal for Manitoba has declined to
assign numerical ranges to the sentencing of manslaughter. In their place, they have suggested
general principles to guide sentencing courts. The court has declined to recognize a difference
between voluntary and involuntary manslaughters noting that “the element of provocation (which
may reduce a murderous killing to a manslaughter) and drunkenness (which may reduce a culpable
homicide to manslaughter because the requisite intent of murder is not proved) often merge… in
particular factual circumstances.”139 The court indicates that while involuntary manslaughters
involving alcohol will attract sentences at the lower end compared to voluntary manslaughters,
that heavy sentences are nonetheless reserved for drunken killings involving heavily intoxicated
offenders and brutality.140
Though lacking specifics, the Manitoba Court of Appeal outlined a series of general
considerations to guide the trial courts in sentencing manslaughter. They noted, as in
Saskatchewan, that there had been a general increase in the length of sentences in Manitoba as a
reflection of the need to protect society and that the two paramount considerations in determining
an appropriate sentence will be the culpability of the offender and the extent of the violence or
138
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brutality involved in the offence.141 With respect to the appropriate range for manslaughter, the
court noted that the range offered by the Criminal Code moving from a suspended sentence to life
imprisonment was not a particularly useful guide. While technically true, in reality:
this is not the range of reasonable sentences available to a trial judge in any
particular case. The available range will be much narrower and its limits fixed by
reference to the circumstances of the offence and the offender and, most
particularly, the degree of the offender’s blameworthiness. The higher the degree
of blameworthiness, the higher will be the range.142
Unlike the Alberta Court of Appeal, which has a tendency to keep a hand on the tiller of the trial
courts, the Manitoba Court of Appeal prefers to defer to the expertise of the trial courts in
determining appropriate sentences.

F. The Territories
A survey of territorial court of appeal jurisprudence on manslaughter sentencing is bare.
There are few cases dealing with manslaughter and none address ranges or sentence quantum.
Consequently, the determination of sentences for manslaughter in Yukon, the Northwest
Territories and Nunavut appears to be left more or less to the trial courts. Much of the membership
of the Courts of Appeal of the Northwest Territories and Nunavut are drawn from the Alberta
Court of Appeal and those of the Yukon Court of Appeal from the British Columbia Court of
Appeal. It is fair to say that the influence of these jurisdictions on the jurisprudence of the territories
is strong.
One recurring theme in the manslaughter jurisprudence of the territorial trial courts is the
importance of local conditions to sentencing. These courts tend to focus on the distinctive nature
of life and society in the north, in particular the reality that most of the offenders coming before
these courts for sentencing on convictions for serious and violent crimes are Indigenous. Nunavut
manslaughter sentencing decisions in particular concentrate on the unique local conditions in the
territory, placing particular emphasis on the social issues affecting the Inuit population. The
Nunavut Court of Justice therefore frequently emphasizes the need for deterrent sentences given
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the high levels of domestic homicide and violent crime and their strong connection to
uncontrollable alcohol consumption.143

7. Conclusion
Having outlined the general scheme for sentencing manslaughter in Canada and the
regimes of the jurisdictions under examination, this chapter sought to provide an overview of the
prevailing court of appeal jurisprudence with respect to the sentencing of manslaughter across
different provinces and territories. The next chapter will assess how these regimes operate in
practice. It will also present the major statistical findings of this paper comparing the sentence
outcomes for Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders for manslaughter generally and within the
subcategories of manslaughter outlined in this chapter.
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Chapter Four: Comparative Sentencing Outcomes for Indigenous
and Non-Indigenous Offenders
1. Introduction
This chapter examines the differences in sentence outcomes between Indigenous and nonIndigenous offenders across all categories of manslaughter and among the jurisdictions examined
for this study. It begins with an outline of the study as it was conceived and carried out. It then
proceeds to analyze the general data on manslaughter drawn from the study before assessing that
information across different categories of manslaughter and different jurisdictions. This section
concludes with a comparison of the near murder and drug and alcohol categories. These two
categories account for the overwhelming proportion of offenders in this study and they
demonstrate some interesting differences between the treatment of Indigenous and non-Indigenous
offenders based on the category of manslaughter in which they were sentenced.

2. Plan of Study
This study is designed to examine the process of sentencing for manslaughter to determine
if there is a different methodology employed in sentencing Indigenous offenders and, if so, what
results it produces. The object is to take the measure of the landscape over the recent past. One
problem with the earlier studies discussed above was the use of a pre-Ipeelee comparator group
which is, in effect, a different jurisprudential regime for sentencing Indigenous offenders. This
project aims to avoid that by drawing on cases exclusively from the post-Ipeelee period. This study
is focused on a single violent offence sentenced at one level of court with the aim of addressing
the application of the Gladue provisions to sentencing offenders for serious and violent crimes.
The decisions for this project were drawn from Ontario, British Columbia, Alberta,
Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Yukon, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut. It does not deal with
cases drawn from Quebec or the Atlantic provinces. The omissions of these provinces is meant to
allow the study to concentrate on areas with large Indigenous populations. With the exception of
Ontario, all the provinces and territories under consideration have Indigenous populations that are
greater than the 4.85% national figure. The proportion of the population that is Indigenous in these
jurisdictions varies from a low of just under 3% in Ontario to a high of over 85% in Nunavut and

66
a provincial high of nearly 18% in Manitoba.1 These five provinces and three territories account
for over 80% of Canada’s Indigenous population.2
These jurisdictions, with the exception of Ontario, also have elevated levels of violent
crime compared to the national average. Between 2013 and 2017, each of these provinces and
territories - except Ontario - had police-reported rates of violent crime above the national average,
often by considerable margins.3 Not only do these jurisdictions consistently have high levels of
violent crime but in the same period they accounted for over 85% of all homicides reported in
Canada and almost 95% of all homicides in which the accused was identified as Indigenous.4 Given
that these jurisdictions account for an overwhelming number of homicides committed in Canada
and particularly those alleged to have been committed by Indigenous offenders, they represent
fertile ground for conducting this study. While Ontario’s levels of violent crime and homicide are
consistently below the national average, the province nonetheless accounts for nearly 40% of the
country’s population and a large proportion of its Indigenous people, its inclusion is therefore
important to provide a thorough survey of the national landscape. While Nunavut and the
Northwest Territories only represented 0.31% of the total population from these jurisdictions,
those territories produced 8% of all the manslaughter offenders.5 Notwithstanding this substantial
share of the total number of manslaughter offenders, both territories still maintained the lowest
average sentences for drug and alcohol manslaughters.6
To maximize the number of cases available, this study collected all manslaughter
sentencing decisions reported in CanLII, Westlaw and Quicklaw for the period 2013 to 2018
inclusive. The intention was to gather as complete a sample set as possible but one confined by
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time and offence to allow a detailed assessment of how the Gladue provisions function within the
sentencing process and what outcomes result. The cases produced in the initial search represent all
the sentencing decisions reported in those databases in that time period and sentenced before the
superior courts. The initial search resulted in 217 sentencing decisions from within the jurisdictions
and time period.
This study deals only with unlawful act manslaughter and not manslaughter by criminal
negligence. This is because it is meant to examine the application of the Gladue provisions to
crimes of violence. While some crimes of violence may fall under the heading of criminal
negligence, most were cases of unlawful act manslaughter. Cases involving the sentencing of
accessories for manslaughter have been omitted in order to concentrate on those who have
participated directly in the violent act leading to the death of the victim. Cases involving young
offenders have been omitted, as have those cases involving the deaths of children to concentrate
on violence committed between adults. Those cases involving dangerous offender and long-term
supervision order applications have also been omitted since these decisions tend to concentrate
primarily on the designation itself. Finally, some decisions were so threadbare that they did not
include enough information beyond the sentence quantum to be useful and were omitted. As a
result of removing these cases, the material under consideration consists of 167 cases representing
sentencing decisions for 179 discrete offenders.
The core of this study is a survey of the decisions carried out to determine the outcome and
the judge’s reasoning in reaching their conclusions. This survey recorded the date, the presiding
judge, the jurisdiction and district, the Indigenous status of the offender, the age of the offender
and victim, the gender of the offender and victim, the relationship between the two, a description
of the offence, the sentence quantum (gross and net), time spent on remand, the original charge
(i.e. whether manslaughter was a lesser included offence), reference to Indigenous-specific
sanctions or correctional programs, aggravating and mitigating factors, Indigenous-specific
mitigating factors, the two stages of the Gladue analysis, the offender’s criminal record, the
offender’s history of violence, the sentencing principles cited, and justifications for sentence. This
data was analyzed in light of provincial sentencing jurisprudence for manslaughter to allow
comparisons between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders and between and within
jurisdictions. Drawing out this information permits an analysis of the judicial decision-making
process for a particular offence across jurisdictions and between Indigenous and non-Indigenous
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comparator groups in order to answer the core question of whether there is a different methodology
at work and if so, what differences in outcome it produces.
The first part of this analysis presents an overview of the landscape of manslaughter
sentencing in the cases surveyed. This section examines the characteristics of offences such as the
subcategory of manslaughter, the manner of death, the age of the offender, their relationship to the
victim, the type of trial chosen by the offender, joint submissions, the positions of the parties at
contested sentencings, and the age and gender distribution of offenders. The second half of this
section examines the sentencing outcomes by subcategory of manslaughter and jurisdiction to
highlight differences and similarities between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders across
types of manslaughter and jurisdictions.

3. National Manslaughter Data
A. National, Annual and Provincial Data Totals
Of the 179 offenders examined in this study, 80 were Indigenous and 99 were nonIndigenous. The vast majority of decisions came from Ontario and British Columbia with 59 and
67 offenders respectively of whom 12 and 40 were Indigenous. The prairie provinces produced
another 38 offenders divided between Alberta with 14, Saskatchewan with 10 and Manitoba with
12 each. These provinces produced five, nine and 11 Indigenous offenders respectively. The
Yukon produced one Indigenous and one non-Indigenous offender. The Northwest Territories and
Nunavut produced six and nine decisions respectively, with all offenders identified as Indigenous.
Manitoba, Saskatchewan, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut all had proportions of
Indigenous offenders in excess of 90%. Alberta and British Columbia had proportions of
approximately 35% and 40% respectively, and Ontario some 20%. Half the cases in the Yukon
dealt with Indigenous offenders but since there were only two cases in the data, this was
insufficient to come to any conclusions about the general distribution between Indigenous and
non-Indigenous offenders for that territory.
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Table 4.1 – Sentencing Decisions by Jurisdiction, Year and Indigenous Status
2013 Ind.
2013 Tot.
2014 Ind.
2014 Tot.
2015 Ind.
2015 Tot.
2016 Ind.
2016 Tot.
2017 Ind.
2017 Tot.
2018 Ind.
2018 Tot.
Tot. Ind.
Tot. Non
Overall
Prov. %

ON
1
10
5
1
8
5
14
3
8
2
14
12
47
59
20.33

BC
5
7
7
13
3
9
3
7
4
15
5
16
27
40
67
40.29

AB
1
2
1
1
1
2
1
1
5
1
3
5
9
14
35.71

SK
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
3
2
2
9
1
10
90.00

MB
4
4
3
3
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
11
1
12
91.66

YK
1
1
1
1
1
2
50.00

NT
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
1
6
6
100.0

NU
1
1
1
1
3
3
4
4
9
9
100.0

Total
14
26
14
25
10
25
18
31
12
35
12
37
80
99
179
44.69

Ann. %
53.84
56.00
40.00
58.06
34.28
32.43
44.69
55.31
-

B. Manner of Death
The most common methods of committing manslaughter in these cases were stabbing
(48.60%), beating (24.02%) and shooting (15.64%) followed by arson (3.35%), strangulation
(4.04%) and the “one-punch” and unusual circumstances cases (3.34%). The method of homicide
remained largely consistent between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders with stabbings the
leading cause of death in both groups of cases. However, there were two significant differences
between the two groups. Just over 20% of all cases involving a non-Indigenous offender resulted
from a shooting; among Indigenous offenders, this was less than 10%. Conversely, nearly one third
of Indigenous offenders killed the deceased by beating them to death. The comparable figure for
non-Indigenous offenders was slightly less than 20%.
Table 4.2 – Cause of Death
Indigenous
Percentage
Non-Ind.
Percentage
Total

Stabbing

Shooting

Beating

Strangle

Vehicle

40
50.00
47
47.47
87

7
8.75
21
21.21
28

25
31.25
18
18.18
43

1
1.25
4
4.04
5

1
1.25
2
2.02
3

One
Punch
2
2.50
2
2.02
4

Arson

Unusual

Unknown

Total

3
3.75
3
3.03
6

0
2
2.02
2

1
1.25
0
1

80
99
179

C. Relationship to Victim
The most common relationships between victims and offenders in these cases were
strangers (32.59%), acquaintances (32.59%), family relationships (11.59%), spousal relationships
(9.38%), and intimate relationships (8.28%), with the relationship in the remaining cases not
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discernible from the decision (5.52%).7 Like the figures for cause of death, the relationship
between the victim and the offender were largely similar between Indigenous and non-Indigenous
offenders. The figures for familial, spousal and intimate relationships, for example, were nearly
identical. The most substantial difference between the two groups comes with respect to strangers
and acquaintances. Non-Indigenous offenders (40.59%) were nearly twice as likely to kill a
stranger than were Indigenous offenders (22.5%). Conversely, cases involving Indigenous
offenders were slightly more likely to involve the death of an acquaintance than those with nonIndigenous offenders. This may be a result of larger numbers of Indigenous offenders living in
smaller communities such as First Nations’ reserves where they were less likely to encounter
strangers.
Table 4.3 – Relationship to Victim
Indigenous Number
Indigenous Percentage
Non-Ind. Number
Non-Ind. Percentage
Total Number
Total Percentage

Stranger
18
22.50
41
40.59
59
32.59

Acquaintance
29
36.35
30
29.70
59
32.59

Spouse
9
9.25
8
9.22
17
9.38

Intimate
8
10.00
7
6.93
15
8.28

Relative
8
10.00
13
12.87
21
11.59

Unknown
6
07.50
4
03.96
10
05.52

D. Original Charge and Trial Type
It has been noted by the Manitoba Court of Appeal that it is quite rare that a conviction for
manslaughter will arise from a charge of manslaughter and this is likely the result of
“overcharging” on the part of the Crown.8 While no opinion is offered on the latter conclusion, the
former is borne out by the evidence from this study. For 37 of the 179 offenders examined here,
the sentencing decision did not indicate the original charge. However, that information was
available in the remaining cases and confirms the observations of the Manitoba court. Among
cases where information was available, nearly nine in ten cases resulted from an indictment
alleging murder. The overwhelming number of these charges were for second degree murder
(69%), with first degree murder (15.49%), unspecified murder (4.22%), and manslaughter
(11.26%) charges accounting for the remainder. In the sample set of cases reviewed, nonIndigenous offenders were more than twice as likely to be charged with first degree murder
compared with Indigenous offenders. Similarly, Indigenous offenders were charged with murder
7

“Intimate relationship” includes current and former intimate partners; “spousal relationship” includes current,
former and separated spouses; “acquaintance” includes criminal relationship.
8
R v Csincsa (1993), 85 Man R (2d) 241 (CA) at 17.
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in nearly two-thirds of cases (63.75%) compared with non-Indigenous offenders in more than
three-quarters of cases (75.57%).
Table 4.4 – Original Charge
Ontario
British Columbia
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Yukon
NWT
Nunavut
Total
Percentage
Percentage Where
Charge is Known

First Degree

Second Degree

13
7
2
22
12.29
15.49

35
37
5
5
6
2
2
6
98
54.74
69.00

Murder –
Unspecified
3
2
1
6
03.35
04.22

Manslaughter

Unknown

3
10
1
1
1
16
8.93
11.26

5
11
7
4
5
4
1
37
20.67
n/a

More than half of all convictions for manslaughter arose from guilty pleas (55.86%),
followed by trials by judge and jury (27.37%) and trials by judge alone (15.08%). Indigenous
offenders demonstrated a slight preference for pleading guilty (60%) over non-Indigenous
offenders (52.52%). However, non-Indigenous offenders were twice as likely to opt for a trial by
judge and jury (35.35%) than Indigenous ones (17.5%). Jury trials were most common in Ontario
where over 60% of offenders opted for them. This was in contrast to British Columbia where only
one in ten offenders chose trial by judge and jury. Judge alone trials, while the rarest overall, were
favoured in relative terms by offenders in British Columbia who opted for them in nearly one
quarter of cases regardless of whether the offenders was Indigenous or non-Indigenous.
The near murder and drug and alcohol categories formed 84% of the body of cases used in
this study but they accounted for 91% of all guilty pleas. Therefore discussions of guilty pleas and
joint submissions will mostly be conducted with respect to these two subcategories. Ontario and
British Columbia, the two largest provinces in this study, accounted for 65 of the 100 offenders
who pleaded guilty. This figure was relatively close to their combined total of seven in ten cases
overall. However, there was a clear disparity between the two provinces. British Columbia
accounted for a disproportionate number of guilty pleas at 43 out of 100, or approximately 64% of
all cases resolved in this fashion. Ontario represented the opposite end of the spectrum with only
22 guilty pleas accounting for some 37% of trials.
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Table 4.5 - Trial Type
Total
Percentage of Total
Indigenous
Percentage of
Indigenous
Non-Indigenous
Percentage of NonIndigenous

Guilty Plea
100
55.86
48
60.00

Jury
49
27.37
14
17.50

Judge Alone
27
15.08
15
18.75

Unknown
3
01.67
3
03.75

52
52.52

35
35.35

12
12.12

-

E. Guilty Pleas and Joint Submissions
It is a well-established principle of sentencing that where an offender has pleaded guilty
they can expect to receive a more lenient sentence compared with one who has not. However, this
was not strictly true in these manslaughter cases and a close examination of the figures suggests
an interesting contradiction. A simple comparison of offenders who did and did not plead guilty
in the drug and alcohol category found that guilty pleas resulted in sentences that were less than
one month shorter. A comparable examination of the figures for near murder manslaughters
showed that guilty pleas resulted in sentences that were longer on average by one month.
Dividing the guilty pleas between contested sentencings and those arrived at by way of a
joint submission suggests an explanation. The average near murder sentence coming about through
a guilty plea and determined by a trial judge was slightly less than seven years and nine months or
nearly nine months shorter than cases where the offender did not plead guilty. By comparison,
cases involving a joint submission had an average sentence just short of nine years, a figure that
was ten months longer than those who opted for a trial. A similar pattern was discernible in drug
and alcohol cases, where joint submissions resulted in sentences that were 20 months longer than
offenders who did not plead guilty and over 30 months longer among those who pleaded guilty
but contested the sentence. This pattern was common to Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders.
Sentencing decisions unfortunately do not contain particulars of the negotiations leading to joint
submissions, so there is no way of knowing how these figures were arrived at or why they were
longer than those who opted to forego the supposed benefit of a guilty plea. While joint
submissions tended to carry heavy sentences in this research, the benefit of pleading guilty was
clearly demonstrated where the sentence was determined by a judge.
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Table 4.6 – Sentence Outcomes with Guilty Pleas and Joint Submissions – In Months
No Guilty Plea
Guilty Plea
GP with Joint Submission
GP no Joint Submission

Near Murder –
Indigenous
115.63
113.20
116.57
110

Near Murder – NonIndigenous
90.85
91.05
97.61
87.85

Drugs/Alcohol –
Indigenous
78.25
85.79
99
71.4

Drugs/Alcohol – NonIndigenous
88.5
85
104
66.5

Of the 100 cases resolved through guilty pleas in this study, 36 involved joint submissions
and one joint submission arose from a jury trial. The near murder and drug and alcohol categories
accounted for 34 of the total in roughly similar proportions (39% and 33%). As a percentage of
their respective groups, one third of Indigenous offenders had their sentence determined by a joint
submission while the figure for non-Indigenous offenders was slightly more than 40%. As with
guilty pleas overall, joint submissions were most frequently found in British Columbia. Here, half
of all guilty pleas resulted in joint submissions, compared to over a third of guilty pleas in Ontario.
British Columbia alone accounted for approximately six in ten joint submissions compared with
only one in five for Ontario.
F. Positions of the Crown and Defence
Among the majority of cases not resolved by way of a joint submission it is useful to
examine the sentences proposed by Crown and defence counsel and their relationship to sentence
quantum. In approximately half of all contested sentencings, whether involving Indigenous or nonIndigenous offenders, the sentence lay somewhere between the ranges proposed by the parties.
Around one fifth of all sentences ended up within the ranges proposed by the Crown and an equal
number within that proposed by defence counsel.
Around one quarter of sentences between the ranges proposed by the parties were closer to
that proposed by the Crown and around a fifth closer to that proposed by the defence. Indigenous
offenders were as likely to have received sentences closer to the range proposed by either party,
with approximately one fifth falling into each category. However, non-Indigenous offenders were
more likely to find their sentences closer to that proposed by the Crown (25%) than by the defence
(15%). In approximately one third of cases, the judge found a sentence that was within or closer
to the range proposed by the Crown. This was also true for the proposed ranges of defence counsel,
where the judge passed a sentence that was within or closer to the range proposed by defence
counsel in approximately one third of cases. By contrast, judges found a sentence within or closer
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to the defence range in around a third of cases involving non-Indigenous offenders but closer to or
within the Crown range in approximately 45% of cases.
In those provinces with generally accepted ranges for manslaughter most of the proposed
sentences lay within those ranges. For British Columbia, Alberta and Saskatchewan this was not a
significant issue since those ranges are broad, running from four to 12 years in Alberta and
Saskatchewan and four to 15 years in British Columbia. Ontario was a different matter and one
that presents a distinct issue for the proposed sentences of the Crown. In British Columbia, 65%
of near murder sentence proposals from the Crown were above eight years and only 43% of those
proposed for drug and alcohol manslaughters were above the eight year mark. There was an evident
separation between the two groups of cases where Crown submissions were concerned. In Ontario,
by contrast, 77% of all near murder sentence proposals by the Crown were eight years or more as
were 71% for the drug and alcohol category. This was connected to the fact that Ontario only has
an established category and range for “aggravated manslaughter” which corresponds to the near
murder classification used in this study. As a result, the Crown in Ontario appeared to treat those
manslaughters falling into the drug and alcohol category as corresponding to an aggravated
manslaughter. Borrowing Gillian Balfour’s phrase, the dominant sentencing discourse in Ontario
understands virtually all manslaughters not in the near accident category as belonging to the
aggravated category and they were treated as such by the Crown in their sentencing submissions.

G. Criminal Records
Indigenous offenders were more likely to have a criminal record (63.5%) than nonIndigenous ones (51.51%). However, this was not consistent across the country. Indigenous
offenders in Ontario, the prairie provinces and the territories were more likely to have a criminal
record than non-Indigenous accused. The opposite held true in British Columbia, which accounted
for one third of all Indigenous offenders. Among offenders with criminal records, there was no
appreciable difference in the likelihood that Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders had criminal
records for violence. Within both groups, the criminal records for seven in ten of those offenders
contained convictions for violence. Unlike the lower number of Indigenous offenders in British
Columbia with criminal records on the whole, over 90% of those with prior convictions in that
province involved violence. This figure was the highest of any jurisdiction except for Nunavut
where all offenders with criminal records also had convictions for violence and were Indigenous.
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Table 4.7 - Criminal Records
Ontario
British Columbia
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Yukon
NWT
Nunavut
Total

Indigenous
9
12
4
5
10
5
5
50

Indigenous %
75.00
44.44
80.00
55.55
90.09
83.33
55.55
63.50

Non-Ind.
19
23
6
1
1
1
51

Non-Ind.%
40.42
57.50
66.66
100
100
100
51.51

Total
28
35
10
6
11
1
5
5
101

Non-Ind.
14
16
4
1
35

Non-Ind.%
73.68
69.56
66.66
100
68.62

Total
18
27
5
3
7
1
4
5
70

Table 4.8 - Criminal Records with Violence
Ontario
British Columbia
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Yukon
NWT
Nunavut
Total

Indigenous
4
11
1
3
7
4
5
35

Indigenous %
44.44
91.66
25.00
60.00
70.00
80.00
100.00
70.00

H. Age Distribution
This study divided manslaughter offenders into four age groups: 18-24 year-olds, 25-34
year-olds, 35-49 year-olds and those over 50 years of age.9 The sentencing decisions suggest that
judges generally considered a youthful offender as one who was under 25 years of age and so
represented a strong potential for rehabilitation. Judges have remarked that offenders between the
ages of 25 and 34 had the potential for rehabilitation but they did not appear to benefit from the
mitigating effects of youth. Those between 35 and 49 were not considered strong prospects for
rehabilitation. Those older than 50 were similarly not viewed as good candidates for rehabilitation
but their more advanced age was taken into consideration with regard to how many years they may
have left to live and the threat they might pose to society as they age. The distributions between
Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders did not vary substantially from age group to age group,
as might be expected given the comparatively youthful Indigenous population.
Approximately one third of offenders were under the age of 25, roughly 40% were between
25 and 34-years-old, just over 17% between 35 and 40, and less than a tenth were over 50 years
old. These figures show little variation between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders. Along
with the presence of a criminal record, age was one of the leading indicators for sentencing judges
of an offender’s prospects for rehabilitation and could play a substantial role in determining

9

Age of offender was available for 156 of 179 offenders.
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sentence. For near murder and drug and alcohol manslaughters, there were clear spikes in sentence
length among offenders in the 25-34 category, which dropped off in the two categories of older
offenders. The other types of manslaughter did not provide sufficient numbers of offenders to
make any meaningful observations about the distribution among age groups.
Table 4.9 – Age Distribution – As Percentage of Total
Indigenous
Non-Indigenous
All

18-24
32.81%
34.78%
33.97%

25-34
42.18%
36.95%
39.10%

35-49
14.06%
19.56%
17.30%

50+
10.93%
08.69%
09.61%

I. Gender and Domestic Violence
As with most acts of violent crime, men represented the overwhelming majority (87.15%)
of offenders in these cases. However, Indigenous women were over-represented in the figures for
female offenders in manslaughter convictions. As a proportion of their respective demographic
groups, Indigenous women represented twice the number of manslaughter offenders as nonIndigenous women. One in five Indigenous offenders were women compared with only one in ten
non-Indigenous offenders. While Indigenous people are vastly overrepresented within the criminal
justice system, Indigenous women are over-represented to an even greater degree than men.10 In
these decisions, female offenders received lower sentences overall than male offenders, with an
average sentence of just over seven years and seven months’ imprisonment, compared with an
average for male offenders of less than eight years and one month. This was partially a result of
the fact that female offenders were not found in the home invasion and robbery categories which
tended to have higher sentences.
Among domestic manslaughters overall, three quarters were committed by men and
Indigenous men accounted for roughly half of all domestic manslaughter convictions. Female
offenders were also more than twice as likely to be convicted of a domestic manslaughter than
male offenders. Over one third of all female Indigenous offenders were sentenced for the
manslaughter of a domestic partner compared to approximately one fifth of non-Indigenous female
offenders. Most domestic cases were either in the near murder or drug and alcohol categories. The
remaining two were arsons and those sentences lay at the high and low end of sentences overall.
For the remaining domestic manslaughter cases, men received an average sentence of nine years

10

Elspeth Kaiser-Derrick, Implicating the System: Judicial Discourses in the Sentencing of Indigenous Women,
(Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press, 2019) at 4-5.
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and five month’s imprisonment. This was substantially higher than the six-year average sentence
received by women for the same. This was largely attributable to the fact that many female
offenders were in a relationship in which they had been victims of domestic violence. While they
were not necessarily acting in self-defence at the time they killed the deceased, the nature of the
relationship was a factor at sentencing.
Table 4.10 - Gender Distribution
Indigenous - Number
Indigenous – Percentage
Non-Indigenous - Number
Non-Indigenous - Percentage
Total – Number
Total - Percentage

Male
66
82.50
90
90.09
156
87.15

Female
14
17.50
9
09.09
23
12.85

Female % of Total
21.21
10.00
-

Table 4.11 - Gender Distribution – Domestic Violence
Indigenous – Number
Indigenous – Percentage
Non-Indigenous - Number
Non-Indigenous – Percentage
Total – Number
Total - Percentage

Male
11
52.38
10
47.62
21
13.46

Female
5
71.42
2
28.57
7
30.43

J. Mental Illness
Mental illness as a consideration in sentencing for manslaughter arose infrequently in these
cases. It was only cited in a total of 11 decisions. Seven of those decisions arose in Ontario and
two in British Columbia. All cases involving mental illness were classified in the near murder
category. They received an average sentence of nearly eight years and four months, or
approximately four months shorter than the national average for that category among offenders
not determined to be suffering from a mental illness. This was predictable given that mental illness
is typically understood as diminishing the offender’s moral blameworthiness and renders
deterrence and punishment less important as factors at sentencing.11
In only one case citing the offender’s mental illness were they Indigenous. This outcome
mirrors a pattern seen in the forensic mental health system. While these cases do not deal with
findings of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (“NCR”), studies have found
that such findings are rarely made for Indigenous people. One study determined that Indigenous

11

R v Batisse, 2009 ONCA 114 at para 38.
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offenders accounted for only 2.9 percent of NCR findings nationwide, a number below their
proportion in the population but well below their relative numbers in the criminal justice system.12

4. Manslaughter by Categories
Of the 179 offenders studied here, 175 received a defined period of imprisonment. One
Indigenous offender in British Columbia and a second non-Indigenous offender in Ontario
received suspended sentences and probation.13 In addition, one Indigenous offender in Manitoba
and a second non-Indigenous offender in Alberta received sentences of imprisonment for life. Both
of the life imprisonment cases involved multiple victims. The Alberta case involved an elderly
couple murdered in the course of a robbery and the Manitoba case involved five victims burned to
death in a fire deliberately set at a rooming house.14 These four cases have therefore been omitted
from the analysis of sentence quantum in this section but they form part of the analysis elsewhere
in the paper.
It is important to consider the regional distribution of offenders. In Ontario there were a
total of 12 Indigenous and 47 non-Indigenous offenders sentenced and in British Columbia, 27
Indigenous and 40 non-Indigenous offenders. These two provinces provide distinct groups large
enough to allow a robust comparison. Alberta produced two smaller groups from which some
conclusions could be drawn with nine Indigenous offenders and five non-Indigenous ones.
Saskatchewan and Manitoba, with ten and 12 offenders respectively, each had only one nonIndigenous offender and therefore no effective intra-provincial comparisons can be made. The
same was true for the Yukon which had one Indigenous and one non-Indigenous offender and so
it was not possible to draw conclusions about sentencing generally or an Indigenous/nonIndigenous comparison in particular for that territory. The Northwest Territories and Nunavut had
six and nine offenders respectively but all were Indigenous and so no conclusions can be drawn
about the relationship of these sentences to those of non-Indigenous offenders in those jurisdictions
- to the extent that they might exist.
Taken alone, the national averages present a fairly simple picture. The overall average
sentence for a manslaughter among the 175 offenders receiving determinate sentences was just
12

Patrick Baillie, “A Valuable (and Ongoing) Study: The National Trajectory Project Addresses Many Myths About
the Verdict of Not Criminally Responsible on Account of Mental Disorder” in 60 Can J Psych 3 (2015) at 94.
13
R v Alphonse, 2018 BCSC 2045; R v Anguelov, 2014 CarswellOnt 18747.
14
R v Vader, 2017 ABQB 48; R v Flett, 2013 MBQB 124.
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over eight years’ imprisonment. Among the 78 Indigenous offenders, the average sentence was
slightly less than seven years, nine months’ imprisonment and for the 97 non-Indigenous offenders,
it was just under eight years and three months’ imprisonment. Taken as a whole, Indigenous
offenders were more likely to receive a shorter sentence. However, once the numbers were broken
down into different categories of manslaughter, a more nuanced picture emerged.
Table 4.12 - Provinces/Territories Gross Sentence Lengths
Ontario
British Columbia
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Yukon
Northwest Territories
Nunavut
Total

All
103.55 months
88.26 months
102.38 months
98.90 months
95.73 months
96 months
62 months
116 months
96.04 months

Indigenous
108.33 months
85.32 months
73.20 months
100.55 months
98.4 months
108 months
62 months
116 months
92.63 months

Non-Indigenous
120.30 months
91.47 months
120.62 months
84 months
84 months
84 months
98.78 months

On the whole, Indigenous people received longer sentences in most categories of
manslaughter and in most jurisdictions than non-Indigenous offenders. The one factor that appears
to account for this difference were the sentences for drug and alcohol cases. Here, the average
sentence was lower than other types of manslaughter and a majority of Indigenous offenders were
sentenced for this type of manslaughter.
A. Near Murder
Near murder cases for the purposes of this paper included both those in which provocation
was found to reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter as well as cases where, though such
provocation was absent, a jury nonetheless convicted for manslaughter, or a plea to manslaughter
was accepted by the court. Notwithstanding that distinction, these cases tended to closely resemble
those in the drugs and alcohol category but for the absence of intoxication as a defining feature.
This category accounted for 99 offenders representing 55.30% of the total of whom 98 received
determinate sentences. Indigenous offenders were underrepresented in these cases, accounting for
only 27 of 99 offenders. This was in contrast to the drug and alcohol cases where Indigenous
offenders represented the overwhelming majority.
Near murder accounted for 72.72% of all sentences for non-Indigenous offenders but only
31.25% of sentences for Indigenous offenders. This category of manslaughter was sentenced more
severely than the overall average, with sentences of approximately eight years and eight months’
imprisonment on average. Non-Indigenous offenders in this category were sentenced to slightly
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less than eight years, three months’ imprisonment. By contrast, Indigenous offenders received an
average sentence of over nine years, 11 months or nearly one year, nine months longer than nonIndigenous offenders.
Table 4.13 – Provincial and Territorial Average Sentences for Near Murder Manslaughter
Ontario
British Columbia
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Yukon
Northwest Territories
Nunavut
Total

i.

All
100.57 months
95.91 months
108.66 months
100.5 months
111.6 months
96 months
175.2 months
103.92 months

Indigenous
108 months
114 months
66 months
106 months
122 months
108 months
175.2 months
117.87 months

Non-Indigenous
99.7 months
92.17 months
130 months
84 months
96 months
84 months
98.67 months

Nunavut
This difference can be partially attributed to the long average sentences handed down in

Nunavut. While Nunavut accounted for only nine Indigenous offenders, it produced five of the 25
Indigenous offenders convicted for a near murder manslaughter. These five individuals received
average sentence of 14 years and seven months’ imprisonment, considerably higher than the
overall average. However, even if Nunavut were removed from the calculations, the average
sentence for an Indigenous offender overall would be over eight years, nine months imprisonment,
approximately nine months longer than those for non-Indigenous offenders. Two near murder
cases in Nunavut have among the longest sentences in the survey and skew the territorial average.
One case involved an offender who killed three men with a semi-automatic rifle when they
attacked his home armed with a sword and a golf club. This was taken to be a case of excessive
force used in self-defence and resulted in a sentence of 20 years.15 The other was a domestic killing
that had gone through a lengthy process of trial and retrial before finally resulting in a guilty plea
and a sentence of 18 years’ imprisonment which amounted to time served.16 Notwithstanding these
two cases, the average of the other three Nunavut near murder cases remained 11 years and eight
months, still the longest in the country. This appears to be the result of the Nunavut Court of
Justice’s attempts to strongly denounce the use of firearms to commit homicide in the territory.
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ii.

Ontario
Ontario accounted for the largest number of near murder manslaughters at 38, or nearly

four in ten of those decisions in the data set. It also accounted for four of the 25 Indigenous near
murder cases. The average sentence for this category in Ontario was around eight years and four
months for non-Indigenous offenders and nine years for Indigenous ones. This accorded roughly
with the national average for the category and is situated toward the bottom of the range of eight
to 12 from Ontario’s “aggravated manslaughter” category. There were only four cases to inform
the findings for Indigenous offenders and so it was difficult to reach a definitive conclusion about
the relative length of sentences.
iii.

British Columbia
British Columbia produced 35 near murder manslaughters and six of those involving

Indigenous offenders, or around 35% of all sentences for near murder and approximately one
quarter of Indigenous sentences for the same. The average sentence for non-Indigenous offenders
in that province was slightly more than seven years and eight months’ imprisonment. The average
for Indigenous offenders was nearly one year and ten months longer at an average of nine years
and six months. Sentence lengths for non-Indigenous offenders were below the middle of British
Columbia’s established range of four to 15 years where sentences for Indigenous offenders were
in the middle of the range. The British Columbia courts’ tendency to sentence drug and alcohol
cases more leniently for Indigenous offenders compared to non-Indigenous ones did not appear to
extend to near murder cases.

iv.

Alberta
Alberta accounted for nine near murder cases and three involving Indigenous offenders.

The average sentence for the six non-Indigenous offenders was ten years and ten months’
imprisonment. The average sentence for Indigenous offenders was shorter by five years and four
months for an average sentence among the three Indigenous offenders of five years, six months.
The near murder category accorded most closely with the third Laberge category of manslaughter
classification in Alberta which captures actions placing the victim at risk of life-threatening injury.
This category was generally associated with ranges of eight to twelve years.
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It appears from the data that non-Indigenous offenders were sentenced roughly in
accordance with the range set out by the Alberta Court of Appeal but that Indigenous offenders
were benefitting from lower sentences. The actions of five of the six non-Indigenous offenders
were mentioned as belonging in the third category of Laberge. No mention was made of Laberge
for the sixth but much of the sentencing material concentrated on her mental health issues and their
impact on her moral blameworthiness.17 A Laberge classification was not provided for two of the
three Indigenous offenders but the third was described as being situated somewhere between the
second and third categories, though the circumstances of the offence appear to fall clearly within
the near murder category. Based on this limited data set from Alberta, as illustrated in Table 4.13,
it would appear the Court of Queen’s Bench was reticent to apply the third Laberge category to
Indigenous offenders who committed a near murder manslaughter but were comfortable in doing
so with non-Indigenous offenders. Despite a body of only nine cases, there was an evident
difference between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders, with the lowest sentences handed
down to Indigenous offenders in this category. The absence of explicit reference to the appropriate
Laberge category in the sentencing of Indigenous offenders in near murder manslaughters could
suggest a reticence to classify them under the third category which allowed for lower sentences
for those offenders without running afoul of the Alberta Court of Appeal.
v.

Saskatchewan
A total of four near murder cases were drawn from Saskatchewan with three Indigenous

and one non-Indigenous offender. The average sentence for all four was eight years, four and a
half months’ imprisonment. The single non-Indigenous offender received a sentence of seven
years, while the Indigenous offenders received average sentences of eight years and ten months’
imprisonment, or 22 months longer. Both of these average sentences were around the middle of
the accepted Saskatchewan range of four to 12 years for manslaughters involving brutality and
drugs and alcohol. Once again, the small sample set, particularly the presence of only a single nonIndigenous offender, makes it impossible to draw a conclusion on the question of sentence
differential in the province for the Indigenous/non-Indigenous divide.
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vi.

Manitoba
Manitoba produced five near murder cases in total, divided between three Indigenous and

two non-Indigenous offenders. The average provincial sentence for this category of manslaughter
was approximately nine years and four months’ imprisonment. The two non-Indigenous offenders
in the group received an average sentence of eight years between them. By contrast, the three
Indigenous offenders received an average sentence two years and two months longer at ten years
and two months. Of note for the Manitoba near murder category is that all three Indigenous
offenders were co-accused in the beating death of a federal inmate arising from an internal conflict
within a prison gang rather than from unconnected incidents of manslaughter.18 Therefore there
was no variation in the fact patterns giving rise to this particular group of cases and so it was
difficult to arrive at any generalizations.

vii.

Yukon and the Northwest Territories
While both cases arising in the Yukon were near murders, they represented too small a

sample set to analyze in a useful manner. It consisted of one Indigenous offender receiving a
sentence of nine years imprisonment and one non-Indigenous offender receiving a sentence of
seven years. There was no Yukon Court of Appeal range against which to examine them. No
sentencing decisions from the Northwest Territories Supreme Court dealt with manslaughters in
the near murder category. Nor was there any jurisprudence dealing with this category of
manslaughter from the Northwest Territories Court of Appeal.
viii.

Trial Types, Guilty Pleas and Joint Submissions

Nearly 60% of all near murder cases were resolved through a guilty plea regardless of
whether the offenders were Indigenous or non-Indigenous. There was, however, a stark division
between Ontario and British Columbia. In British Columbia over 80% of near murder sentences
came about as the result of a guilty plea compared with only one third of Ontario cases. In Ontario,
by contrast, 68% of non-Indigenous offenders opted for a trial by jury but only one Indigenous
offender of the four did the same. In British Columbia, less than 10% of offenders chose a jury
trial and none of those were Indigenous. Judge alone trials were the least common option for

18

R v Ryle, 2013 MBQB 33.

84
offenders overall but Indigenous offenders opted for them in over a fifth of cases, where nonIndigenous offenders did the same in only 5% of cases. As with manslaughter on the whole,
Indigenous offenders in this category expressed a clear preference for trial by judge alone or
pleading guilty over taking their chances with a jury.
Near murders accounted for 23 of the 37 joint submissions found in this research and arose
in 40% of all guilty pleas for this category. About half of all Indigenous offenders who pleaded
guilty did so in connection with a joint submission, this was true of only 35% of non-Indigenous
offenders.

As noted above, the averages for near murder cases involving a joint submission

suggest that no benefit arose for an offender entering into a joint submission with the Crown
relative to a mere guilty plea. While it may be that the cases resolved by joint submissions tend to
involve more serious factual circumstances and were likely to result in longer sentences if decided
by a judge, this does not appear to be the case. Whatever the logic may be, it is impossible to know
what the outcome might have been.
The tendency of joint submissions to result in sentences that were longer than bare guilty
pleas suggests that Crown counsel were not playing a part in attempting to reduce the overincarceration of Indigenous people for serious and violent crimes through the plea bargaining
process. As noted in chapter one, only Ontario among the jurisdictions studied for this research,
has a Crown policy directive dealing with Indigenous accused but it does not contain many
specifics. While Gladue speaks to the role of judges in remedying the overrepresentation of
Indigenous people in the criminal justice system, judges frequently work with the tools provided
to them by counsel. Joint submissions that were in excess of bare guilty pleas run counter to the
project of reducing Indigenous overrepresentation. Though defence counsel plays a role in the plea
negotiation process, the Crown retains the balance of power and appear uninterested in making
concessions to Indigenous offenders. This was visible both in the elevated prison terms resulting
from joint submissions – some six and a half months longer than bare guilty pleas – and the nearly
21-month gap between joint submissions for Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders.

ix.

Criminal Records and Violence
In this category, of the 98 cases where information was available, 52 offenders had criminal

records and 35 of those records involved violence. This held true across Indigenous and nonIndigenous offenders with more than half of all offenders having prior criminal records. As a
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proportion of all near murder offenders, one third had criminal records for violence whether or not
they were Indigenous. There was effectively no difference in the proportion of Indigenous and
non-Indigenous offenders who had criminal records and criminal records involving violence.
However, there was a clear difference in average sentence outcome for those who had criminal
records and records with violence.19
Indigenous offenders without a criminal record received an average sentence of eight years
and two months, compared to an average sentence of over seven years, seven months for nonIndigenous offenders without a criminal record. Where a criminal record was present, those figures
increased to almost nine years, four months for Indigenous offenders and nearly eight years and
ten months for non-Indigenous ones. Finally, where the criminal record contained convictions for
violence, the average sentence for Indigenous offenders was ten years and 11 months, compared
to less than eight years and ten months for non-Indigenous offenders. There was an escalation in
sentence quantum due to the presence of criminal records and a further increase attributable to
records with violence. There was also a clear indication that Indigenous offenders with criminal
records and records for violence consistently received lengthier sentences than their nonIndigenous counterparts. This indicates that criminal records for Indigenous offenders may be
understood as making the offender less receptive to rehabilitation and therefore presenting a
greater risk to reoffend.

x.

Age of Offenders
As with the figures for criminal records, there was a pattern among the age groups

represented in the cases. Offenders between the ages of 25 and 34 received the longest sentences,
followed by those over the age of 50 , and by those between 35 and 50. Offenders who were under
the age of 25 received the lowest sentences on average. This pattern was consistent between
Indigenous and non-Indigenous accused. For Indigenous offenders under the age of 25, the average
sentence for near murder was seven years and eight months’ imprisonment, compared to over six
years and nine months for their non-Indigenous analogues. For those between the ages of 25 and
34, Indigenous offenders received average sentences of more than ten years and two months
compared to more than eight years and five months for non-Indigenous offenders.
19

Given the handful of extreme sentences handed down in Nunavut for near murders involving Indigenous
offenders, that territory has been removed as a statistical outlier.
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These figures dropped off again for offenders between 35 and 49-years-old, where
Indigenous offenders received an average sentence of more than nine years and nine months, and
their non-Indigenous counterparts received average sentences greater than seven years, eight
months. Average sentences for non-Indigenous offenders over the age of 50 were greater than nine
years and ten months. There was only a single near murder case involving an Indigenous offender
over the age of 50 and so no meaningful comparison can be made for that age group.
The severity of sentence was tied to age distribution in the near murder category and it
remained consistent between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders. It is clear in each age
range, where sufficient information was available to reach a conclusion, that Indigenous offenders
received sentences longer than their non-Indigenous equivalents. Among younger offenders,
Indigenous ones could expect to receive a sentence over one year longer and for older Indigenous
offenders, the difference was closer to two years.
xi.

Summary of Near Murder
The near murder category of manslaughter is defined by the striking similarities between

Indigenous and non-Indigenous comparator groups while nonetheless producing a dissimilarity in
sentence outcome to the detriment of the former. The one significant distinction involves the
tendency of Indigenous offenders to avoid trial by pleading guilty but this does not produce any
reduction in sentence compared to non-Indigenous offenders. Criminal records and records for
violence were nearly identical as were the age distributions of both groups. The longer sentences
for Indigenous offenders for near murder were mostly consistent across the country with noticeably
lower sentences only in Alberta and the Saskatchewan, both of which had few Indigenous
offenders to contribute to the overall figures. There did not appear to be any substantial difference
between these two groups that would justify the difference in sentence outcome observed.
B. Drugs and Alcohol
Drug and alcohol cases are those where the intoxication of the offender was taken by the
sentencing judge to be the defining characteristic of the case. It would often be that the offender
could not form the requisite intent for murder due to their level of intoxication or that death was
not intended but the offender was nonetheless intoxicated to the point where such cases could be
differentiated from the near murder category where the offender was sober or relatively so. This
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category contained the majority of cases involving Indigenous offenders, accounting for 43 of the
80. Of a total of 52 drug and alcohol cases, only nine involved the sentencing of non-Indigenous
offenders. These cases had an average sentence of approximately six years, ten and a half months’
imprisonment. Indigenous offenders, at six years, nine and a half months, received average
sentences that were slightly more than five months shorter than the seven year, two and-a-half
month average handed down to non-Indigenous offenders.
Table 4.14 - Provincial and Territorial Average Sentences for Drug and Alcohol Manslaughter
Jurisdiction
Ontario
British Columbia
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Yukon
Northwest Territories
Nunavut
Total

All
100 months
76.97 months
77.66 months
101.83 months
81.8 months
62 months
52 months
82.43 months

Indigenous
106.28 months
79.03 months
84 months
101.83 months
81.8 months
62 months
52 months
81.56 months

Non-Indigenous
91.2 months
86 months
65 months
86.55 months

The fact that the majority of Indigenous offenders were sentenced in relation to drug and
alcohol cases and that these cases carried lower sentences accounted for the lower sentences of
Indigenous offenders overall in the body of cases examined for this research. The lower sentences
of Indigenous people were not a result of more lenient sentencing across the board occasioned by
the application of Gladue, but instead of Indigenous offenders being sentenced for a category of
manslaughter that carried lower average penalties. Unfortunately, comparative information for this
category was only available for British Columbia, Ontario and Alberta as no non-Indigenous
offenders were convicted for drug and alcohol cases in other jurisdictions. However, the evidence
suggests that the lower average sentences for drug and alcohol cases involving Indigenous
offenders themselves were sufficient to bring down the overall average for all manslaughters
involving Indigenous offenders. If drug and alcohol cases are removed from consideration for all
offenders, the average sentence for an Indigenous offender for all other categories of manslaughter
changes from six months shorter than the average for a non-Indigenous offenders to six months
longer. The result was an increase in overall Indigenous sentences by nearly 14 months and an
increase in non-Indigenous sentences of just over one month. It initially appeared as though the
lower Indigenous figure nationally may have been the product of lower sentences overall in British
Columbia and the large proportion of Indigenous offenders in that province. However, if British
Columbia is removed from the national figures, this serves to increase averages for Indigenous and
non-Indigenous offenders alike in roughly the same proportion. It therefore appears that the
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difference between Indigenous and non-Indigenous sentences was attributable to differences in the
sentencing of offenders in the drug and alcohol category rather than to a more lenient sentencing
regime in British Columbia overall.
Table 4.15 – Overall Averages without Drug and Alcohol Cases – In Months
With Drug and Alcohol
Without Drug and Alcohol
Change

All
96.04
101.78
+5.74

Indigenous
92.63
106.22
+13.59

Non-Indigenous
98.78
100.03
+1.25

Difference for Ind.
-6.15
+5.92

Table 4.16 – Overall Averages without British Columbia – In Months
With British Columbia
Without British Columbia
Change

All
96.04
100.75
+4.71

Indigenous
92.63
97.28
+4.65

Non-Indigenous
98.78
103.91
+5.13

Difference for Ind.
-6.15
-6.63

It is important to discuss the limitations of the data available for assessing the drug and alcohol
category. Drug and alcohol killings involving non-Indigenous offenders were limited to Alberta,
British Columbia and Ontario. This is because these killings were distributed in a way that made
intra-provincial or territorial comparisons impossible in all but these three jurisdictions. This is
illustrated in Table 4.14, which demonstrates the relative sentences in provinces where that
information was available and also shows those jurisdictions where it was not. The national
numbers saw higher overall sentences for non-Indigenous offenders compared to Indigenous ones
when it came to drug and alcohol killings. This was also true of the cases arising in British
Columbia. However, Alberta and Ontario both produced higher average sentences for drug and
alcohol killings among Indigenous offenders compared with non-Indigenous offenders than did
British Columbia. If we remove Ontario from the figures on the assumption that it is an outlier,
the average sentences for Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders nationwide in the drug and
alcohol category decrease in roughly the same proportion; the drawback, however, is that the
analysis then becomes dependent almost exclusively on British Columbia. The tendency of Ontario
courts to sentence drug and alcohol manslaughters harshly is explored below in the discussion of
the role played by that province’s “aggravated manslaughter” categorization. However, this does
not provide an explanation for why Indigenous offenders received longer sentences for drug and
alcohol killings in that province than non-Indigenous offenders did.
Because of the limitations in the data, the sentences given to non-Indigenous offenders as a
whole had to be compared with data that relied heavily on jurisdictions where there were no non-
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Indigenous drug and alcohol offenders sentenced at all. This required a comparison that used the
national averages for the two groups and consequently was not able to adequately explain the
longer sentences received by Indigenous offenders in Alberta and Ontario when compared with
British Columbia. This is not ideal but the limitations in the data do not allow for more robust
comparisons. Differences in average sentences between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders
in the drug and alcohol category is smaller than that for near murder and the conclusions drawn
about the relative length of drug and alcohol sentences for non-Indigenous offenders are based
primarily on the fact that such offenders tended to receive shorter sentences in Ontario and longer
sentences in British Columbia. To draw general conclusions about the relative figures required
bringing in averages from jurisdictions that contained no non-Indigenous offenders. The relative
differences in sentences involving drug and alcohol killings between Indigenous and nonIndigenous offenders should therefore be assessed cautiously given that over a third of all drug
and alcohol manslaughters occurred in jurisdictions where no non-Indigenous offenders fell into
that category.

i.

Ontario
Ontario produced a total of twelve drug and alcohol cases involving seven Indigenous and

five non-Indigenous offenders. These accounted for slightly more than one quarter of these cases.
Indigenous offenders received average sentences of greater than eight years and ten months’
imprisonment. In contrast, sentences for non-Indigenous offenders were over one year, eight
months shorter at slightly more than seven years, seven months. Overall, Ontario had the secondhighest average sentences in the country for drug and alcohol manslaughters, falling only four
months short of the province’s average sentence for a near murder manslaughter. It also had the
highest average sentence for Indigenous offenders in this category of manslaughter.
This phenomenon may be a result of the Ontario courts’ approach to establishing ranges
for manslaughter. British Columbia and Saskatchewan have large, general ranges for
manslaughters running from a low of four years to a high of 12 and 15 years respectively.
Similarly, Alberta has established ranges for the two highest categories of manslaughter that
together accord roughly with the wider ranges in British Columbia and Saskatchewan. By contrast,
the Ontario courts have only developed one range for what is referred to as “aggravated
manslaughter”. While a good deal of these cases had characteristics that fit the model of aggravated
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manslaughter there was still a recognizable pattern in Ontario and across the country that the drug
and alcohol cases received lower sentences. In Ontario, the absence of a wider range for general
manslaughter or a specific range for manslaughters of a lower category created a situation in which
eight to 12 years was viewed as the standard range for most violent manslaughters not falling into
the unusual circumstances or one-punch categories on the one hand or home invasion and robbery
category on the other. This produced higher average sentences than other jurisdictions, as a
sentence below the eight-year bottom of the range appeared comparatively lenient. In the absence
of a lower end of the range in which such crimes could be placed, manslaughter sentences for this
category were pulled higher.
ii.

British Columbia
The largest proportion of drug and alcohol cases - around one third - originated in British

Columbia. This province produced 17 cases in total, 14 involving Indigenous offenders and only
three non-Indigenous ones. While not the lowest sentences in the country, these sentences were
among the lowest and given that they represented a substantial number of Indigenous offenders,
they served to lower the average sentence for these offenders across the country. The average
sentence for an Indigenous offender in British Columbia was just over six years and three months’
imprisonment. Non-Indigenous offenders received average sentences that were nearly 11 months
longer at seven years and two months.
What is notable for the British Columbia figures was that Indigenous offenders convicted
for drug and alcohol manslaughters received sentences which were nearly three years and three
months shorter than Indigenous offenders convicted in near murder cases. The comparable
difference for non-Indigenous offenders were sentences that were lower by slightly more than six
months. The Indigenous average for drug and alcohol murders was situated in the lower half of
the established British Columbia range for manslaughter of four to 15 years, where non-Indigenous
offenders were found in the middle of the range and closer to the average for near murder cases.
There was a clear difference between near murder and drug and alcohol charges among
Indigenous offenders in British Columbia. Drug and alcohol manslaughters were viewed as a
separate and less morally blameworthy category of homicide and offenders were sentenced
accordingly. While Alberta also saw lower sentences for non-Indigenous offenders sentenced for

91
drug and alcohol cases, this was a result of a single non-Indigenous offender and so does not permit
a worthwhile comparison.

iii.

Alberta
The Alberta data produced one non-Indigenous and two Indigenous offenders in this

category. Unfortunately, this sample was not large enough to reach any conclusions about the
differences between the two sets of offenders. The two Indigenous offenders received an average
sentence of seven years where the lone non-Indigenous offender received one of five years. These
figures were below the national average for drug and alcohol cases. This is notable since Alberta
generally produced among the highest sentences overall for manslaughter. The two Indigenous
offenders received an average sentence that was actually 18 months longer than the Indigenous
average for the near murder category, while the non-Indigenous offender received a sentence that
was five years and five months shorter than the non-Indigenous average for the same.
One of the Indigenous offenders was found to be in the second Laberge category, while
the other was found to be in the third and their sentences reflect this with a difference of two years.
The single non-Indigenous offender was found to be in the upper part of the second category of
Laberge and he received a sentence that was six months shorter than the Indigenous offender found
within the second category. Nonetheless, all three sentences were within the generally accepted
higher end of the range for the second Laberge category. Such a small difference in sentence could
be attributable to any number of factors. As noted above, the small number of cases makes it
difficult to draw useful conclusions for this category in this province.

iv.

Saskatchewan
Six drug and alcohol cases emerged from Saskatchewan, representing the majority of cases

from the province. All of these decisions dealt with Indigenous offenders and accounted for two
thirds of the Indigenous total for that province. The average sentence handed down in the province
for these cases was just over five years and two months’ imprisonment. This figure was lower than
that for near murder cases in the province by over three years and two months. The average
sentences for drug and alcohol cases involving Indigenous offenders were located toward the lower
end of the province’s established four to twelve-year range for manslaughters involving brutality
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and drugs and alcohol. There were no non-Indigenous cases in this category and it was therefore
not possible to determine whether this was also true of those offenders.

v.

Manitoba
Like Saskatchewan, the drug and alcohol decisions in Manitoba all involved Indigenous

offenders. The five offenders in this category represented nearly half of those in the province
overall as well as half of Indigenous offenders. The average sentence for such cases was slightly
less than six years and ten months’ imprisonment. This figure was approximately three years and
four months shorter than the average sentence for Indigenous offenders involved in a near murder
case. It should be recalled that Indigenous offenders received sentences in excess of two years
longer for near murder cases in Saskatchewan than did non-Indigenous ones. Even accounting for
that, Indigenous offenders in drug and alcohol cases in the province still received sentences that
were more than 14 months shorter than the non-Indigenous figures for a near murder manslaughter.
This difference was present despite the Manitoba Court of Appeal’s insistence that there will be
heavier sentences for drunken killings. Unfortunately, the lack of a non-Indigenous comparator
group makes it impossible to determine if this was a trend common to all drug and alcohol cases
in the province, or merely those involving Indigenous offenders.

vi.

The Territories
There were no cases fitting this category of manslaughter in the Yukon. By contrast, all six

cases in the Northwest Territories were classified as drug and alcohol manslaughters and all
involved Indigenous offenders. The average sentence in the territory for these killings was five
years and two months’ imprisonment. While there were no near murder or non-Indigenous cases
against which to compare these decisions, they were on average slightly less than 17 months
shorter than the national average for an Indigenous offenders convicted of a drug and alcohol
manslaughter and more than two years shorter than those for non-Indigenous offenders.
Three of Nunavut’s nine decisions were classified as drug and alcohol killings and like all
decisions arising in the territory, they dealt with Indigenous offenders. Nunavut had the highest
sentences for manslaughters overall and the highest by far for near murders at over 14 years and
seven months. Nunavut had the lowest average sentences in the country for drug and alcohol
killings at four years and four months’ imprisonment. This is unusual given the territory’s often
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strong emphasis on local conditions and the particularly harsh manner in which the near murder
category of manslaughters was sentenced there.

vii.

Trial Types, Guilty Pleas and Joint Submissions
It is important to note that drug and alcohol cases amounted to a total of 52 offenders,

therefore this discussion of trial types was based on a smaller sample set than the foregoing
discussion of near murder cases. For this type of manslaughter, the largest group consisted of
Indigenous offenders from British Columbia. Overall, Indigenous offenders demonstrated a slight
preference (62.6%) for pleading guilty in drug and alcohol cases, compared with non-Indigenous
offenders. Like the figures for near murders, there was a marked difference between Ontario and
British Columbia. In Ontario, only 40% of non-Indigenous offenders pleaded guilty with the
remainder opting for trial by jury, while 85% of Indigenous offenders opted to plead guilty and
the remainder – consisting of only one offender – chose trial by jury. These figures were roughly
consistent with the Ontario figures for near murders.
In British Columbia, two of the three non-Indigenous offenders pleaded guilty while the
third opted for trial by judge alone. By contrast, less than half of Indigenous offenders pleaded
guilty with a fifth choosing trial by judge and jury and a quarter trial by judge alone. There was no
information to determine the trial type for the remaining offender. The Indigenous offender figures
for British Columbia dealing with drug and alcohol cases offered a very different picture than those
for near murder. The judge alone figures were fairly consistent at a fifth for near murder and a
quarter for drug and alcohol cases. However, where 80% of Indigenous offenders chose a guilty
plea for near murder, only 46% did so in drug and alcohol cases. Similarly, while no Indigenous
offenders in the near murder category chose trial by judge and jury, a fifth of those involved in
drug and alcohol cases did. Though nearly half of Indigenous offenders pleaded guilty in the drug
and alcohol category, this was far lower than the 80% figure for near murder cases. The Indigenous
offenders from British Columbia in drug and alcohol cases demonstrated a discernible preference
for taking their chances at trial rather than pleading guilty.
Eleven of the 37 joint submissions were the product of guilty pleas in drug and alcohol
cases. Sixty percent of non-Indigenous offenders who pleaded guilty did so in connection with a
joint submission, but the comparable figure for Indigenous offenders was under 30%. As noted,
there was no demonstrated benefit arising from a joint submission when compared with a bare
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guilty plea. Non-Indigenous offenders who did not plead guilty received sentences of an average
of seven years and four months, compared with Indigenous offenders who received an average of
six years and six months. For bare guilty pleas, the figures were effectively identical at around
seven years and one month. Where there was a bare guilty plea, Indigenous offenders received
sentences of roughly five years and 11 months compared with five years and six months for nonIndigenous offenders. While the sentences were higher overall for joint submissions at eight years
and three months for Indigenous and eight years and eight months for non-Indigenous offenders,
the figures for Indigenous offenders were lower than non-Indigenous ones. This was in contrast to
those for near murders, where Indigenous sentences were higher across the board. Therefore there
was a benefit for Indigenous offenders in a joint submission but only relative to non-Indigenous
ones, rather than Indigenous offenders who had their sentence determined by a judge.

viii.

Criminal Records and Violence

In drug and alcohol manslaughters, among the 52 cases, 37 offenders had criminal records
and 27 of those included convictions for violent offences. Unlike the near murder category where
there was no discernible difference between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders with respect
to criminal records and records with violence, there was a striking difference among the drug and
alcohol cases. Nearly 80% of Indigenous offenders had a criminal record compared with only one
third of non-Indigenous ones. Within those figures, nearly three quarters of Indigenous records
involved violence, a figure which was two thirds for non-Indigenous offenders. As a proportion of
all offenders, nearly 60% of Indigenous offenders had criminal records for violence compared to
just over 20% of non-Indigenous ones.
Indigenous offenders without criminal records received an average sentence of five years
and eight months’ imprisonment, where non-Indigenous offenders without criminal records were
given sentences averaging seven years and three months. Where the offender had a criminal record,
those figures increased to slightly more than seven years for Indigenous offenders and nearly seven
years and two months for non-Indigenous offenders. Finally, for offenders with criminal records
including convictions for violence, the average sentence for an Indigenous offender was just over
seven years and one month. The comparable figure for non-Indigenous offenders was more than
five years and eight months, however this sample consisted of only two offenders and so it does
not allow for a useful comparison to the 25 Indigenous offenders with records for violence.

95
While there was an obvious escalation for all offenders with criminal records, and then for
Indigenous offenders with records involving violence, the information was insufficient to make a
similar conclusion for non-Indigenous offenders. Despite the clear increase of over 16 months
between Indigenous offenders without criminal records and those with prior convictions, there was
no discernible increase between those with criminal records and those with records involving
violence. This was in contrast to Indigenous offenders convicted for near murder manslaughters,
where there was an increase of around 20 months for those with records for violence compared to
those with criminal records without convictions for violence.
This suggests that in the drug and alcohol categories, while criminal records were a
consideration at sentencing, the presence of violence in those records was not treated as a further
aggravating factor on the whole. It should be noted that 30% of Indigenous offenders in this
category were from British Columbia and that 70% of them had records for violence. Given British
Columbia’s generally low sentences in this category and relatively large share of the total number
of offenders, these cases play an outsized role in determining the figures overall.

ix.

Age of Offenders
As with all figures in this section, there were fewer non-Indigenous drug and alcohol

offenders to deal with so limited conclusions can be drawn about their presence in the different
age categories. For Indigenous offenders the patterns between age groups were similar to those for
the near murder category. Indigenous offenders under 25 years of age received an average sentence
of slightly less than five years and eight months’ imprisonment. This figure increased to nearly
seven years and nine months for those between the ages of 25 and 34 and decreased for Indigenous
offenders between 35 and 50 to five years and three months. One point of interest here was the
presence of five individuals older than 50 among Indigenous offenders, who received an average
sentence of nearly seven years and six months’ imprisonment. There was only a single nonIndigenous offender over the age 50 among drug and alcohol offenders.
For non-Indigenous offenders the pattern among the handful of drug and alcohol offenders
in the data followed a pattern similar to Indigenous offenders. The three offenders aged 18-24
years old received an average sentence of almost six years and four months. This increased to ten
years for the single non-Indigenous offender aged between 25-34 and decreased again to six years
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for the one offender aged between 35-50. The single non-Indigenous offender over the age of 50
received a sentence of four years’ imprisonment.
The pattern of increasing sentences for offenders in the 25-34 category that was apparent
among Indigenous drug and alcohol offenders and both categories of near murder offenders
persisted for non-Indigenous drug and alcohol offenders. The shorter sentences for Indigenous
offenders in the drug and alcohol category were apparent across the age distribution with the
exception of offenders over 50, where the single non-Indigenous offender received a lower
sentence.
Interestingly, while there were five Indigenous offenders over the age of 50 in the drug and
alcohol category against a single non-Indigenous one, the figures were reversed for the near murder
category where there were six non-Indigenous offenders compared with a single Indigenous
offender over the age of 50. In the respective categories in which Indigenous and non-Indigenous
offenders represented the overwhelming number of offenders, non-Indigenous offenders over 50
represented only 9% of offenders compared to older Indigenous offenders representing 13.5% of
the total.

x.

Summary of Drug and Alcohol
Drug and alcohol manslaughters saw more differences between Indigenous and non-

Indigenous offenders. Most notable was the overall reversal in sentence severity in this category,
with Indigenous offenders receiving lower sentences without a significant difference in guilty
pleas, despite the substantially higher likelihood that Indigenous offenders would have both
criminal records and records with convictions for violence. There was some evidence in these
cases that the Crown was willing to offer more lenient plea agreements in their joint submissions
to Indigenous offenders than to non-Indigenous ones. This was the reverse of the plea bargaining
situation for near murder cases which resulted in longer sentences for non-Indigenous offenders.
Like the near murder category, there does not appear to be any readily discernible explanation for
the difference in sentence outcome from this data alone.
C. Robbery and Home Invasion
Home invasion and robbery cases represented a fairly small fraction of the total sentencing
decisions for manslaughter in the country but tended to be sentenced most severely. These cases
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generally dealt with the offender killing the victim in the course of a robbery or a home invasion
and the severity of sentence results from premeditation and the indifference to human life
demonstrated in the course of a crime committed for financial gain. There were a total of 14 cases
involving either home invasions or robberies and only three involved Indigenous offenders. Eight
of these decisions were from Ontario, three from British Columbia, two from Alberta and one from
Manitoba. Thirteen of these cases resulted in a determinate sentence and one offender from Alberta
was sentenced to life imprisonment for killing an elderly couple during a robbery on a remote
stretch of highway.20
Indigenous offenders were largely underrepresented in this category. While such decisions
accounted for a tenth of all non-Indigenous offenders, they accounted for less 4% of Indigenous
ones. Among manslaughters of this kind, the average sentence was over ten years and nine months
imprisonment or two years, ten months longer than the average sentence for a manslaughter
generally. For non-Indigenous offenders, the average sentence was in excess of 11 years, seven
months which was over three years and seven months longer than the Indigenous average of eight
years’ imprisonment. However, the Indigenous figure was drawn from a sample of only three cases
and so can provide little in the way of general information about Indigenous robbery and home
invasion cases.
Table 4.17 – Provincial and Territorial Average for Robbery and Home Invasion Manslaughters
Total Months
Number of offenders
Average in months

All
1,680
13
129.23

Indigenous
288
3
96

Non-Indigenous
1,392
10
139.2

D. Arson
There were six offenders sentenced for manslaughters committed by arson, and they were
split evenly between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders. In discussing arson cases it is not
particularly useful to analyze them in terms of averages as the difference between the cases was
too great. One Indigenous offender was given a life sentence for setting a fire in which five
residents of a rooming house were killed.21 In another case, a non-Indigenous man in British
Columbia set his home on fire with his wife and five children inside and killed his spouse for
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which he was given a sentence of 18 years following a guilty plea.22 Another case involved an
Indigenous woman in Nunavut who was sentenced to one year imprisonment when, following an
argument with her husband, she set the small shed in which he was drinking on fire and killed
him.23 While this case and the rooming house fire that resulted in five deaths were the outliers, it
can be said that manslaughters resulting from arson were punished most severely. If the life
sentence and the reformatory sentence are removed from consideration, there remains an average
sentence of 13 years and seven and a half months’ imprisonment. The high average for arson
sentences was derived from the extraordinary risk to the public created by the intentional setting
of fires and the obvious indifference to human life involved.
Of the six cases involving arson, four were domestic homicides. All arson cases involving
non-Indigenous offenders were domestic homicides wherein the offender’s spouse was either the
victim or the intended victim. In only one case involving an Indigenous offender was this true. The
domestic violence aspect of arsons were considered to be a significant aggravating factor that
produced substantial sentences for two of the non-Indigenous offenders.24 However, for the single
Indigenous offender where the arson was domestic in nature, the sentence was among the lowest
received by any offender in this study for any manslaughter conviction.25
E. Unusual Circumstances and One-Punch
The lower end of the sentence averages were occupied almost exclusively by those
classified as one-punch and unusual circumstances cases. In both these categories, the resulting
death depended heavily on the element of chance. One-punch cases consist of a single punch to
the victim where they subsequently lost consciousness and struck their head causing death.
Unusual circumstances manslaughter cases were varied but the resulting death also depended
substantially on chance. There were four one-punch cases, all arising in British Columbia and
divided evenly between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders. One Indigenous and one nonIndigenous offender were sentenced to six months and one Indigenous and one non-Indigenous
offender were each sentenced to three years.

22

R v BKJL, 2018 BCSC 379.
R v Ussak, 2013 NUCJ 9.
24
BKJL, supra note 22; R v Dosanjh, 2018 BCSC 2302.
25
Ussak, supra note 23.
23

99
There were a total of three cases classified as unusual circumstances, all occurring in
British Columbia, of which two involved non-Indigenous offenders. In both cases with nonIndigenous offenders, they both received sentences of six months. The only Indigenous offender
in the category received a sentence of five years. The death in that case resulted from the offender
attempting to attack the victim with pepper spray and a length of chain while he was sitting in a
car, causing the deceased to flee into the street where he was struck by a passing vehicle and
killed.26 Despite the substantial sentence, it was classified as an unusual circumstances case
because of the degree of chance that led to the death. As with the arson cases, the wide differences
in the circumstances of the offence and the small number of cases make generalizations about these
cases difficult.

5. Comparison Between Drug and Alcohol and Near Murder Categories
Comparing Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders convicted of manslaughter
demonstrates that the two groups of offenders were substantially similar to one another. The
principal differences arose in the types of manslaughter for which they were convicted and the
dissimilarity in sentence quantum. Indigenous offenders tended to be involved in more personal
crimes. They were more likely to kill acquaintances and family members than non-Indigenous
offenders and they were less likely to be involved in offences committed for profit. The most
substantial difference has to do with the classifications of their crimes. Indigenous offenders were
largely convicted in the drug and alcohol category and this was the sole category in which they
received lower sentences overall.
Drug and alcohol and near murder killings between them represented 84% of all offenders
examined in this study. The two categories essentially represented a division between the bulk of
Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders. Seventy two of ninety nine near murder offenders were
non-Indigenous and represented roughly 72% of both the near murder category and the total
number of non-Indigenous offenders. By contrast, forty three of fifty two three drug and alcohol
offenders were Indigenous, which represented just under 54% of all Indigenous offenders and just
short of 83% of all drug and alcohol offenders. Drug and alcohol killings therefore represented
less than one in ten of all non-Indigenous offenders compared to over half of Indigenous ones.

26

R v Cote, 2013 BCSC 2424.

100
In the near murder category the difference in average sentence outcome between
Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders was evident. There, Indigenous offenders received
sentences that were an average of twenty months longer than those handed down to nonIndigenous offenders. Among drug and alcohol killings there was a less substantial difference in
sentence outcome between Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders with Indigenous offenders
receiving average sentences five months shorter than non-Indigenous ones.
Of particular interest in the division between these two groups was the presence of criminal
records in the two categories. Among the body of offenders for near murder, there was virtually
no difference between the rates of criminal records and criminal records with violence between
Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders. However, Indigenous offenders still received
demonstrably longer sentences than non-Indigenous offenders. By contrast, nearly 80% of
Indigenous offenders in the drug and alcohol category had criminal records compared to a third of
non-Indigenous offenders and those Indigenous offenders with criminal records were more likely
to have convictions for violence on their records. Despite these differences between Indigenous
and non-Indigenous offenders in the two categories, near murder sentences still saw consistently
longer sentences applied to Indigenous offenders despite identical rates of criminal records and
records with violence. In the drug and alcohol category, notwithstanding the substantially higher
numbers of Indigenous offenders with criminal records and records for violence, sentences for
Indigenous offenders remained lower for than those for non-Indigenous ones.
The difference in criminal records and records with violence was the only significant one
between the bodies of offenders in the near murder and drug and alcohol killings. Otherwise, they
were substantially similar. Given the relative difference in the rates of criminal records in the drug
and alcohol category it would be expected that sentences for Indigenous offenders would be longer
instead of shorter. In the near murder category, the similar rates of criminal records and records
with violence would be expected to produce similar sentence outcomes, with all else being equal.
This suggests that the criminal record issue, despite its importance in sentencing overall, did not
play a significant role in determining relative sentence outcome, meaning that some other factor
was at play in creating that difference.
The vast bodies of Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders were substantially similar in
most aspects, the only significant differences lay in the types of manslaughters for which they were
convicted and the differences in sentence quantum between those categories. This suggests that

101
something else explains the relative differences in sentence length between the two categories of
manslaughter offenders. Indigenous offenders, despite pleading guilty at roughly the same rates as
non-Indigenous offenders and having similar rates of criminal records and records with violence
received longer sentences for near murder and with similar rates of guilty pleas and a greater
likelihood of criminal records and records with violence, Indigenous offenders received shorter
sentences for drug and alcohol killings. This suggests that a contributing factor in both of these
was the impact or lack of impact of the Gladue provisions on sentence.

6. Conclusion
The social conditions of many Indigenous communities and neighbourhoods in Canada are
well known, as are the community’s struggles with substance abuse. It should therefore not be
surprising that many of the manslaughters committed by Indigenous people fell into the drugs and
alcohol category. Despite the more frequent guilty pleas in near murder cases and nearly identical
figures for criminal records and for violence, Indigenous people received longer sentences than
non-Indigenous offenders for this type of manslaughter. Conversely, lower rates of guilty pleas
but considerably higher rates of criminal records and records with violence in the drug and alcohol
category led to lower sentences for Indigenous offenders compared with non-Indigenous
offenders.
This apparent contradiction was likely related to the operation of the Gladue principles but
in a particular fashion. Drug and alcohol killings may be viewed by judges, although never
explicitly in these terms, as a typically Indigenous style of manslaughter. Because of the role
played by intoxication, such crimes can be connected more easily with the prevalent stereotypes
about the social conditions of Indigenous people and the effects of residential school and
intergenerational trauma. Therefore, when Indigenous offenders committed types of manslaughter
that did not fit the drug and alcohol pattern they were viewed as departing from crimes that could
be readily connected to these experiences and so lost the benefit of a reduced sentence that might
result from that connection. Instead, they were being viewed as more dangerous to the public and
in need of longer sentences to deter them from committing further crimes. These questions are
explored in more depth in the following chapter through the analysis of the application of the
Gladue principles to the judicial decision-making process and their impact on sentence outcomes.
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Chapter Five: The Application of Gladue at Sentencing
1. Introduction
This chapter examines the application of the Gladue provisions in the sentencing process
itself. Its purpose it to ascertain whether there was a different methodology employed in sentencing
Indigenous offenders and how that manifested in judicial decisions. The previous chapter
suggested that in comparing Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders there were distinctions in
sentence outcomes between these two groups. Indigenous offenders received lower sentences for
drug and alcohol killings compared to non-Indigenous offenders but they received equal or higher
sentences in other categories such as near murder. This section serves to assess whether causes
for these disparities can be attributed to the operation of the Gladue provisions.
This chapter begins with an analysis of the rates of Gladue Reports in the cases examined
and the material which they contained. It then moves to a consideration of the two stages of Gladue
by trial courts. The balance of this chapter involves an examination of the different types of
methodologies that have been employed to sentence Indigenous offenders for manslaughter before
comparing the impact of the provisions on sentence outcome between and within Indigenousspecific sentencing methodologies and traditional methodologies.

2. Gladue Reports
Before analyzing the application of the provisions themselves, it is necessary to return to
the question of Gladue Reports and place the information submitted to the sentencing courts into
context. As noted in chapter one,1 the availability of Gladue Reports is not consistent across
Canada and some provinces and territories have no mechanisms for producing them. However,
with the seriousness of a conviction for manslaughter, it would be reasonable to expect Gladue
Reports to appear frequently in these cases. Even where resources for their production are scarce
– which is the case everywhere – given the potential severity of sentence, manslaughter convictions
are a good place to direct the limited resources available to the Gladue Report infrastructure.

1

See pages 24-25.

103
Unlike pre-sentence reports, there is no established form for Gladue Reports and no
particular mechanism for ordering them.2 While they are not standardized in any fashion, these
reports will usually convey information on the background and systemic factors related to the
offender being sentenced and the community from which they come. Here, this often included
discussions of the individual’s personal experiences with physical, emotional, and sexual abuse;3
substance use;4 history in the child welfare system;5 and, any relevant experiences they may have
had with residential schools.6
These reports also dealt with the offender’s family history where appropriate. This often
involved a discussion of the residential school experiences of parents and grandparents,7 or their
adoption into non-Indigenous families and the resulting intergenerational trauma that may have
affected the offender.8 This may be in the form of personally experiencing violent and neglectful
childhoods9 or witnessing widespread substance abuse and physical violence in the home.10 A
Gladue Report is designed to bring this information to the attention of the court in order to
appreciate the impact of the background and systemic factors on the offender and craft a sentence
taking them into account.11 It should be noted that Gladue Reports are not expert reports and
instead serve to convey the information without any judgment as to its veracity.12
As outlined in chapter one,13 formal processes do not exist for producing Gladue Reports
in Manitoba, Saskatchewan, the Northwest Territories and Nunavut. The Yukon created a pilot
program to produce Gladue Reports in 2018 but only after the single case from that jurisdiction
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considered in this study was decided.14 Among the jurisdictions examined, Ontario, British
Columbia and Alberta each have a formal system for producing Gladue Reports.15 Resources in
the criminal justice system are scarce everywhere and this is evident in the paucity of coverage for
Gladue Reports. As Jonathan Rudin has stated, “[t]o describe that availability of Gladue Reports
across the country as a patchwork quilt would do a disservice to quilt makers” as even “patchwork
quilts do not have huge holes in them.”16
Table 5.1 – Gladue Reports by Province/Territory
Gladue Report
Ontario
British Columbia
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Yukon
NWT
Nunavut
All
Percentage of Total

8
12
2
2
6
30
37.50

PSR – Gladue
Component
4
1
5
6.25

Gladue Report
Waived
5
5
6.25

None/Unknown
4
6
3
6
5
1
6
9
40
50.00

Percentage of
Jurisdiction
66.66
44.44
40.00
22.22
54.54
-

The differences in Gladue Report production across the country are apparent in the cases
considered in this research. Of the 80 Indigenous offenders examined here, only 30 had Gladue
Reports prepared for their sentencing hearings. While the absence of some Gladue Reports can be
attributed to the presence of a joint submission and a more limited sentencing hearing,17 there were
also cases involving joint submissions that included Gladue Reports,18 so this was not
determinative. There were no Gladue Reports cited in the decisions from the territories at all. Twothirds of Ontario cases involved a Gladue Report compared to less than half of British Columbia
cases, while in Alberta only two of the five Indigenous offenders had a Gladue Report prepared.
Despite the absence of a formal system for their production in Manitoba, over half of all cases
from that province involved a Gladue Report as did two of the nine cases from Saskatchewan.
Reports were produced in less than one third of near murder cases but close to 40% of drug and
alcohol cases, however, all three home invasion or robbery cases involved a Gladue Report.
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Table 5.2 – Gladue Reports by Category of Manslaughter
Gladue Report
Near Murder
Drug/Alcohol
Home Invasion/Robbery
Arson
One Punch
Unusual Circumstances
Total

8
17
3
1
1
30

PSR – Gladue
Component
3
2
5

Gladue Report
Waived
1
2
1
1
5

None/Unknown
15
23
1
1
40

Percentage by
Offence
29.62
38.63
100.0
33.33
100.0
-

There were occasions where a pre-sentence report was written that contained a “Gladue
component.” These were essentially pre-sentence reports where the probation officer who drafted
them attempted to address the background and systemic factors affecting the offender and offering
their conclusions about possible impacts. Caution has been expressed by scholars toward this
practice because of the tendency of pre-sentence reports to focus on risk assessment and from fears
that discussion of the systemic and background factors may cause the offender to be deemed a
higher risk than they might be were these details omitted.19 Notwithstanding the potential negative
effects of these reports, they served to convey some of the same relevant information to the court.
Pre-sentence reports with a Gladue component were submitted to the court in four cases in British
Columbia and one in Saskatchewan.20
In most other cases where the provision of pre-sentence information was specified it came
in the form of a traditional pre-sentence report or occasionally from psychiatric reports and
sometimes from a combination of the two. It is evident from reading the decisions that even in the
absence of Gladue Reports or Gladue components within pre-sentence reports, most traditional
pre-sentence reports contained some information germane to the offender’s Indigenous
background that could be useful in determining sentence. Where this was not the case, there were
rare instances in which submissions of defence counsel were presented in lieu. One of these
submissions occurred in British Columbia21 and two in the Northwest Territories.22 A final case
from Nunavut involved a “Gladue Report” that was written by defence counsel.23
It is impossible to determine from the information contained in the decisions why Gladue
Reports were submitted in some cases and not in others. However, there were several cases where
19
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the preparation of a Gladue Report was waived by the offender. In one instance, this was because
the offender was not sufficiently affected by the Gladue factors, however, defence counsel
nonetheless made submissions on the matter.24 In another, the offender’s connection to their First
Nations’ heritage was deemed insufficient by defence counsel to merit the preparation of a report.25
In one case, no report was prepared on the basis that a joint submission had been agreed and the
preparation of a Gladue Report was therefore not necessary as sentence had been determined.26 In
a final instance, defence counsel waived the report on the basis that the offence was simply too
serious to warrant consideration of the Gladue factors, though the provisions were still considered
by the court.27
While the Gladue Report is the preferred vehicle for bringing evidence of systemic and
background factors before the court, this information found its way before the courts one way or
another in virtually all cases. In the Northwest Territories and Nunavut, where Gladue Reports
were not produced at all, this often took the form of judicial notice by the court. Given that these
jurisdictions have substantial Indigenous populations, the judges may well have sufficient
knowledge of local conditions to take notice of the effects that the background and systemic factors
have had on the wider community, though they may lack an in-depth understanding of the role
they have played in the life of any particular offender.

3. Gladue Provisions
A. Stage One

Following the direction of the Supreme Court, the application of the Gladue provisions is
a two-stage process. The first stage consists of analyzing the “unique systemic and background
factors which may have played a role in bringing the particular aboriginal offender before the
court.”28 This is where the information relevant to the offender is considered by the court. It is here
that the Gladue Report comes into play by providing a detailed description, though this information
most frequently came by another route in these cases. This is a fairly low bar to clear. While it is
preferable for this information to come about in a formal manner or through witness testimony,

24

R v Morris, 2018 BCSC 803.
R v Hanley, 2014 BCSC 1373.
26
R v Grenier, 2013 BCSC 1894.
27
R v Houle, 2013 ABQB 70.
28
R v Gladue, [1999] 1 SCR 688 at para 66.
25

107
the presiding judge may also take judicial notice of the effects of the systemic and background
factors on the offender and their community where evidence has not been adduced.29 This is a
common practice in cases drawn from Nunavut where judges tended to recognize the damaging
effects on the wider community regardless of whether the offender had been personally impacted.30
In this respect, Gladue was sometimes seen as being relevant to the wider community and not just
the individual.
The first stage was addressed in 72 of the cases involving Indigenous offenders in this
study. In five of the eight cases where the first stage was not considered, the decision involved a
joint submission.31 These decisions were generally cursory and consisted mostly of the judge
assessing whether the joint submission was acceptable to the court rather than examining the life
of the offender or the principles of sentencing in detail. This was not, however, the case with most
joint submissions, where the judge nonetheless undertook the first stage of the Gladue analysis
before endorsing the joint submission. The lack of a first stage consideration was not fatal to a
subsequent consideration of the second stage of Gladue.32 In virtually all cases involving
Indigenous offenders, even those with tenuous connections to their heritage and those who had
waived the considerations altogether, the court nonetheless engaged in some limited examination
of the first stage of the Gladue provisions. As likely as not this had to do with judges assuring
themselves that they had at least given the offender’s Indigenous status some attention should an
issue arise on appeal. There is no airtight formula for identifying an application of the first stage
of Gladue, a state of affairs that is equally apparent with the second stage.
B. Stage Two
The second stage of Gladue requires a consideration of “[t]he types of sentencing
procedures which may be appropriate in the circumstances for the offender because of his or her
particular aboriginal heritage or connection.”33 This stage speaks to two distinct aspects of
sentencing Indigenous people. Following strictly from the Criminal Code, the first aspect requires
a remedial approach emphasizing restraint in sentencing and a suggestion that alternatives to
29
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imprisonment or restorative justice be considered.34 The second aspect requires sentencing an
Indigenous offender according to a different methodology following the decision of the Supreme
Court in Wells.35
As the Supreme Court has stated, Gladue does not mandate a different result.36 The
assumption entering into this research was that, with those few exceptions where restorative justice
measures or a non-custodial sentence were found to be appropriate, manslaughter convictions
would result in a period of imprisonment. This presumed that where the remedial aspect of Gladue
was being addressed by the sentencing court there would be some evidence of a reduction in
sentence quantum. However, a different methodology employed to arrive at the final sentence is
distinct from whether or not the final sentence is different from what it may have been for an
offender to whom the Gladue provisions do not apply. A judge could sentence an Indigenous
offender in a manner entirely undifferentiated from how they would a non-Indigenous offender
and still fulfill the remedial aspect of Gladue by passing a lower sentence. Equally, the judge could
undertake a non-traditional approach to sentencing an Indigenous offender and nonetheless arrive
at the conclusion that the sentence warranted was no different from a proportionate sentence for a
similarly situated non-Indigenous offender.
Therefore, the measure of the second stage is not simply whether it results in restorative
justice or alternatives to incarceration or even a reduction in sentence quantum. Rather, analyzing
a court’s approach to Gladue at sentencing requires looking first to whether there are distinct
procedures utilized in sentencing the Indigenous offenders and second to whether a difference in
the sentence outcome can be ascertained. Examples of the latter are not confined to restorative
justice, other alternatives to imprisonment, or to comparatively lower sentences. This chapter
examines the process of sentencing first through assessing any differences in methodology
employed and then through ascertaining the impact which the application of the provisions were
found to have on sentence. A different methodology employed in sentencing an Indigenous
offender is distinct from an outcome in which Gladue can be seen to affect sentence and could be
exhibited in different ways. There were two distinctive forms of different methodologies employed
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for sentencing Indigenous offenders identified in this study: one involving a first principles’
methodology and the other an Indigenous comparator case methodology.

4. Differences in Methodology
A. Traditional Methodology
The traditional methodology of sentencing involves a judge assessing the principles and
purposes of sentencing, along with any relevant mitigating and aggravating factors, and then
coming to a decision as to the appropriate penalty with reference to any relevant case law in much
the same fashion as any offender would be sentenced. An illustrative example of this was a case
where the Gladue provisions were explicitly applied as a sentence reduction. In R v Mitchell,
Mearow, and Jocko, two Indigenous offenders (Eric Shane Joseph Mearow and Dylan Albert
Jocko) and one non-Indigenous offender (Ronald Albert Mitchell) participated in a group attack
on a fourth man in a “flop house” in Sault Ste. Marie, Ontario where drugs were sold and consumed
and in which Eric Mearow resided.37 All three were charged with first degree murder in the
stabbing death of Wesley Hallam and the subsequent dismemberment and disposal of his body.
All three pleaded guilty and agreed to a joint submission for a period of imprisonment of ten years
for manslaughter and three years to be served concurrently for indecent interference with human
remains. All three men spent prolonged periods on remand and all received reformatory sentences
as a result.
The sentencing proceeded in an identical fashion for all three offenders and they were
treated in a manner consistent with a traditional sentencing. The principles and purposes of
sentencing were analyzed, as were the aggravating and mitigating factors, and the cases used in
sentencing followed similar fact patterns and involved non-Indigenous offenders. Neither
Indigenous offender had a Gladue Report prepared and while their Indigenous status and
background were discussed, they clearly had no effect on the gross sentence as Mr. Mitchell – the
non-Indigenous offender - received an identical one, although he had spent slightly longer in
custody and would receive a lower net sentence as a result. In his final pronouncement of sentence,
Justice McMillan gave Mearow and Jocko a further reduction in sentence of five months based on
their status as Indigenous offenders and in recognition of time spent in solitary confinement while
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awaiting trial. The judge made no distinctions about how that reduction was apportioned between
Gladue and solitary confinement.
Though this case was resolved by way of a guilty plea and joint submission, the presiding
judge nonetheless undertook a full review of the sentence to determine its fitness and did not make
any particular allowance for the Indigenous status of two of the offenders during that process.
Gladue clearly impacted sentence outcome in this case but as a reduction after the appropriate
sentence had been determined by the court as being one of ten years’ imprisonment. Even with the
resulting reduction of five months, both Indigenous offenders were still sentenced to more time in
prison than their non-Indigenous co-accused because of his longer remand time. Though this is
one of the few cases produced in this research in which the judge explicitly outlined how Gladue
was impacting sentence, and one of even fewer in which that explicit application took the form of
a sentence reduction, it was nonetheless conducted as a textbook sentencing following the
traditional methodology.
B. Indigenous Comparator Cases
The first difference in methodology manifested as a consideration of the offender and
offence with reference largely to decisions involving other Indigenous offenders and the manner
in which they had been sentenced, rather than cases dealing with non-Indigenous offenders. For
the purposes of this discussion, these decisions are referred to as Indigenous comparator cases.
These decisions qualify as a different methodology, despite their procedural similarities to the
traditional approach to sentencing. This methodology effectively required sentencing the offender
as an Indigenous person but employing the traditional framework. This sometimes involved more
emphasis being placed on what impact the offender’s actions had on their community or the judge
downplaying the importance of an offender’s criminal record or their past difficulties abiding by
conditions, but the sentencing procedure still closely resembled those employed for nonIndigenous offenders. This Indigenous comparator case methodology nonetheless emphasized the
Indigenous status of the offender within a traditional framework.
An illustrative example of this sentencing methodology was the British Columbia decision
of R v Johnny.38 Dakota Dillon Johnny, aged 19, beat Cindy Scow, aged 28, to death with a wooden
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dowel on the Tsulquate Reserve of the Gwa’Sala ‘Naxwaxda’xw Nation and left her to die in an
abandoned house before returning to the party where he had been drinking heavily. At no point
was the offender able to offer an explanation for his actions in the death of the victim, but he
pleaded guilty nonetheless.
Justice Maisonville of the British Columbia Supreme Court, sitting in Campbell River,
ultimately sentenced Johnny to eight years’ imprisonment, the lowest sentence suggested by the
Crown’s range and the highest suggested by the defence. The sentencing proceeded in a more or
less traditional manner. While it involved discussions of Johnny’s life story and his personal
problems occasioned by the background and systemic factors outlined in the Gladue Report, the
sentence was largely determined with reference to factually-similar cases involving Indigenous
offenders introduced by counsel. The only cases not involving Indigenous offenders with similar
facts were those British Columbia Court of Appeal cases establishing the general range for
manslaughter in the province. Justice Maisonville approached the sentencing of Johnny in a
fashion that recognized the cases suited to his circumstances were defined by the Indigenous
heritage of the offenders as much as by the similarities of the offences themselves.
After accounting for time spent on remand, Johnny was sentenced to a further seven years’
imprisonment. While sentencing Mr. Johnny, Justice Maisonville noted that the community
options suggested would not be relevant at this stage but that his rehabilitation could be assisted
by the Integrated Code Program Model in the Pacific Region of Correctional Services Canada. He
suggested:
This model is an innovative and holistic approach to correctional programs with a
view to enhancing public safety. It endeavours to address the needs and risk of a
specific offender population in the most effective manner possible. If sentenced to
a federal sentence… an aboriginal person would be managed within the context of
an aboriginal continuum care model, and could then access various aboriginal
programs and services, including elders, traditional circles, smudging kits,
aboriginal liaison officers, aboriginal-specific units, sweat lodge ceremonies,
powwows, and other ceremonies.39
In the case of Dakota Johnny, circumstances ultimately did not coalesce to allow his sentence to
be reduced to a reformatory term but the judge suggested that his time in a federal penitentiary
39
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should be focused as much as possible on his First Nations’ heritage. Notwithstanding the
outcome, the sentencing procedure was undertaken with the understanding that Mr. Johnny was
an Indigenous offender and that the cases against which to compare an appropriate sentence were
others involving Indigenous offenders.
C. First Principles’ Cases
The second fashion in which a different methodology was apparent was where offenders
were not subject to an Indigenous-focused version of the traditional sentencing model but were
instead sentenced in a manner that was more holistic. These are referred to here as the first
principles’ cases. In these decisions, though they might have been listed and considered, the
traditional considerations such as the principles and purposes of sentencing and the weighing of
aggravating and mitigating factors did not play a central role. Instead, judges were mostly
concerned with the offender as an Indigenous person and they were sentenced in a fashion where
this took centre stage. Other considerations were either not mentioned at all or played a secondary
role. Often these cases did not involve the use of comparator cases at all but instead focused on
Gladue and Ipeelee – or the leading provincial cases interpreting their application – to assess how
the criminal justice system should deal with the offender as an Indigenous offender. These first
principles’ cases focused heavily on the needs of the individual and the community rather than
abstract discussions of society and the necessity of the legal system to condemn the actions of the
offenders. These were the closest thing to a truly distinct method of sentencing Indigenous
offenders that appeared in these cases.
A case that exemplifies the type of sentencing procedures found in first principles’
decisions is Holmes.40 Barbara Elizabeth Holmes killed her intimate partner in what was described
as a frenzied attack with a knife, stabbing him 17 times. It was a difficult relationship and there
were suggestions that she had been the victim of domestic violence but these were not examined
in depth as aggravating and mitigating factors as would be expected with a more traditional
approach. Justice Langston of the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench, sitting in Lethbridge, instead
engaged in a lengthy discussion of Ms. Holmes, what the process meant to her and what beneficial
outcomes could possibly come from sending her to prison.
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There was no Gladue Report submitted nor were the particulars of her life connected
explicitly to any analysis of the Gladue provisions. While he ultimately felt constrained by the
submissions of counsel, Justice Langston made no reference to the cases offered to support those
positions. Instead he looked to the offender as an Indigenous person and attempted to justify how
imprisonment would serve to further the ends of justice. He wrote of the limitations of the criminal
justice system to address the needs of Ms. Holmes and of the Gladue provisions to offer real
alternatives, remarking:
…I’m limited to some degree by the numbers game. Counsel for the accused
recognizes this, as does the Crown. So how many years is appropriate for this
woman to stay in jail, to stay isolated, locked up, away from her family, away from
her community, away from the support mechanisms which we all recognize would
be advantageous to her?... if I were to ask everyone in this room, if there were police
who investigated this charge and the Crown who is prosecuting, is this woman
likely to go out and commit another crime like this, I am sure the overwhelming
response would be no. This was a singular, aberrant, inexcusable, unexplainable
act, but yet we will send this woman to jail to deter others who find themselves in
that inexcusable, unexplained situation. Will anyone in this community, apart from
those that the press tells, have any inkling about this woman or her history or why
she got the number of years which I will impose? I would think that they would be
unlikely to be interested.
If denunciation and deterrence truly worked, then those societies and countries that
indulge in sending great percentages of their population to jail would surely be
expected to be the safest places on Earth. The reality is that just isn’t the fact. We
in my criminal justice system yearn to find better solutions for antisocial conduct,
and some of that, fortunately, has come from the Aboriginal world, where we take
a more holistic view of how we deal with antisocial behaviour. But as today
illustrates, their input is restricted by the largess of the Supreme Court when they
annunciate the rules in Gladue, cautiously encouraging judges to take an Aboriginal
offender’s background into the equation of sentencing yet recognizing that
probably there aren’t many because, after all, we have to deal with deterrence and
denunciation.41
In the end, the offender was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment resulting in slightly less than
two years after accounting for remand time and ordering no probation. Justice Langston
41
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recommended that she be placed in a healing lodge and that culturally-relevant supports from her
community be provided to her while she was incarcerated. Though Barbara Holmes would
ultimately have to serve time in prison, she was nonetheless given the lowest sentence that the
judge felt he was able to give and the focus of her sentencing and its outcomes was geared toward
her Indigenous heritage. No principles of sentencing were offered in support of this position, with
the exception of section 718.2(e), and no cases were cited as justification for the sentence. Barbara
Holmes was the sole focus of the hearing that sentenced her for manslaughter.
Despite the fact that submissions of counsel were seen as a controlling factor in sentence
outcome by the court, this case still involved a different methodology than what is found in the
traditional sentencing process. The fact that the court felt constrained by the submissions of
counsel with respect to sentence suggests that the role played by counsel, in particular the Crown,
is an important one in allowing the provisions to impact upon sentence. Where the Crown
continues to suggest sentences that are in line with those for non-Indigenous offenders, the courts
will have to deal with those submissions and may feel obliged to respect them.
Evident in this decision and others like it is a palpable sense of frustration with the tools
supplied to sentencing judges to deal with Indigenous offenders in cases of serious and violent
crime. This decision could be quoted in its entirely but the excerpt above provides a clear
illustration of the conclusions reached in first principles’ cases. Though Barbara Holmes was not
given a suspended sentence, the final outcome was not reached through a traditional analysis but
through an attempt to conduct a sentencing focused on the offender as an Indigenous person rather
than as an offender who is Indigenous. The first principles’ cases were not always this direct in
their indictment of the sentencing regime nor did they always include judicial recognition of their
own limitations with respect to the positions of the parties, but they had in common an approach
that viewed the traditional methods of sentencing as having little relevance to Indigenous offenders
and minimizing their consideration. The outcomes of these cases varied but the tendency to
emphasize the offender as an individual and an Indigenous person remained their central focus.

D. Methodologies vs. Outcomes
The differences between methodologies are fine distinctions but they are important ones.
Neither of these processes nor the traditional sentencing model were consistent with crafting
sentences where the Gladue provisions ultimately impacted upon sentence. A judge who sentenced

115
an Indigenous person from the first principles of Gladue might still conclude that the offender
must be imprisoned for a prolonged period for their own sake or that of the public. A judge who
undertook a textbook traditional sentencing might equally find that the offender was best served
by spending a bare minimum of time in prison and engaging instead with a restorative justice
process. No particular methodology was the handmaiden of any outcome. However, not all
outcomes are created equal. A judge who determined the quantum of sentence and then deducted
six months or a year from that figure for Gladue, while they were fulfilling their remedial duty to
reduce the over-incarceration of Indigenous people, had not really considered the directive to
sentence Indigenous offenders differently. Such a judge would be following the letter of the law
but not the spirit of the different methodology imagined in Wells.
In those cases, of which there were several, there was doubtless an impact on the sentence
in practice but it was formalistic rather than fundamental. By the same token, some first principles
analyses of an offender resulted in a lengthy term of imprisonment. While this would not be
understood as a remedial application of the provisions, in that the sentence was not noticeably
different from what it might have been for a non-Indigenous offender, it did comprise a different
methodology. The question of methodology and sentence impact were therefore treated as separate
ones and while they were found together in some cases, they were not symbiotic.
The intention here is to engage in a qualitative evaluation of the operation of the provisions
in order to classify them. The individualization of the sentencing process renders it more art than
science, and the alchemy of sentencing does not lend itself easily to having its constituent elements
examined. The whole is greater than the sum of its parts, even in the rare situation where all those
parts are visible, as such the divisions between methodologies were not as clean where those
decisions depended on Indigenous comparator cases rather than a first principles’ approach. This
paper discusses both the impact or lack of impact on sentence outcomes separately from the
approaches taken in sentencing by the courts. Therefore, a first principles’ case did not necessarily
equate to an application of the Gladue provisions nor a traditional methodology to their rejection.
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5. Gladue’s Impact on Sentence Outcome
As noted in chapter one,42 it was assumed at the outset of this study that the Gladue
provisions were likely to manifest in cases involving the sentencing of offenders for serious and
violent crime as a reduction in sentence rather than as alternatives to imprisonment. This is not to
say that there would not be situations where the offender served no time in prison, however, this
would remain a sentence reduction in the broadest sense. Even a decision that did not see the
offender sentenced to a term of imprisonment but to a suspended sentence with probation – of
which there was one among these cases43 - still constitutes a reduction in sentence compared to the
body of manslaughter offenders examined here. A sentence reduction for the purposes of this paper
was therefore a reduction in the length of sentence compared to a comparable offender in
comparable circumstances who was found not to have been affected by the systemic and
background factors. Because of the wide variety of sentences available for manslaughter, such a
reduction had to be substantial to qualify or would have to have been explicitly identified as such
by the presiding judge. A sentence reduction that could be attributed to the provisions was one
possible indicator suggesting that the provisions had impacted upon sentence but it was not
analogous to a different methodology.
Much of the Gladue analysis was conducted in a unspoken fashion. This is not merely
because it is impossible to assign a numerical value to the suffering of individuals – let alone
cultures – but because it is difficult to assign such a value to virtually any aspect of sentencing,
though that is the final form the product takes. This, combined with the potentially slippery
problem of public reaction to applying discounted sentencing to Indigenous people, means that the
impact on the provisions upon the final sentence was often not explicit but could be ascertained by
comparing such decisions to one another and to the comparative data between Indigenous and nonIndigenous offenders discussed in the preceding chapter.
These cases have been divided into two broad categories based on the manner in which the
Gladue provisions were found to have impacted upon sentence or not. The remaining few cases
were decisions where it was difficult to ascertain whether or not any form was given to the
provisions. There were cases where the impact of the provisions were made explicit by the judge
who stated that a particular action was being taken with respect to the offender as a direct result of
42
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the operation of the provisions. Some of these cases focused on restorative justice, either in the
form of a suspended sentence44 or reformatory time plus probation,45 others included an explicit
reduction in sentence attributed to Gladue.46 Some viewed Gladue as being satisfied either in the
submissions of counsel47 or through a joint submission to the court,48 while others attributed a
refusal to impose a period of parole ineligibility to the operation of the provisions.49 Judges
sometimes decided that the impact of Gladue must manifest in the form of a prison sentence
because they believed that prison was the best place for the offender to receive culturally-relevant
programming that might serve them in their rehabilitation and that prison was therefore necessary
for the good of the offender.50
In other cases the impact on sentence was not outlined explicitly by the trial judge but was
nonetheless still apparent. These decisions fell into two categories. The first involved judges noting
that Gladue had informed the sentence handed down by the court but it was not stated how nor
was it always readily apparent. In the second category, offenders received sentences that were
clearly lower than those in line with jurisdictional averages. These decisions often, but not always,
involved reformatory time and probation, though this was frequently a result of long periods spent
on remand. Over 90% of Indigenous offenders examined in this study were not released on bail at
any time between their arrest and sentencing and so there was no clear connection between long
periods on remand and reformatory sentences. It should be noted with respect to bail, that the same
was true for non-Indigenous offenders. While non-Indigenous offenders were slightly more likely
to have been released on bail at some point leading up to sentencing, they were not released at all
in around 87% of cases. As a point of interest, a total of 41 offenders, both Indigenous and nonIndigenous, received net prison sentences of two years or less – including suspended sentences
and those sentenced to time served – which accounted for around a quarter of Indigenous offenders
and a fifth of non-Indigenous offenders.
There were a variety of justifications provided by judges for why the provisions would not
have an impact on sentence for an offender. Some judges determined that the Gladue factors had

44

Ibid.
R v Taniskyhayinew, 2018 BCSC 296; R v Okewmow, 2016 MBQB 240.
46
R v Mitchell, Mearo and Jocko, 2016 ONSC 5339; R v David, 2017 BCSC 877; R v Dick, 2014 MBQB 187.
47
R v Abraham, 2014 MBQB 242.
48
R v Brerrton, 2013 BCSC 1029.
49
R v Halkett, 2013 SKQB 41; R v Fiddler, 2018 SKQB 197.
50
R v Johnny, 2015 BCSC 615.
45

118
a limited effect on the life of the offender51 while others noted that there could be no impact
because counsel had failed to make submissions connecting the Gladue factors to the offender.52
The most common reasoning provided by judges was that the circumstances of the offence were
such that that this was precisely the sort of case envisioned by the Supreme Court when they
cautioned that there will be cases where the sentence would be the same for an Indigenous offender
as for a non-Indigenous one.53 Some cases saw the court determine there would be no impact on
the basis that both counsel had proposed a term of imprisonment and the judge felt constrained by
those submissions.54 Related to this, some decisions determined there would be no impact based
on the need to protect Indigenous victims of crime or from a need to tailor the sentence to reflect
local conditions in order to emphasize denunciation and deterrence.55
Cases in which the judge did not explicitly state that there would be no impact followed
many of the same forms as those in which the judge’s reasoning was stated explicitly but without
the court taking the step of officially declining to do so. There were cases waived by counsel,56
suggestions that prison would be necessary for the offender,57 or statements that the sentence had
been determined by a joint submission or submissions of counsel.58 The remainder of cases
contained no substantive discussion of the second stage of Gladue and moved on to the imposition
of long sentences.
Finally there were cases where the existence of a sentence in the mid-range and no explicit
discussion of the impact or lack of impact of the provisions on sentence made it impossible to
assess the judge’s reasoning with respect to the provisions.59 These cases were few, representing
only three of the total. Unfortunately, not all sentencing decisions are written with academic
analysis in mind and sometimes they are not as neatly divided as one might like. With that in mind,
it is still possible to examine these divisions to come to some general conclusions about how the
provisions did or did not impact sentence and to what types of manslaughter such impacts were
being most frequently applied.
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A. Different Methodology Decisions
Of the 80 decisions involving Indigenous offenders, 24 were decided according to a
different methodology. Nineteen of those offenders were convicted for a drug and alcohol
manslaughter, four in connection with a near murder, and one for manslaughter involving arson.
In total there were eight offenders classified as first principles’ cases, all of which were drug and
alcohol manslaughters. Like all cases in this study, the manner in which Gladue impacted sentence
or not varied greatly in both the different methodology categories and the similar methodology
one. For those decisions involving a first principles’ consideration of Gladue, in only two cases
did the provisions not appear to have an impact on sentence, in the remaining six the impact was
discernible in the form of low sentences.
Sixteen offenders were sentenced in the Indigenous comparator cases category. Of these,
11 were drug and alcohol manslaughters, four near murders, and one involved arson. One issue
arising with the decisions from the Indigenous comparator cases, was that in those jurisdictions
where there is a large Indigenous population it was difficult to establish if the offender was being
sentenced in comparison to Indigenous offenders as a matter of methodology or whether the cases
in the jurisdiction overwhelmingly involved Indigenous offenders. It is difficult to parse this
question, though it may be an academic distinction in the end. Among these decisions, there were
six cases in which the provisions were not found to have impacted the sentence, eight in which an
appreciable impact on the outcome of sentence could be observed, and two in which no conclusion
could be reached.
Table 5.3 –Different Methodology - Gladue Impact on Sentence
First Principles
Comparator Cases
All

Impact
6
8
14

No Impact
2
6
8

Unclear
2
2

Impact %
75.00
50.00
58.33

Together, the cases sentenced according to a different methodology accounted for 30% of
all Indigenous offenders in this study and represented the largest proportion of cases in
Saskatchewan at 55% - the only jurisdiction in which a different methodology was employed for
the majority of Indigenous offenders. That Saskatchewan is leading the way in its treatment of
Indigenous offenders has been remarked upon by judges in Alberta, who have suggested that more
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Indigenous people would benefit from the regime operating in that province.60 Different
methodology cases accounted for half of those from the Northwest Territories and 40% from
Alberta. Approximately one quarter of cases from British Columbia and Ontario were sentenced
according to a different methodology, one third of those in Nunavut, and a single case from the
eleven arising in Manitoba.
Table 5.4 – Different Methodology – Jurisdiction
Ontario
British Columbia
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Yukon
Northwest Territories
Nunavut
All

First Principles
2
3
1
2
8

Comparator Cases
1
4
1
5
1
1
3
16

All
3
7
2
5
1
3
3
24

Percentage of Total
25.00
25.92
40.00
55.55
09.09
50.00
33.33
30.00

Table 5.5 – Different Methodology – Categories of Manslaughter
Near Murder
Drug/Alcohol
Home/Robbery
Arson
Unusual
One Punch
All

i.

Impact on Sentence
2
11
1
14

No Impact on Sentence
2
6
8

Unclear
2
2

Impact Percentage
50.00
57.89
100
58.33

First Principles’ Cases

Distribution
These decisions represented the closest thing to an entirely different approach to the
sentencing of Indigenous offenders. As a consequence they were rare, representing only one in ten
Indigenous offenders. Notwithstanding their rarity, they were the category seeing the highest
likelihood of the Gladue provisions impacting sentence outcome at 75%, compared to an average
of 47.5% in decisions overall. Importantly, they were also made up entirely of drug and alcohol
cases and accounted for nearly one in five of the Indigenous offenders in that category, twice their
proportion among offenders Indigenous overall. They were not confined to any particular
jurisdiction and were found in Ontario, British Columbia, Alberta and the Northwest Territories.
This is opposed to Indigenous offenders sentenced in the Indigenous comparator cases category
which appeared in every jurisdiction except for the Yukon.
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Outcomes
In this category, there were only two cases in which the provisions clearly did not impact
the outcome of the sentence. One involved a killing in which a young man in a state of extreme
intoxication beat a 65-year-old elder to death who was suffering from cancer.61 Justice Fitzpatrick
of the Ontario Superior Court, sitting in Thunder Bay, determined that the provisions could not be
applied on the basis that both counsel had proposed terms of imprisonment and sentenced the
offender, Mr. Wesley, to eight years’ imprisonment. In another decision from the Northwest
Territories, a woman stabbed her common-law husband once in the back following an alcoholfueled argument.62 The judge decided that Gladue would not impact sentence outcome based on
the need to protect Indigenous victims. Justice Charbonneau noted that Indigenous victims were
no less worthy of protection than non-Indigenous ones and that the rights of both must be balanced
to achieve a fit sentence. As a consequence, she endorsed the joint submission of five years’
imprisonment. This sentence accorded with the territorial average for drug and alcohol
manslaughters in the Northwest Territories.
In the remaining six cases the impact of the provisions on sentence outcome was
ascertainable. At no point in any of these decisions did the judge state that Gladue was being
utilized to lower the sentence but it was clear in the final outcome that lower sentences were the
result of an application of the provisions. Three cases involved the imposition of net sentences
resulting in reformatory time.63 In another decision, the offender was given a sentence of two years
to be served in a federal penitentiary followed by three-years’ probation.64 Finally, two offenders
received sentences of imprisonment below what would be expected given the circumstances of the
offence and the offender.65 Altogether, there was no impact on the final sentence in two cases in
this category and there was an appreciable impact in the remaining six, for an overall impact rate
of 75%. All cases in this category were drug and alcohol manslaughters.
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ii.

Indigenous Comparator Cases

Distribution
These decisions were, after the first principles’ cases, the most likely to see the sentence
impacted by the provisions, which occurred at a rate of 50%. Together they represented one fifth
of all Indigenous offenders and, unlike the first principles’ cases, they were not limited to drug and
alcohol manslaughters, but those represented nine of the total, along with four near murders, and
a single case involving arson. These cases were found in every jurisdiction with the exception of
the Yukon and were most common in Saskatchewan, where they accounted for more than half.
Ontario, Alberta, Manitoba and the Northwest Territories each produced one case in this category,
there were three from Nunavut, four from British Columbia, and five from Saskatchewan.
Outcomes
In eight cases the provisions impacted the final sentence outcome. In one case the offender
was sentenced to three years and eight month’s imprisonment which, after accounting for remand,
resulted in a sentence of two years less a day and three-years’ probation.66 Justice Keyser of the
Manitoba Court of Queen’s Bench, sitting in Winnipeg, justified this sentence on the basis that the
offender would be best served by a sentence geared toward returning him to the community so he
could reconnect with his Indigenous heritage while noting that the analysis must be holistic, and
that there could not be an automatic reduction in sentence for an Indigenous person.
In another case, the provisions were applied following the same rationale. The offender
was sentenced to slightly more than three years and three months’ imprisonment, resulting in a
sentence of two years less a day and three-years’ probation for the beating death of a man he
discovered sexually assaulting an unconscious woman.67 Justice Baird of the British Columbia
Supreme Court, sitting in Nanaimo, connected the probation order to the need to engage in a
restorative justice process with the family of the victim but he did not link this directly to the
Gladue provisions. In the remaining six cases, the impact of the provisions could be seen in the
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form of sentences lower than might otherwise be expected. Three of the decisions were drug and
alcohol killings,68 two were near murder cases,69 and one involved a death by arson.70
Two decisions involving Indigenous comparator cases, one near murder and one drug and
alcohol manslaughter, did not see an impact on sentence quantum but instead saw the judge tie
prison time to the needs of the offender as an Indigenous person. The court justified this on the
basis that prison was necessary for the offender to rehabilitate and that they would be aided by the
Indigenous-specific programming available in the federal correctional system.71 While it may not
be satisfying to think of the need for prison as an impact of the Gladue provisions, this scenario
remains one in which the judge has crafted a sentence they feel will be the most beneficial for the
offender given their status as an Indigenous person.
In four cases, the Gladue provisions clearly did not impact the final sentence. In two of
these decisions, both drug and alcohol manslaughters, this was demonstrated by the imposition of
long terms of imprisonment, albeit preceded by lip service to the importance of alternative
sanctions for Indigenous offenders, albeit ones not permitted by the particular facts of those
cases.72 Two other cases, one a near murder and the other a drug and alcohol manslaughter, also
saw no impact as demonstrated by long sentences but the judges did not pay any heed to
alternatives to incarceration and instead proceeded directly to sentencing.73 Finally, there were two
drug and alcohol decisions in which it was not possible to come to any conclusion about whether
or not the provisions were applied.74 In all, eight decisions involving Indigenous comparator cases
saw the provisions impact sentence, six did not, and two were not sufficiently clear to make a
determination resulting in an sentence impact rate of 50%. This impact rate was below that of the
first principles’ cases but above those in the traditional methodology categories.
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B. Traditional Methodology Cases
Distribution
Decisions sentenced according to the traditional methodology made up the majority of
cases involving Indigenous offenders, occurring in seven out of ten decisions. In 57% of cases
involving drug and alcohol manslaughters and 85% of near murder cases, Indigenous offenders
were sentenced according to the traditional methodology. These cases were found in all provinces
and territories, and Manitoba led with nearly 82% of offenders sentenced in this manner. Ontario
and British Columbia saw approximately 75% of Indigenous offenders sentenced according to the
traditional methodology with Alberta and Saskatchewan slightly lower at 60% and 45%,
respectively. This was also true of half of offenders in the Northwest Territories, two-thirds of
those in Nunavut and of the single decision involving an Indigenous offender in the Yukon.
Table 5.6 – Similar Methodology – Gladue Impact on Sentence
Impact on Sentence
23

All

No Impact on Sentence
32

Unclear
1

Impact Percentage
41.07

Outcomes
Twenty-three decisions in this category saw the provisions impact sentence. One of those
cases was a drug and alcohol manslaughter involving an already low sentence reduced to
reformatory time and three-years’ probation.75 In that case, Justice Griffin of the British Columbia
Supreme Court, sitting in Vancouver, imposed this sentence on the offender despite the fact that
he considered the crime a particularly vicious and unnecessary killing. Still, he believed the
offender would be better served by treatment programs related to her issues with alcohol. With
four offenders, three in the drug and alcohol category and one involving a robbery, the judge
explicitly applied the provisions as a sentencing discount. The two offenders in one of the drug
and alcohol cases received a reduction of 5-months’ imprisonment bringing the total down to a
reformatory sentence,76 the remaining drug and alcohol offender received a reduction in sentence
of one year,77 as did the offender in the robbery manslaughter.78 Finally, in one near murder case,
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the court decided that the offender would be better served by the programming available in the
federal correctional system.79
In two drug and alcohol cases involving a total of three offenders, the judge determined
that the provisions had already been applied because the sentence proposed in the joint submission
was low enough to have incorporated them.80 Finally, in one near murder and one drug and alcohol
case arising in Saskatchewan, the judges refused to impose a period of parole ineligibility on the
offenders in recognition of their status as Indigenous people.81 Eight of the ten cases in this
category in which the judge stated explicitly that Gladue would impact sentence were drug and
alcohol killings.
In one case, the offender was given a suspended sentence and three-years’ probation after
stabbing his friend to death in a drunken fight in the home shared by their girlfriends.82 Though it
was never stated outright, the final determination of sentence immediately followed the judge’s
remarks that section 718.2(e) should form part of any consideration of sentence though he drew
no direct connection. In seven cases, the judges remarked only that Gladue had been considered
in crafting the ultimate disposition of the case. In some of these cases it was difficult to determine
precisely what the impact on sentence had been. However, as the judge had explicitly stated that
the provisions had been taken into account in crafting the sentence, they were counted as cases in
which sentence outcome had been impacted by Gladue. Among these cases were a single arson in
which five people were killed and for which the offender received a sentence of life
imprisonment,83 a single drug and alcohol manslaughter,84 and five near murder offenders85- with
one case involving three offenders.86 Finally, one near murder and one drug and alcohol offender
were each given net sentences involving reformatory terms and probation,87 while one drug and
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alcohol offender,88 one home invasion offender89 and a single one-punch offender90 received
sentences lower than might be expected in the circumstances.
A total of 32 offenders saw no appreciable impact on sentence outcome. In seven cases,
the impact of the provisions were rejected explicitly on the basis that the sentence for those
offenders would be the same as it would be for a non-Indigenous offender. Judges made this
finding with respect to offenders in four drug and alcohol cases,91 two near murder cases,92 and
one home invasion case.93 In a single near murder case, the judge declined to allow the provisions
to impact sentence length as both counsel had proposed time in prison and he felt bound by those
submissions.94
In three cases, the court decided that the circumstances of the offence and the offender
were such that there must be prison time and therefore the provisions could not operate to lower
the sentence. This occurred in one drug and alcohol case,95 one case involving unusual
circumstances,96 and one involving arson.97 In one near murder case the judge refused to apply the
provisions on the basis that local conditions, there the prevalence of gun violence in Nunavut,
dictated that a prison sentence was necessary.98 In one near murder and one drug and alcohol
decision, the judge declined to apply the provisions on the basis that the relevance of the Gladue
factors to the life of the offender had not been explained by counsel and therefore they could not
be considered.99 In a single one-punch manslaughter, the judge simply determined that the Gladue
factors had a limited effect on the life of the offender and therefore it was not appropriate to
consider them.100
In one near murder case and one drug and alcohol case, defence counsel waived the
consideration of the provisions.101 In one drug and alcohol decision, the judge paid lip service to
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the need to consider alternatives to incarceration before moving on to impose a sentence of
considerable length.102 In two drug and alcohol cases103 and six near murder cases,104 the presence
of a joint submission meant there was no discussion of the need to apply the provisions. In addition,
in two drug and alcohol decisions105 and three near murder cases106 there was no suggestion of
sentence impact by the judge and the offenders received long sentences. Finally, in one drug and
alcohol case it was not clear if the provisions had impacted sentence.107 In all, 23 cases saw an
impact on sentence resulting from the Gladue provisions, 32 involved no appreciable impact, and
one was not sufficiently clear to make a determination. This produced an overall rate of sentence
impact of 41% for offenders sentenced in accordance with a traditional methodology.

6. Comparative Analysis of Outcomes Between Methodologies
The manner of sentence impact varied considerably between offenders as did the rates of
sentence impact between those decisions involving traditional and different methodologies and
within those different methodologies. However, there were some patterns which could be
discerned when examining this information, although some conclusions are necessarily limited by
the small sample sizes involved in some jurisdictions, as was seen in discussions of sentence
quantum in the preceding chapter.
Slightly over 58% of all cases sentenced according to a different methodology saw the
Gladue provisions impact sentence in some fashion and in all jurisdictions with the exception of
the Yukon and Saskatchewan. While the Northwest Territories, Manitoba and Alberta had a one
hundred percent impact rate for different methodology cases, each of those jurisdictions only
represented a single case. Nunavut had a 40% impact rate among five cases in the territory and
Ontario had a rate of 66% among three cases in that jurisdiction. British Columbia, with the largest
number of different methodology cases at seven, had an impact rate of 85%.
The twenty-four cases involving different methodologies were so widely distributed
between different provinces and territories and some jurisdictions produced so few cases that it
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was not possible to make any definitive statements about the rates of application in those
jurisdictions for cases employing a different methodology.108 In many of the jurisdictions
examined, there were so few cases sentenced according to a different methodology it was not
possible to make statements about the rate of sentence impact that would be statistically significant.
Similarly, looking within and comparing the first principles’ and Indigenous comparator categories
also does not yield enough cases to make definitive statements about their rate of sentence impact
in a given province or territory, as only British Columbia and Saskatchewan had more than three
offenders sentenced according to a different methodology. Notwithstanding this difficulty, within
the different methodology cases from all provinces and territories considered together, there was
a clear divide. First principles’ cases saw an impact rate of 75% and Indigenous comparator cases
had an impact rate of only 50%.
Table 5.7 – Different Methodology –Impact on Sentence – Jurisdiction
Ontario
British Columbia
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Yukon
NWT
Nunavut
All

Impact on Sentence
2
6
2
1
1
2
14

No Impact Sentence
1
1
4
1
1
8

Unclear
1
1
2

Impact Percentage
66.66
85.71
100
00.00
100
33.33
66.66
58.33

The number of cases sentenced according to a traditional methodology was large enough
and sufficiently well distributed among jurisdictions that some conclusions could be drawn from
intra-jurisdictional comparisons. The overall rate at which the Gladue provisions were found to
impact sentence in some manner among the traditional methodology cases was approximately
41%. The nine cases in Ontario saw an impact rate of 33% and the twenty in British Columbia
had a similar rate at 35%. Likewise, the three cases in the Northwest Territories saw an impact
rate of 33% and the six in Nunavut were half that rate at 16%. The only two provinces in which
the impact rate exceeded half were the five cases in Saskatchewan at 60% and the nine cases in
Manitoba at 89%. No traditional methodology cases in Alberta saw the provisions impact sentence
outcome. While these were not large numbers of cases to deal with, they were sufficient to allow
a slightly clearer picture within different provinces and territories than did cases from the different
methodology categories.
108

For example, Manitoba which had one case and Alberta which had two.
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Table 5.8 – Similar Methodology –Impact on Sentence – Jurisdiction
Ontario
British Columbia
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Yukon
NWT
Nunavut
All

Impact on Sentence
3
7
3
8
1
1
23

No Impact on Sentence
6
13
3
2
1
1
1
5
32

Unclear
1
1

Impact Percentage
33.33
35.00
00.00
60.00
88.88
00.00
33.33
16.66
41.07

It is fairly clear – even with the limited number of cases in the different methodology
categories – that where these methodologies were employed, the Gladue provisions were more
likely to impact sentence outcome on average at a rate of roughly 60%, against 40% for the
traditional methodology. Where a different methodology was used, the impact of the Gladue
provisions was more likely on average, however, it was unlikely in any given jurisdiction that a
different methodology would be used to sentence Indigenous offenders. As noted in Table 5.4, the
likelihood of a different methodology being employed to sentence an Indigenous offender was
low, with only Saskatchewan and the Northwest Territories reaching the halfway mark and the
overall average brought down to 30% by the low numbers produced in Ontario, British Columbia
and Manitoba. Therefore, while an Indigenous offender frequently fared better when sentenced
according to a different methodology, the likelihood of that coming to pass was generally quite
low.
Table 5.9 - Proportion of Similar and Different Methodologies by Jurisdiction
Same Methodology
Ontario
British Columbia
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Yukon
NWT
Nunavut
All

9/12
20/27
3/5
4/9
9/11
1/1
3/6
6/9
56/80

Same Methodology
Percentage
75.00
74.07
60.00
44.44
81.81
100.0
50.00
66.66
70

Different Methodology
3/12
7/27
2/5
5/9
2/11
0/1
3/6
3/9
24/80

Different Methodology
Percentage
25.00
25.92
40.00
55.55
18.18
50.00
33.33
30

When examined across categories of manslaughter a similar pattern emerged to that seen
in chapter three, showing an appreciable difference in the treatment of near murder and drug and
alcohol cases. The robbery and home invasion, arson, unusual circumstance, and one-punch cases
had too few incidents from which to draw any conclusions about sentencing patterns. What was
immediately apparent about the near murder category is that in over 85% of those cases, a
traditional methodology was employed to sentence Indigenous offenders. By contrast, in drug and
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alcohol killings, only 57% of cases were sentenced according to the traditional methodology used
in sentencing non-Indigenous offenders. As with the lower average sentence quantum for
Indigenous offenders in drug and alcohol manslaughters compared to non-Indigenous offenders,
it is clear that among Indigenous offenders, drug and alcohol cases were also treated more
favourably from the standpoint of Gladue application and impact than were near murder killings.
Table 5.10 - Proportion of Similar and Different Methodologies by Category
Same Methodology
Near Murder
Drugs and Alcohol
Home/Robbery
Arson
Unusual Circumstances
One Punch
All

23/27
25/44
3/3
2/3
1/1
2/2
56/80

Same Methodology
Percentage
85.18
56.81
100.0
66.66
100.0
100.0
70.00

Different Methodology
4/27
19/44
1/3
24/80

Different Methodology
Percentage
14.81
43.18
33.33
30.00

Where a different methodology was employed in sentencing offenders for near murder
cases, the Gladue provisions were likely to impact sentence in 50% of all cases, in drug and alcohol
manslaughters this number was closer to 58%. Unfortunately, there were only four near murder
decisions against which to compare the 19 drug and alcohol cases in the different methodology
categories and therefore it is difficult to draw any definitive conclusions about sentence impact in
near murder cases sentenced according to a different methodology. As noted, where the first
principles’ approach was used, the rates of sentence impact for drug and alcohol manslaughters
increased to 75%.
Table 5.11 – Different Methodology – Categories of Manslaughter
Near Murder
Drug/Alcohol
Home/Robbery
Arson
Unusual
One Punch
All

Impact on Sentence
2
11
1
14

No Impact on Sentence
2
6
8

Unclear
2
2

Impact Percentage
50.00
57.89
100
58.33

The traditional methodology category had more cases and a greater geographical
distribution and so a better comparison could be made between near murder and drug and alcohol
categories here. The sample set of 23 near murder decisions using this methodology produced an
average sentence impact rate of around 30%. By contrast, the 25 drug and alcohol decisions
sentenced according to a traditional methodology saw the Gladue provisions impact sentence in
48% of cases. This suggests, like the outcomes of sentencing examined in chapter 3, that drug and
alcohol manslaughters were not only receiving lower sentences overall compared to near murder
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manslaughter but they were also seeing the provisions impact sentence more frequently than near
murders when sentenced according to the traditional methodology. The drug and alcohol cases
also held a slight edge in sentence impact in the different methodology category overall and a
demonstrably higher rate of impact where a first principles’ methodology was employed.
Table 5.12 – Similar Methodology – Categories of Manslaughter
Near Murder
Drug/Alcohol
Home/Robbery
Arson
Unusual
One Punch
All

Impact on Sentence
7
12
2
1
1
23

No Impact on Sentence
16
12
1
1
1
1
32

Unclear
1
1

Impact Percentage
30.43
48.00
66.66
50.00
100
50.00
41.07

Every angle from which methodology used and impact on sentence of the Gladue
provisions could be approached suggests that drug and alcohol cases were given more favourable
treatment than near murder cases. This began with the Gladue Report, where nearly 40% of all
drug and alcohol cases had a Gladue Report prepared, compared with slightly less than 30% of
near murder cases. This pattern continued in the methodology utilized in sentencing offenders.
With 43% of drug and alcohol cases sentenced according to a different methodology, such cases
were three times more likely to receive that treatment than near murder cases which were sentenced
according to a different methodology in only 15% of cases. Drug and alcohol cases represented
nearly 80% of all cases sentenced according to a different methodology, as opposed to just under
17% for near murders.
This pattern of differential treatment between near murder and drug and alcohol
manslaughters continued within the different methodology categories. Drug and alcohol cases
represented close to 70% of all decisions in the Indigenous comparator cases category, compared
to only 25% for near murder cases. Drug and alcohol cases also represented all cases in which the
first principles’ methodology was employed. Among the combined cases sentenced according to
a different methodology, drug and alcohol cases were slightly more likely to see the Gladue
provisions impact sentence at 58%, compared to only 50% for near murder cases.
The preference for the provisions impacting sentence in drug and alcohol cases continued
in decisions sentenced according to the traditional methodology. Here, the Gladue provisions
impacted on sentence nearly 50% of the time for offenders sentenced for drug and alcohol
manslaughters compared to 30% for offenders in the near murder category. Altogether, judges
were substantially more likely to employ either of the different methodologies when sentencing
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offenders facing a drug and alcohol manslaughter than a near murder. Finally, when considering
all decisions together without reference to the methodology used, drug and alcohol manslaughters
saw the Gladue provisions impact sentence in approximately 52% of cases compared to a
comparable figure of 33% for near murder manslaughters.
When the Gladue provisions impacted sentence, there was a greater likelihood that this
would occur in drug and alcohol cases when a different methodology was used and there was a
significantly greater likelihood that they would impact sentence in drug and alcohol cases rather
than near murder cases where courts employed a traditional methodology. It appears that
sentencing judges were more likely, in every respect, to treat drug and alcohol manslaughters not
only as a category of manslaughter to which a different methodology should be utilized but equally
as one in which the Gladue provisions would more frequently impact sentence outcome. This does
not necessarily suggest that the courts were ignoring Gladue where drugs and alcohol were not
involved but it does suggest that they were more likely to see how the provisions could impact
sentence in these cases.

7. Explanations for the difference
What then is the cause of the evident difference in the treatment of drug and alcohol killings
compared to near murder killings in both the methodologies used and the impact on sentence? At
the conclusion of chapter 3 it was suggested that drug and alcohol killings were viewed by judges
as a typically Indigenous form of manslaughter and that due to the role played by intoxication in
these offences, they could be connected more readily to prevailing stereotypes around the social
conditions affecting Indigenous peoples. It was also suggested that where manslaughters
committed by Indigenous peoples departed from these patterns, the offenders in those cases lost
the benefit of a sentence reduction that came from the operation of the Gladue provisions. The
analysis conducted in this chapter with regard to methodology and differences in sentence impact
reinforces that conclusion.
As discussed above, the likelihood that a traditional methodology would be used to
sentence a given Indigenous offender remained high in all categories of manslaughter. The
difference between the rates of similar methodologies between drug and alcohol and near murder
were clear. With 85% of near murder cases sentenced according to a traditional methodology and
only 57% of drug and alcohol cases receiving the same treatment, some explanation for the
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differentials in sentence quantum seen in chapter 3 becomes apparent, that is that Indigenous
offenders received slightly lower sentences than non-Indigenous offenders for drug and alcohol
killings but received higher sentences for near murder manslaughters. When comparing all
methodologies of sentencing, drug and alcohol manslaughters saw an impact rate of slightly over
half and near murders saw a rate of only one third. What is clear from the divisions between drug
and alcohol and near murder manslaughters is that once a given offender in the near murder
category had passed the threshold into either of the different methodology categories, the rate of
Gladue impact on sentence narrowed considerably compared with a drug and alcohol killing to
58% and 50%.
Table 5.13 – Rates of Impact – All Methodologies - All Categories of Manslaughter
Near Murder
Drug/Alcohol
Home/Robbery
Arson
Unusual
One Punch
All

Impact on Sentence
9
23
2
2
1
37

No Impact on Sentence
18
18
1
1
1
1
40

Unclear
3
3

Impact Percentage
33.33
52.27
66.66
66.66
00.00
50.00
46.25

Unclear
1
2
3

Impact Percentage
41.67
48.14
40.00
30.00
90.00
00.00
33.33
33.33
46.25

Table 5.14 – Rates of Impact – All Methodologies – All Jurisdictions
Ontario
British Columbia
Alberta
Saskatchewan
Manitoba
Yukon
NWT
Nunavut
All

Impact on Sentence
5
13
2
3
9
2
3
37

No Impact on Sentence
7
14
3
6
1
1
2
6
40

In respect to both the methodology employed and the impact on sentence, drug and alcohol
cases received a more favourable treatment under the Gladue regime. Once again, it appears that
judges viewed acts of violence perpetrated by Indigenous offenders in the drug and alcohol
category as fitting more closely with the conventional cultural image of Indigenous criminality as
driven by alcohol consumption. Where judges could make this connection as well as trace the
violence perpetrated by the offender back to the experiences of colonialism, family separation, and
residential schools for example, they could more readily see their way to applying the Gladue
provisions. Where the violence was perpetrated by a sober Indigenous offender, or at least one
who was not heavily intoxicated, the explanations for the behaviour and the connections to the
Gladue provisions were not made as readily. This was despite the fact that many individuals who
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were sentenced according to the traditional methodology or who did not see an impact on sentence
resulting from the Gladue provisions, had led lives every bit as traumatizing and in line with
prevailing stereotypes as their counterparts.
One potential explanation for the disproportionate number of drug and alcohol cases
finding themselves in the different methodology categories as well as greater Gladue impact rates,
is the existence of large numbers of Indigenous comparator cases in the drug and alcohol category
dealing with Indigenous offenders. As noted in chapter three, more than eight in ten drug and
alcohol manslaughters examined involved Indigenous offenders. If these numbers hold nationwide
and over time, this would explain why cases in that category were more likely to find themselves
sentenced under the Indigenous comparator cases methodology. As was discussed in chapter 3,
Indigenous offenders tended to receive somewhat lower sentences in those categories when
compared with non-Indigenous offenders so this may also be the result of the use of Indigenous
comparator cases.
Even if this holds true, it still represents a substantial problem for the application of Gladue
to manslaughter sentencing. If offenders in drug and alcohol killings were being treated more
favourably under the Gladue regime because of the circumstances of the offence, it would appear
that more is required for the operation of Gladue in manslaughter sentencing than merely being
affected by the background and systemic factors. It suggests that the circumstances of the offence
itself has to align with how Indigenous people are viewed by the courts. While this is clearly
beneficial for those offenders who stand convicted of drug and alcohol killings, it does not accord
with Gladue’s focus on the individual as an Indigenous offender if they are not also seen as having
committed an Indigenous offence.
The Gladue provisions were being applied, both in methodology and in sentence impact,
to a significant proportion of the cases examined in this paper. However, besides the divide
between drug and alcohol manslaughters and near murder killings, there did not appear to be a
consistent pattern to this application. Much of it appears to result from the judge deciding the case
and to counsel arguing sentence. The concluding remarks in the final chapter of this paper offer
suggestions for how the parties involved in the sentencing process can work toward a more evenhanded application of the provisions to manslaughter and perhaps to sentencing offenders for
serious and violent crime more widely.
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Chapter Six: Conclusion
1. Introduction
This research started with the question of how the Gladue provisions were being applied
to the sentencing of offenders for serious and violent crimes and what impact that application was
having on sentence. It was stated at the beginning of this paper that from the outset of the research
it was assumed that where there was an application of the provisions to a sentence of manslaughter,
it would likely manifest as a reduction in sentence. There were some cases where, in reference to
Gladue, judges determined that prison would best serve the needs of the offender in the long term,
either through generalized or Indigenous-specific programming, sentences that resulted in
reformatory time and probation, and in very few cases in time served. Despite this, more often than
not where an impact was evident, it was in the form of a reduced sentence compared to a
comparable non-Indigenous offender.
The fact that the impact of the provisions most often manifested as a reduction in sentence
is not the lip service and discount that was initially feared by supporters and detractors of the
provisions alike. What emerges from the decisions examined for this paper is a more nuanced
landscape. While there were no truly innovative responses to crafting sentences for Indigenous
offenders convicted of manslaughter, given the gravity the offence, such outcomes were always
unlikely. What does emerge from this research is a sense that some judges are attempting to
approach the sentencing of offenders differently and that this different approach will more often
impact the final sentence quantum than instances in which a traditional sentencing methodology
is used. In the end, lower sentences for Indigenous offenders may be the best outcome that can be
expected for the application of the Gladue provisions to an offence like manslaughter.

2. Summary of Findings
The perpetrators of manslaughter examined for this study were broadly similar to one
another whether Indigenous or non-Indigenous. Most offenders were relatively young men with
prior criminal records who were charged with the murder of someone they knew personally, the
majority of whom subsequently pleaded guilty to manslaughter. Despite these similarities,
Indigenous and non-Indigenous offenders differed in one important respect. On average,
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Indigenous offenders received sentences for manslaughter that were some six months shorter than
those handed down to non-Indigenous offenders.
This simple difference in sentence outcome, when examined closely, suggests a much more
substantial divide between the two groups. The difference in overall sentence does not account for
the fact that the majority of each group of offenders found themselves convicted of different
categories of manslaughter. The majority of non-Indigenous offenders were convicted of
manslaughter fitting the near murder category. They represented some 72% of offenders in that
category and 72% of non-Indigenous offenders overall. The majority of Indigenous offenders were
convicted of drug and alcohol manslaughters, representing 83% of offenders in that category and
more half of Indigenous offenders overall.
It was the shorter average sentences for drug and alcohol manslaughters that accounted for
the overall lower sentences received by Indigenous offenders when compared with non-Indigenous
ones. Within the drug and alcohol category, Indigenous offenders received sentences that were an
average of five months lower than non-Indigenous offenders. This was despite the greater
incidence of criminal records and records with violence for Indigenous offenders in that category.
For Indigenous offenders who were convicted of near murder manslaughters by contrast, the
average sentence was 20 months longer than those for non-Indigenous offenders. This was true
despite no appreciable difference in criminal records or records with violence between the two
groups and the increased instances of Indigenous offenders pleading guilty. Taken as an average
of all manslaughter offenders sentenced during the period 2013-2018, Indigenous offenders
received lower sentences. However, this conceals the fact that Indigenous offenders were most
likely to be sentenced in a category of manslaughter that generally resulted in lower average
sentences. While Indigenous offenders also received somewhat lower sentences on average than
non-Indigenous offenders within the drug and alcohol category, they received longer sentences in
the other categories. Therefore, the lower sentences for Indigenous offenders overall were almost
entirely the result of the category of manslaughter in which most were convicted and the treatment
that those offenders and that particular subset of manslaughter received from trial judges. Those
Indigenous offenders who were not in that category were treated more severely by the sentencing
courts than similarly-situated non-Indigenous offenders.
The conclusion drawn from these apparent contradictions is that sentencing judges could
more readily connect Indigenous offending to the Gladue provisions where the circumstances of
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the offence were aligned with the prevailing stereotypes about Indigenous people, substance abuse
and criminality. The circumstances of the offence in the drug and alcohol category dovetailed with
the view of violent Indigenous offending as indelibly linked with alcohol abuse. The circumstances
of the offence arising in near murder manslaughters by contrast, were not aligned with those views
and so Indigenous offenders were not able to avail themselves of the benefits of the Gladue
provisions as frequently in that category. The courts could more readily understand the
applicability of the provisions where the circumstances of the offence could be connected with
substance abuse.
The differential treatment of manslaughters involving drugs and alcohol continued when
comparing Indigenous offenders convicted in different categories of manslaughter to one another.
Gladue Reports were more prevalent among drug and alcohol cases than near murder cases,
appearing in nearly 40% of the former compared with less than 30% of the latter. The difference
between these two categories was also apparent in the application of the Gladue provisions to
sentencing both with respect to the methodologies employed to sentence Indigenous offenders and
to the impact of the provisions on sentence outcome. This research identified two distinct types of
different methodologies employed in sentencing Indigenous offenders. These were the first
principles’ methodology, involving the sentencing of an Indigenous offender in a manner
concerned principally with their Indigenous heritage rather than the traditional purposes and
principles of sentencing, and the Indigenous comparator case methodology, which involved
sentencing Indigenous offenders with reference primarily to cases involving similarly-situated
Indigenous offenders.
Of the 80 Indigenous offenders in this study, 24 were sentenced according to a different
methodology. Eight of these were sentenced according to the first principles’ methodology, all of
which were drug and alcohol killings. Sixteen were sentenced following the Indigenous
comparator cases methodology, of which 11 were drug and alcohol offenders. Only 15% of
Indigenous offenders in the near murder category were sentenced according to a different
methodology compared with over 40% of offenders in the drug and alcohol category. Drug and
alcohol cases represented almost four in five of those sentenced according to a different
methodology, while accounting for slightly more than half of all Indigenous offenders in total.
Within the categories of different methodologies, the first principles’ methodology was entirely
composed of drug and alcohol killings as were 70% of the Indigenous comparator cases. Once a
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case was sentenced according to one of the two different methodologies, the likelihood that the
Gladue provisions would impact on the final sentence outcome increased relative to the traditional
methodology.
When considering the impact on sentence outcome attributable to the Gladue provisions,
the drug and alcohol cases were once again more likely to be given a favourable treatment. In drug
and alcohol manslaughters overall, greater than half of offenders saw the Gladue provisions impact
on the final sentence outcome. For offenders in the near murder category Gladue’s impact on
sentence was only seen in a third of cases. Sentencing judges were more likely to see both how a
different methodology could be employed and that an impact on sentence would be appropriate
for Indigenous offenders convicted in the drug and alcohol category than the near murder category.
It appeared that where judges were able to connect the circumstances of the offence to
cultural preconceptions surrounding Indigenous substance abuse and criminality they could more
readily see their way both to utilizing a different methodology in sentencing those offenders and
in having the Gladue provisions impact upon the final sentence outcome. The circumstances of
the offence weighed heavily in judicial consideration of the application of Gladue despite the
similarities in lived experience between those offenders in the drug and alcohol and near murder
categories. The influence of alcohol on the commission of serious and violent offences perpetrated
by Indigenous offenders facilitated the application of Gladue at all stages from the preparation of
Gladue Reports to the choice of methodology in sentencing and finally to whether or not the
provisions would ultimately impact upon sentence.
If there are real innovative solutions to the problem of Gladue and the sentencing of
offenders for serious and violent crimes they appear to have escaped the courts as much as they
have the author of this paper. This does not mean that Gladue has no role to play in sentencing
offenders for serious and violent crimes. Evidence drawn from this research suggests that in
manslaughter sentencing, some judges are finding a way to connect the Gladue provisions to the
sentencing of offenders for serious and violent crime and allowing them to impact on sentence. If
different methodologies can develop more fully in the trial courts and receive endorsement from
the courts of appeal then it is possible that solutions may develop in the future. Such innovations
in sentencing practice will need to be coupled with additional resources at every stage of the
process from the provision of Gladue Reports to the programming available in the prison system
to supports provided to offenders once they have been released. Each of these areas requires more
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effort and greater resources to ensure that the application of Gladue to the sentencing of offenders
for serious and violent crimes can manifest as more than just a reduction in sentence in those cases
where the courts deem this appropriate. Long-term solutions to the overincarceration of Indigenous
offenders cannot simply proceed on a case-by-case basis.

3. Counsel
The Crown has a critical role to play in ensuring that the Gladue provisions are applied to
Indigenous offenders sentenced for serious and violent crime. This role begins at the policy level
with the provincial attorneys general and federal and provincial directors of public prosecutions.
At present, among the PPSC and the provincial Crowns surveyed for this research, only Ontario
had a substantive practice directive dealing with the prosecution of Indigenous peoples. However,
Ontario’s direction remains light on details and does not address itself to sentencing. It is
incumbent on those organizations that prosecute Indigenous offenders in Canada to begin the
consideration of the Gladue provisions before the formal sentencing process has begun. This
should begin with clear policy directions that govern the sentencing of Indigenous offenders and
provide frontline Crown counsel with clear guidelines to ensure their operation. It is insufficient
for the Crown to rely on judges to find an appropriate sentence that takes into account an
Indigenous offender’s heritage. Their sentencing submissions should be tailored to reflect that as
well.
Equipped with guidelines from senior management, Crown counsel can approach the
sentencing of Indigenous offenders differently. At sentencing itself, Crown counsel’s
responsibilities should be two-fold. First, they should exercise restraint in making sentencing
submissions for Indigenous offenders. Rather than approaching Indigenous offenders in an
undifferentiated manner from non-Indigenous ones, the Crown should request sentences that take
into account the remedial intentions of the Gladue provisions. Where it is appropriate to ask for a
lower sentence than might otherwise be submitted were the offender not Indigenous, the Crown
should make efforts to do so. This is not innovative, this is already the practice where offenders
suffer from a mental illness. This is not to suggest that the Gladue considerations are akin to mental
illness but it does reflect the reduced moral blameworthiness that the effects of colonialism and
cultural and familial dislocation have had on many Indigenous offenders.
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Second, the Crown should attempt wherever possible to utilize cases involving Indigenous
offenders. In their submissions, the Crown effectively sets the upper end of the sentencing range
for consideration by the judge. Evidence from this research suggests that sentence ranges proposed
by the Crown for manslaughter in cases involving Indigenous offenders do not tend to differ
considerably from those proposed by the Crown for non-Indigenous offenders except in the drug
and alcohol category. The leading cases on manslaughter in most jurisdictions deal with nonIndigenous offenders and these set the standard for sentencing submissions. Crown counsel should
make efforts to submit cases to the court that involve the sentencing of Indigenous offenders
wherever possible and temper their proposed sentence ranges. This is a crucial step in creating an
Indigenous-specific sentencing jurisprudence for use by the trial courts.
Crown counsel can also endeavour to take into account the Indigenous heritage of
offenders in plea negotiations. Evidence suggests that Indigenous offenders are more likely to
plead guilty than non-Indigenous ones. This affords an opportunity for the application of the
Gladue provisions by Crown and defence counsel. Crown counsel can negotiate sentences that
take into account the remedial aims of the Gladue provisions where there has been a guilty plea.
There is no requirement that such considerations be taken into account in the process but given the
degree of deference afforded to joint submissions by trial judges, this is fertile ground for the
application of Gladue to sentence. In this way, the Crown can aid in ensuring that Parliament’s
directive to reduce the overincarceration of Indigenous peoples is carried out.
Defence counsel are restrained to a certain degree by the actions of the Crown. If the Crown
is proposing a lengthy penitentiary term for an offender, defence counsel may feel bound to
propose a sentence that is closer to that proposed by the Crown in order for their proposal to appear
more reasonable. Defence counsel and the Crown should make efforts to propose cases for
consideration that involve other Indigenous offenders. If the defence concentrates on tying the
lower sentences they propose to the Indigenous heritage of the offenders, they can advance the
creation of Indigenous-specific bodies of jurisprudence for manslaughter and other serious and
violent crimes in their jurisdictions.
Unfortunately, there is no shortage of cases involving Indigenous offenders sentenced for
manslaughter and other serious and violent crimes in virtually all jurisdictions in Canada. Both
Crown and defence counsel have access to wide bodies of cases dealing with Indigenous offenders
many of whom are likely to have lived lives substantially similar to the offender being sentenced.
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Both in submissions before the court and in plea negotiations, counsel on both sides can make
efforts to ensure that an Indigenous-focused jurisprudence begins to emerge. After all, it is most
often counsel that supplies the cases upon which the judge will ultimately base their determination
of sentence.

4. Trial Courts
The judiciary represents the indispensable avenue for ensuring that the Gladue provisions
are applied in practice. At the end of the day, the Supreme Court has directed judges to ensure that
the provisions are applied. As suggested above, counsel on both sides should make efforts to
propose sentences that reflect the Indigenous heritage of an offender and to focus on comparator
cases dealing with other Indigenous offenders. Even without those tools, judges can be more
mindful of an offender’s Indigenous status. Trial judges should avoid reflexively resorting to the
notion that the offender and offence before them are precisely the sort to which the Supreme Court
referred when it remarked that some Indigenous offenders will receive sentences that are closer to
or the same as non-Indigenous offenders. Most judges have moved beyond this idea but some
continue to resort to it, perhaps as much from frustration caused by a lack of real alternatives as an
opposition to what might be seen as discounted sentencing.
Likewise, judges should not feel bound by the submissions of counsel. The determination
of a just sanction for the offender and offence before the court is the prerogative of the presiding
justice. Submissions of counsel serve to guide the judge in their determination but judges are
ultimately free to impose the sentence they determine to be appropriate. For a judge to suggest
that, but for the submissions of counsel, they would impose a more lenient sentence on an offender
is, with respect, a pretext. Where a sentencing judge believes that the submissions of counsel do
not reflect the appropriate sentence for the offence, they should make that clear. The judge may
decide on the appropriate sentence themselves or they may call upon counsel to provide additional
cases. Such a scenario could afford an opportunity for a sentencing judge to suggest to counsel
that they provide the court with cases dealing with other Indigenous offenders so they can craft a
sentence that properly accounts for this.
As this research has indicated, the impact of Gladue upon sentence will not necessarily be
a reduction in length. Some judges have pointed to the supports available in prison as the best
means of ensuring that offenders are given the tools necessary to avoid reoffending. More often
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than not, it was suggested by the courts that those resources are to be found in the federal
correctional system as opposed to the provincial or territorial ones. Even if no satisfactory
approach impacting upon sentence outcome can be found, trial judges can nonetheless attempt to
approach the sentencing of Indigenous offenders using a different methodology. This paper has
suggested that there were two distinct variations of a different methodology that were used by trial
courts in Canada. While the first principles’ approach may not be appropriate for all offenders to
whom the provisions have been found to apply, the use of Indigenous comparator cases frequently
will be. Trial judges should encourage counsel to provide them with cases that speak to the
Indigenous heritage of the offender in order to make their determination on sentence. The more
frequently that the trial courts use such cases, the more frequently they will make their way before
the courts of appeal.

5. Courts of Appeal
Most jurisdictions examined in this study had some ranges established for manslaughter by
their courts of appeal. However, British Columbia was alone in having an established range for
Indigenous offenders convicted for manslaughter, specifically younger Indigenous offenders.1
Appeal courts should concentrate on developing a body of jurisprudence that deals with Indigenous
offenders and work to establish sentencing ranges that reflect a body of Indigenous comparator
cases. Courts of appeal have shown a willingness to establish sentencing ranges that take into
account aggravating factors in manslaughter, such as spousal violence, they should also entertain
a willingness to take into account the Gladue factors in determining appropriate ranges for
Indigenous offenders. Developing such a jurisprudence would serve to guide trial courts in their
attempts to identify appropriate sentencing considerations for those Indigenous offenders that
come before them. These ranges may be substantially similar to or the same as those employed to
sentence non-Indigenous offenders but they could be crafted in such a way that they take into
account the unique circumstances that so frequently affect Indigenous offenders that come before
the courts.
Given the striking similarities between offences and offenders that are frequently found in
manslaughter cases involving Indigenous offenders, developing an Indigenous-specific
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jurisprudence would not prove an insurmountable obstacle for appeal courts. There remains a
concern, as there has always been with the Gladue provisions, that such a practice runs the risk of
creating controversy with the public. Despite these concerns, there is a solid legal foundation for
doing so in the decisions of the Supreme Court. The directive of the Court in Wells to sentence
Indigenous offenders according to a different methodology would allow the development of bodies
of case law dealing with Indigenous offenders in particular categories of crime. Even if the courts
of appeal and the trial courts manage to produce such a body of cases, the resources available to
sentencing judges remain limited.

6. Governments
On paper the federal correctional system has made strides to establish programs in
penitentiaries designed to aid Indigenous offenders with their healing and rehabilitation. However,
the Correctional Service of Canada itself admits that these programs are chronically underfunded
and understaffed. As noted in chapter two, the elders program of Corrections Canada has trouble
maintaining staffing levels and healing lodges are few and far between. The correctional system
requires more resources to ensure that those programs that have been established to aid Indigenous
offenders are more widely available and receive adequate funding and resources.
The same will be necessary within the provincial and territorial correctional systems. This
research dealt with some cases in which the judge handed down a sentence that lay on the federal
side of the two-year divide because the resources geared toward Indigenous offenders, limited
though they are, were at least present in the federal correctional system in a way they are not in
many provinces. Provincial correctional institutions should take measures to provide Indigenousspecific programming wherever possible in order to allow judges to send Indigenous offenders to
those institutions with the knowledge that they will have the option of participating in culturallyrelevant programming.
Both levels of government will need to make increased funding available in order to
provide programming that is suitable for Indigenous prisoners and to further fund institutions like
healing lodges to give sentencing judges more options in crafting sentences geared towards the
Indigenous heritage of offenders. Along with increased funding, both levels of government will
need to build relationships and provide resources to Indigenous communities, rural and urban, to
ensure that the provision of services continues after Indigenous offenders are released. It was
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vanishingly rare in the decisions examined for this paper to find judicial reference to particular
programs and services available to offenders upon release. One reason for this is the limited nature
of these programs, an issue exacerbated by the underfunding of the Department of Justice
Aboriginal Justice Strategy. Where such programs exist, they are not provided sufficient funding
to offer comprehensive programming and the uncertainty of funding limits the ability of those
organizations to plan for the future and to build their capacities.

7. Conclusions
Without investing money in the correctional system and post-release support infrastructure,
reduced sentences arising from the impact of Gladue will only serve to limit the time an Indigenous
offender serves in prison for the crime for which they were sentenced. It will not necessarily
provide that offender with the tools they require to prevent them from falling back into the patterns
of behaviour that landed them before the courts in the first place. The Gladue provisions were
never meant to serve as a panacea for the crisis of overrepresentation in the prison system. Despite
this, the provisions continue to be asked to do much of the heavy lifting in this respect and receive
considerable criticism for their failure to alleviate the crisis.
Each stage of the sentencing process requires that greater efforts be made by the actors
involved from Crown and defence counsel, to trial judges and the courts of appeal, to the
correctional system itself. Such efforts should be geared first towards the development of
Indigenous-specific sentencing methodologies for offenders. By treating Indigenous offenders in
the same manner as non-Indigenous offenders, the Gladue provisions risk becoming at best another
mitigating factor to be considered when determining sentence. Developing distinctive sentencing
methodologies for Indigenous offenders is not a guarantee that previously unimagined approaches
to sentencing will arise, however, it does provide a first step in the process of changing how the
criminal justice system treats Indigenous offenders. If courts can begin to view Indigenous
offenders as a distinct category requiring distinct approaches, it is possible that the jurisprudence
can begin to develop more fruitfully. Without a concerted effort to do so, we continue to risk
having the provisions founder.
In order to allow the Gladue provisions to have an effect on as many offenders as possible,
it is essential that trial judges see their way to applying them more broadly, both with respect to
methodology and to sentence impact. If the Gladue provisions are understood as applying only to
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those offenders whose crimes are seen to fit the model of an Indigenous offence, that is one defined
by the abuse of alcohol, then there is little hope that they will fulfill the remedial mandate
envisioned by Parliament. The courts must recognize that most Indigenous people who come
before the criminal courts in Canada have been affected to one degree or another by the Gladue
factors. The experiences of colonialism, residential schools and the intergenerational trauma
produced by both serve to mark the lives of a great many Indigenous people in this country. Where
the sentencing of offenders for serious and violent crime is concerned, the circumstances of the
offence cannot weigh too heavily in the calculus of Gladue application to the exclusion of those
of the offender. The provisions exist to govern the sentencing of Indigenous offenders, not merely
those Indigenous offenders who have acted under the influence of alcohol.
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